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I. INTRODUCTION
The Rehnquist Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence has limited
Congress's power to create a damages remedy for private plaintiffs to sue
state governments for violations of federal statutes.' The Court has also
raised the bar for private plaintiffs who want to utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to
2
obtain a damages remedy against state officers who violate federal statutes.
In contrast, the Court's recent decision in Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public
Service Commission of Maryland' unanimously affirmed the continued vitality
of Ex parte Young,4 which authorizes suits for prospective injunctive relief
against state officers who violate federal statutes. Thus, Verizon might
foreshadow the development of a significant nationalist reaction to the
Rehnquist Court's federalism revolution 5
The Court's decision in Verizon also exposes a crucial fault line between
nationalist and federalist strands of Supreme Court jurisprudence. On the
nationalist side of the fault line is a set of cases that I will call "Shaw
preemption cases." 6 These are cases in which private plaintiffs sue state
officers to enjoin enforcement of state laws that are allegedly preempted by
federal statutes. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council is one example. 7 The
plaintiffs in Crosby sued to enjoin enforcement of a Massachusetts law
barring state procurement from companies that did business with Burma.
1. See Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62
(2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
2. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 282 (2002) (requiring "an unambiguously
conferred right to support a cause of action brought under § 1983").
3. 535 U.S. 635 (2002). To date, the Court's decision in Verizon has sparked little
commentary. There are a few law review articles that mention Verizon briefly, but do not offer
detailed analysis. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Supreme Court Review, 51 U. KAN. L. REv. 269, 282
(2003); Michael T. Gibson, Congressional Authority to Induce Waivers of State Sovereign Immunity:
The Conditional Spending Power (and Beyond), 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 439, 500 (2002); DanielJ.
Meltzer, The Supreme Court's Judicial Passivity, 2002 Sup. CT. REv. 343, 373-74; Catherine T.
Struve, Turf Struggles: Land, Sovereignty, and Sovereign Immunity, 37 NEw ENG. L. REv. 571, 577
n.31 (2003). One recent student note does provide more in-depth analysis. Michelle Reed,
Note, "Arising Under" Jurisdiction in the Federalism Renaissance: Verizon Maryland Inc. v. Public
Service Commission of Maryland, 2002 BYU L. REv. 717.
4. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
5. Other recent decisions also suggest that the pendulum may be swinging back in a
nationalist direction. See, e.g., Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003)
(holding that the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, which creates a private right of action
for damages against state governments, was a valid exercise of Congress's Fourteenth
Amendment power to abrogate state sovereign immunity).
6. The label is derived from the Supreme Court's decision in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
463 U.S. 85 (1983). Shaw established an important jurisdictional principle that gives the federal
courts subject matter jurisdiction over a large class of federal preemption claims. See id. at 96
n.14; see also infra notes 125-45 and accompanying text.
7. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
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The plaintiffs alleged that a federal statute governing international trade
with Burma preempted the state law." The federal Burma statute did not
create a private right of action and was probably not enforceable under §
1983." Even so, the Court in Crosby granted plaintiffs injunctive relief without
questioning whether the plaintiffs had a valid federal cause of action.'0
Crosby is typical of Shaw preemption cases. In Shaw preemption cases, the
Court tacitly assumes that the Supremacy Clause creates an implied private
right of action for plaintiffs who sue state officers to enjoin enforcement of
state laws that are allegedly preempted by federal statutes.11
On the federalist side of the fault line is a set of cases that I will call
"Shaw violation cases." These are cases in which private plaintiffs sue state
officers to enjoin state executive action that allegedly violates a federal
statute. Alexander v. Sandoval is a recent example of a Shaw violation case.
12
The plaintiffs in Sandoval sued to enjoin enforcement of the Alabama
Department of Public Safety's official policy of administering drivers' license
tests only in English. They alleged that the policy violated the disparate
impact regulations promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.13 The Court declined to reach the merits of the plaintiffs' claim,
holding that neither Title VI nor its implementing regulations provided the
plaintiffs a private right of action.14 Sandoval is typical of Shaw violation cases.
In Shaw violation cases, the Court does not address the merits of plaintiffs
claim unless the plaintiff can establish an express statutory private right of
action, either under the federal statute that creates the substantive right, or
under § 1983.15
The juxtaposition of Crosby and Sandoval shows that the Supreme Court
applies two very different private right of action doctrines in cases where
plaintiffs sue to enjoin state action that allegedly conflicts with a federal
statute. In cases where plaintiffs sue to enjoin enforcement of a state law that
8. See id. at 366-71.
9. See infra notes 230-46 and accompanying text for a detailed defense of these
propositions.
10. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 388. The term "cause of action" has different meanings in different
contexts. See, e.g., LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 219 n.120 (2d ed. 2003) (stating that the
phrases "private right of action" and "private cause of action" are used interchangeably). This
Article uses the terms "private right of action" and "private cause of action" interchangeably. As
used in this Article, both terms refer to a remedial right, not a primary right.
11. Several lower federal courts have held explicitly that the Supremacy Clause creates an
implied private right of action for injunctive relief against state officers to prevent enforcement
of state laws that are preempted by federal statutes. See infra note 192. The Supreme Court has
never explicitly held that such a right of action exists. However, the thesis that there is an
implied right of action under the Supremacy Clause provides the best explanation for the
Court's decisions in Shaw preemption cases. See infra Part IV.
12. 532 U.S. 275, 275-79 (2001).
13. Id. at 278.
14. Id. at 292-93.
15. See infra notes 58-76 and accompanying text.
[2004]
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is allegedly preempted by a federal statute ("Shaw preemption cases"), the
Court tacitly assumes that the plaintiffs have an implied right of action
under the Supremacy Clause. 16 But in cases where plaintiffs sue to enjoin
state executive action that allegedly violates a federal statute ("Shaw violation
cases"), the Court will not address the merits of the claim unless plaintiffs
can establish an express statutory cause of action. Under this approach, if
Alabama codified its drivers' license policy as a law, the Sandoval plaintiffs
would have had an implied right of action under the Supremacy Clause.
Conversely, the Massachusetts governor could adopt a policy that would be
functionally equivalent to the law invalidated in Crosby, but that policy would
be immune from federal judicial review because the federal Burma statute
does not create a private right of action. Thus, the current doctrinal
categories create perverse incentives for states to de-codify laws.
Verizon is situated on the fault line between Shaw preemption claims and
Shaw violation claims. In Verizon, the plaintiff sued to enjoin enforcement of
an adjudicative order issued by a state administrative agency that allegedly
violated the Telecommunications Act of 1996.7 Verizon is a "Shaw case"
because the plaintiff sued state officers18 to enjoin state action that allegedly
conflicted with a federal statute. But Verizon does not fit neatly into either
the "violation" or "preemption" category because the administrative order at
issue was neither legislative nor executive in character.
The Verizon defendants argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction,
in part because the plaintiff did not have a private cause of action under the
Telecommunications Act.19 The district court granted defendant's motion to
dismiss and declined to reach the merits of plaintiff s claim.2 0 The Fourth
Circuit affirmed, implicitly placing the case on the "violation" side of the
fault line by refusing to reach the merits of the claim." However, the
Supreme Court reversed, citing Shaw (the progenitor of the Shaw
preemption line) in support of the proposition that the district court did
have subject matter jurisdiction and should have reached the merits of
plaintiff's claim.22 Thus, unlike the lower courts, the Supreme Court
behaved as if Verizon fell on the preemption side of the fault line.
16. An alternative explanation is that the Court tacitly assumes that the Declaratory
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (2000), creates a private right of action for Shaw
preemption claims. Either way, the Court behaves as if there is a generally available private right
of action for Shaw preemption claims that does not depend upon either 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or the
preemptive federal statute. See infra Part IV. For discussion of the Declaratory Judgment Act,
and its relation to Shaw preemption claims, see infra notes 310-36 and accompanying text.
17. Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 638-41 (2002).
18. The defendants in Verizon included the Maryland Public Service Commission and "its
individual members in their official capacities." Id. at 640.
19. Id. at 641-44.
20. See Bell Ad. Md. v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279, 286-87 (4th Cir. 2001).
21. Id. at 309.
22. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 641-44.
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Shaw held that federal courts have jurisdiction over suits to enjoin
enforcement of state laws that are preempted by federal statutes. Verion
extended Shaw's jurisdictional principle to claims in which plaintiffs sue to
enjoin enforcement of state administrative orders that allegedly violate
federal statutes. However, the Court in Verizon did not decide whether the
plaintiffs had an implied right of action under the Supremacy Clause. Even
so, Verizon lends some support to the theory that the Supremacy Clause
creates a private right of action for Shaw claims because the Court indicated
that the district court should have addressed the merits of plaintiffs claim,
regardless of whether the plaintiff had a valid cause of action under the
Telecommunications Act.
2 4
The Supreme Court has never explicitly decided whether plaintiffs in
Shaw preemption cases have an implied right of action under the Supremacy
Clause. But the Court cannot continue to duck this issue. Broadly speaking,
the Court has three options. First, the Court could hold explicitly that
plaintiffs in Shaw preemption cases have an implied right of action under
the Supremacy Clause, but limit that right of action to claims challenging
state legislative action. As Verizon illustrates, this option is problematic
because there is a broad range of state administrative action that does not fit
neatly into either the legislative or executive category. Moreover, as noted
above, this option creates perverse incentives for states to de-codify laws.
Second, the Court could decide that the Supremacy Clause does not
create an implied private right of action for Shaw preemption claims. As a
formal matter, this would not overrule Shaw because Shaw and its progeny
have held only that federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over Shaw
preemption claims. As a practical matter, though, the repudiation of a
Supremacy Clause right of action would vitiate Shaw's jurisdictional holding
because-absent a Supremacy Clause right of action-most Shaw
preemption plaintiffs would not have any valid federal cause of action, and
would therefore be forced to litigate their claims in state court. 25 Thus,
under this option, a large class of federal preemption claims that are
currently litigated in federal court would be relegated to state court.
26
Third, the Court could hold that the Supremacy Clause creates an
implied private right of action not only for Shaw preemption claims, but also
for Shaw violation claims. The Court took a large step in this direction in
23. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n. 14 (1983).
24. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 641-44.
25. See infta Part IV. This statement assumes that a Supreme Court decision to reject a
Supremacy Clause right of action would also entail rejection of a right of action under the
Declaratory Judgment Act. For discussion of the Declaratory Judgment Act and its relation to
Shaw preemption claims, see infra notes 310-36 and accompanying text.
26. The Supreme Court has decided more than twenty Shaw preemption cases over the
past twenty years. See infra note 141. It is fair to assume that the lower federal courts have
adjudicated many times that number of Shaw preemption cases during the same time period.
[2004]
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Verizon by extending Shaw's jurisdictional principle to a claim challenging an
adjudicative order issued by a state administrative agency. If Shaw's
jurisdictional principle encompasses suits to enjoin state administrative
orders that violate federal statutes, that same jurisdictional principle should
arguably encompass suits to enjoin state executive policies that violate
federal statutes (i.e., Shaw violation claims). Moreover, if the Supremacy
Clause creates an implied right of action for claims within the scope of
Shaw's jurisdictional principle (as the Court has tacitly assumed in its Shaw
preemption cases), and that jurisdictional principle encompasses Shaw
violation claims, then it follows that the Supremacy Clause right of action
also extends to Shaw violation claims.
Extension of the Shaw right of action to Shaw violation claims, such as
Sandoval, would provide a significant nationalist counterweight to the recent
federalist thrust of Supreme Court jurisprudence. In particular, it would
empower civil rights plaintiffs to bring claims for injunctive relief against
state officers who violate federal statutes, without having to rely on § 1983 or
other civil rights statutes to establish a private right of action. This possibility
assumes added significance in light of the Court's recent decision in Gonzaga
University v. Doe,27 which limits the availability of § 1983 as a mechanism for
private plaintiffs to obtain judicial remedies against state officers for federal
statutory violations.
This Article has three main objectives. First, the Article documents the
fact that the Supreme Court actually employs two very different private right
of action doctrines in Shaw cases. For Shaw violation claims, the Court insists
upon a statutory cause of action that establishes the plaintiffs' right to bring
suit in federal court. But for Shaw preemption claims, the Court tacitly
assumes the availability of an implied right of action under the Supremacy
Clause. Federal courts scholars have generally overlooked the significance of
28the Shaw preemption line of cases. Shaw is cited frequently in articles on
• 29
ERISA preemption, and occasionally in articles on general preemption
doctrine,30 but those articles do not discuss the source of the private right of
27. 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
28. But see Meltzer, supra note 3, at 373-74. Meltzer writes:
[A]t the same time that the Court has declared its unwillingness to recognize
implied rights of action (typically in actions by one private party against another),
it has consistently recognized a particular kind of implied right of action-that
asserted by plaintiffs (often businesses) seeking a federal court injunction against
officials charged with enforcing state or local laws to which the plaintiff is subject
and which the plaintiff alleges to be preempted.
Id.
29. The following electronic search of law review articles yielded 292 hits: (Shaw /3 "Delta
Airlines") & ERISA & preemption. [Westlaw search inJLR file. Date unknown.]
30. See, e.g., BetsyJ. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of State Tort Remedies,
77 B.U. L. REv. 559, 566 (1997); Ronald J. Mann, Federal Jurisdiction Over Preemption Claims: A
Post-Franchise Tax Board Analysis, 62 TEX. L. REv. 893, 904-05 (1984) (discussing Shaw in the
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action for Shaw preemption claims. Most federal courts casebooks and
treatises either omit Shaw entirely31 or give it abbreviated treatment. Apart
from a previous article by this author,33 currently there are only six law
review articles that cite Shaw in the context of a discussion of private rights
of action.34 This is the first article to present a detailed analysis of the Shaw
line of cases.
Second, the Article evaluates the policy arguments for and against
recognition of an implied right of action under the Supremacy Clause for
Shaw preemption claims. There are weighty arguments on both sides, but I
conclude that the Court should explicitly hold that there is an implied right
of action under the Supremacy Clause for Shaw preemption claims.35 By
focusing on a constitutional right of action to enforce statutory law, this Article
fills a gap in the current literature. Legal scholars have written extensively
about constitutionally based private rights of action to enforce federal
context of an analysis of federal jurisdiction over preemption claims); Susan J. Stabile,
Preemption of State Law by Federal Law: A Task for Congress or For the Courts?, 40 VILL. L. REV. 1, 54
(1995).
31. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION (4th ed. 2003) (no reference
to Shaw); PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-
STATE RELATIONS (4th ed. 1998) (same); MARTIN H. REDISH c SUZANNA SHERRY, FEDERAL
COURTS: CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS (5th ed. 2002) (same).
32. See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & JOHN B. OAKLEY, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 248 n.8 (10th ed. 1999) (quoting Shaw in a footnote); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 18, at 115 n.28 (6th ed. 2002) (citing Shaw in a
footnote). But see RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 787, 901-04 (5th ed. 2003) (devoting a few pages to Shaw); 13B CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3566, at 99-103 (1984) (devoting
several pages to Shaw).
33. See David Sloss, Ex parte Young and Federal Remedies for Human Rights Treaty Violations,
75 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1177-83 (2000).
34. See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 39 n.182 (citing Shaw in support of proposition that "[t]here is a long tradition of
judicial provision of specific relief.., against government action that violates statutory
requirements-even when the statute in question fails expressly to authorize such relief");
Meltzer, supra note 3, at 373-74; Henry P. Monaghan, Federal Statutory Review Under Section 1983
and the APA, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 233, 238-40 (1991) [hereinafter Monaghan, Federal Statutory
Review] (criticizing Shaw); Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity Exception, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 102, 131 n.202 (1996) (hereinafter Monaghan, Sovereign Immunity Exception] (same); EricJ.
Segall, Twenty Questions (Or the Hardest Course in Law School), 18 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 497, 502 n.31
(2001) (citing Shaw in a footnote); Carlos M. Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of
Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1149 n.286 (1992) (citing Shaw in support of proposition
that "a plaintiff seeking a declaration that agency action violates federal law need not show
more than a primary right under federal law and the availability of a remedy under the
Declaratory Judgment Act").
35. That right of action is constitutionally presumed, not constitutionally compelled,
because Congress should be able to bar the remedy for a particular statute by expressing its
intent to do so. On the distinction between constitutionally compelled remedies and
constitutionally presumed remedies, see Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional
Remedies, 86 GEO. LJ. 2537, 2559-65 (1998).
[2004]
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constitutional rights,36 and about statutorily based implied rights of action to
enforce federal statutory rights.37 However, scholars have written very little
about constitutionally based implied rights of action to support private
enforcement of federal statutory rights.
38
Third, the Article criticizes the differential treatment of Shaw
preemption claims and Shaw violation claims. The current doctrinal
framework is inconsistent with the principle of legislative primacy because it
has the perverse effect of insulating state executive policies from federal
judicial review, even in cases where the policy at issue is functionally
equivalent to a law that would be subject to federal judicial review. There is
simply no rational basis for presuming a constitutional right of action under
the Supremacy Clause for Shaw preemption claims, while insisting on a
statutory right of action for Shaw violation claims. Therefore, the implied
right of action for Shaw preemption claims, like Crosby, should be extended
to encompass Shaw violation claims, like SandovaL
The remainder of this Article is divided into five parts. Part II
documents the fact that the Supreme Court applies one private right of
action doctrine in Shaw preemption cases and a different private right of
action doctrine in Shaw violation cases. Part III discusses the doctrinal basis
for federal jurisdiction over Shaw claims. Part IV demonstrates that judicial
precedent supports an implied right of action under the Supremacy Clause
36. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV. 289 (1995); Michael G. Collins, "Economic Rights, "Implied Constitutional Actions, and the Scope
of Section 1983, 77 CEO. L.J. 1493 (1989); Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The
Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1972); Richard H. Fallon,Jr. & DanielJ. Meltzer,
New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1731 (1991); Henry M.
Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489 (1954); Alfred Hill,
Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1109 (1969);John C. Jeffries,Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap
in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE LJ. 87 (1999); Meltzer, supra note 35; Ann Woolhandler, The
Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77 (1997).
37. In the past fifteen years, there has been very little scholarship on the topic of implied
rights of action for federal statutes. But see Susan J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent in
Determining the Existence of Implied Private Rights of Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 861 (1996);
Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies: An Integrated Approach, 76 WASH. L. REV.
67 (2001). In the 1980s, though, the topic was the subject of extensive commentary. See Robert
H.A. Ashford, Implied Causes of Action Under Federal Laws: Calling the Court Back to Borak, 79 Nw.
U. L. REV. 227 (1984); H. Miles Foy, III, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and Implied
Private Actions in the State and Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 501 (1986); Tamar Frankel,
Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REV. 553 (1981); Thomas L. Hazen, Implied Private Remedies
Under Federal Statutes: Neither a Death Knell Nor a Moratorium-Civil Rights, Securities Regulation, and
Beyond, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1333 (1980); John E. Noyes, Implied Rights of Action and the Use and
Misuse of Precedent, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 145 (1987); Stephen E. Ronfeldt, Implying Rights of Action
for Minorities and the Poor Through Presumptions of Legislative Intent, 34 HASTINGS LJ. 969 (1983);
Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193
(1982).
38. But see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III,
101 HARv. L. REV. 915 (1988) (contending that Article III mandates a private right to appellate
review of decisions by federal administrative agencies adjudicating statutory claims).
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for Shaw preemption claims. 9 Part V presents a policy justification for that
implied right of action. Part VI contends that the Court should also
recognize an implied right of action under the Supremacy Clause for Shaw
violation claims.
II. Two PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION DOCTRINES
Between October 1996 and June 2003, the Supreme Court decided
40twenty cases in which: (1) private plaintiffs filed civil actions in federal
court,4' (2) against state officers or local governments or officers, (3)
seeking prospective declaratory and/or injunctive relief,42 (4) to remedy an
alleged violation of a federal statute, or to block enforcement of a state or
local law allegedly preempted by a federal statute. a This Article refers to
39. Since the Supreme Court has never commented on the source of the private right of
action for Shaw preemption claims, and the lower courts rarely discuss it, documentation of this
point requires extensive reliance on unpublished materials, including pleadings and other
documents filed in the lower courts in Shaw preemption cases. See infra Part IV.
40. Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. 1855 (2003); Ky. Ass'n of
Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 123 S. Ct. 1471 (2003); Branch v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 1429 (2003); City
of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424 (2002); Verizon Md., Inc. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635 (2002); Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535
U.S. 125 (2002); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); Alexander v. Sandoval,
532 U.S. 275 (2001); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000); Christensen v.
Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000); Olmstead v.
L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999); Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 (1999); Calderon v. Ashmus,
523 U.S. 740 (1998); Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67 (1997); Foreman v. Dallas County, 521 U.S. 979
(1997); De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806 (1997); Blessing v.
Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997); Young v. Fordice, 520 U.S. 273 (1997); Cal. Div. of Labor
Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N. Am., Inc., 519 U.S. 316 (1997).
41. This Article focuses primarily on the availability of an implied private right of action to
enforce federal statutes. Accordingly, the category of Shaw claims excludes suits brought by
Indian tribes, see, e.g., Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84 (2001), and suits brought
by or on behalf of the federal government, see, e.g., Idaho v. U.S., 533 U.S. 262 (2001), because
such cases do not implicate private right of action doctrines. Federal habeas cases are also
excluded from the category of Shaw cases, see, e.g., Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856 (2002),
because habeas petitions are not technically "civil actions," and the federal habeas statute
provides an express right of action, so the question of an implied right of action does not arise
in habeas cases. The category of "Shaw cases" also excludes cases filed in state court, see, e.g.,
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002), because they do not implicate federal jurisdictional
rules, and there is a close link between those jurisdictional rules and implied right of action
doctrines. See infra notes 109-24 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between
federal question jurisdiction and implied rights of action).
42. In cases involving suits against state officers in their official capacities, sovereign
immunity bars claims for money damages, but not claims for prospective injunctive relief. See
infra note 303. Hence, cases in which plaintiffs seek money damages are excluded from the
Shaw category, as are cases in which plaintiffs seek both injunctive relief and money damages.
43. The category of "Shaw cases" excludes cases in which plaintiffs raise only constitutional
claims, see, e.g., Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001), because this Article focuses on the
availability of an implied private right of action to enforce federal statutes. There are many
cases in which plaintiffs sue state or local governments or officers for violation of federal law
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cases that satisfy these criteria as "Shaw cases" because they fit within the
parameters identified and implied by the Supreme Court in Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc.4
A. PREEMPrIoN CASES AND VIOLATION CASES
As has been mentioned, Shaw cases can be divided into "preemption"
cases and "violation" cases. "Shaw violation cases" are cases in which plaintiffs
challenge state or local executive action. "Shaw preemption cases" are cases
in which plaintiffs challenge state or local legislative action. Cases in which
plaintiffs challenge state administrative regulations are also included in the
category of "Shaw preemption cases" because regulations are similar to laws
in that they prescribe general rules to regulate private conduct.
Between October 1996 andJune 2003, the Supreme Court decided nine
Shaw preemption cases-i.e., cases in which private plaintiffs filed civil
actions in federal court against state or local governments or officers,
seeking prospective declaratory and/or injunctive relief to block
enforcement of a state or local law or regulation allegedly preempted by a
federal statute. These nine cases are: Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America v. Walsh,4 ' Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v.
Miller,46 City of Columbus v. Ours Garage and Wrecker Service, Inc.,4 7 Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reiy, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Counci44 United States v.
that satisfy some, but not all, of the elements that define Shaw claims. Part II focuses on cases
that satisfy all four elements that define Shaw claims.
44. See 463 U.S. 85, 96 n.14 (1983). In Shaw, the court stated:
It is beyond dispute that federal courts have jurisdiction over suits to enjoin state
officials from interfering with federal rights. A plaintiff who seeks injunctive relief
from state regulation, on the ground that such regulation is pre-empted by a
federal statute which, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, must
prevail, thus presents a federal question which the federal courts have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve.
I& (citations omitted). Strictly speaking, Shaw addresses only preemption cases, not violation
cases. However, this Article contends that Shaw violation cases are, and should be seen to be,
jurisdictionally and procedurally indistinguishable from Shaw preemption cases.
45. 123 S. Ct. 1855 (2003) (pharmaceutical manufacturers' association sued
Commissioner of Maine's Department of Human Services to enjoin enforcement of state statute
allegedly preempted by federal Medicaid statute).
46. 123 S. Ct. 1471 (2003) (HMOs sued Commissioner of Kentucky's Department of
Insurance to enjoin enforcement of state statute allegedly preempted by the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)).
47. 536 U.S. 424 (2002) (Ohio corporation and trade association sued city and city
officials to enjoin enforcement of city ordinance allegedly preempted by the Interstate
Commerce Act).
48. 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (manufacturers and distributors of tobacco products sued
Massachusetts Attorney General to enjoin enforcement of state regulations allegedly preempted
by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act).
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Locke,5° Foster v. Love,5' De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Medical & Clinical Services
Fund,52 and California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham
Construction, North America, Inc.55 In all nine Shaw preemption cases, the
Supreme Court reached the merits of plaintiffs' claims without considering
whether the allegedly preemptive federal statute accorded plaintiffs a private
right of action.54
In most of the Shaw preemption cases, the allegedly preemptive federal
statute does not create a private cause of action.55 Moreover, although 42
U.S.C. § 1983 provides a private cause of action to enforce some federal
statutory rights against state and local government officers, 56  it is
questionable whether the plaintiffs in these Shaw preemption cases could
have brought suit under § 1983. 7 No matter. The Court consistently reaches
the merits in these cases without reference to § 1983, and without
49. 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (nonprofit corporation representing companies engaged in
foreign commerce sued state officials to enjoin enforcement of state statute allegedly
preempted by federal statute that imposed sanctions on Burma).
50. 529 U.S. 89 (2000) (association of oil tanker owners sued the Governor of Washington
to enjoin enforcement of state regulations allegedly preempted by the Tank Vessel Act of 1936,
the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990).
51. 522 U.S. 67 (1997) (Louisiana voters sued state officials to enjoin enforcement of state
statute allegedly preempted by federal election statutes).
52. 520 U.S. 806 (1997) (trustees of fund established to administer employee welfare
benefit plan sued state officials to enjoin enforcement of state statute allegedly preempted by
ERISA).
53. 519 U.S. 316 (1997) (contractor on public works project sued California state agencies
and officers for declaratory judgment that state statute was preempted by ERISA).
54. Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. 1855 (2003) (holding that
federal Medicaid statute does not preempt Maine Act to Establish Fairer Pricing for
Prescription Drugs); Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 123 S. Ct. 1471 (2003) (holding
that ERISA does not preempt "Any Willing Provider" provisions of Kentucky Health Care
Reform Act); City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424 (2002)
(holding that Interstate Commerce Act does not preempt city ordinance regulating the
operation of tow trucks within city limits); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001)
(holding that Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act preempts state regulations on
cigarette advertising); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (holding that
federal Burma statute preempts state statute barring state procurement from companies that do
business with Burma); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) (holding that various federal
statutes preempt state regulations concerning, inter alia, the design and operation of oil
tankers); Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67 (1997) (holding that federal election statute preempts
Louisiana's "open primary" statute); DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520
U.S. 806 (1997) (holding that ERISA does not preempt New York state tax on income of
medical centers); Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N. Am., Inc.,
519 U.S. 316 (1997) (holding that ERISA does not preempt California labor statute).
55. See infra Part IV.
56. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
57. See infra Part IV. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536
U.S. 273 (2002), further restricts the use of § 1983 to enforce federal statutes against state
officers, thereby making it even more difficult for private plaintiffs to utilize section 1983 to
pursue Shaw preemption claims.
[2004]
HeinOnline  -- 89 Iowa L. Rev. 366 2003-2004
CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES FOR STATUTORY VIOLATIONS 367
considering whether the allegedly preemptive federal statute accords
plaintiffs a private right of action. In short, the Court behaves as if there is
some other generally available right of action that enables plaintiffs to bring
Shaw preemption claims.
Between October 1996 and June 2003, the Supreme Court decided ten
Shaw violation cases-i.e., cases in which private plaintiffs filed civil actions
in federal court against state or local governments or officers, seeking
prospective declaratory and/or injunctive relief to enjoin state executive
action that allegedly violated a federal statute. These ten cases are: Branch v.
Smith5 8 Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker,59 Alexander v.
Sandova46° Christensen v. Harris County,61 Olmstead v. L.C.,62 Lopez v. Monterey
County,61 Calderon v. Ashmus,64 Foreman v. Dallas County,
65 Blessing v. Freestone,66
67
and Young v. Fordice.
Four of these ten Shaw violation cases were brought under section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act:68 Branch v. Smith, Lopez v. Monterey County, Foreman v.
Dallas County, and Young v. Fordice. Section 5 provides an express private
58. 123 S. Ct. 1429 (2003) (Mississippi voters sued state officers to enjoin conduct of
congressional elections pursuant to state redistricting plan that had not been precleared under
Voting Rights Act).
59. 535 U.S. 125 (2002) (public housing tenants sued Oakland Housing Authority to
enjoin enforcement of lease provision that allegedly violated federal housing statute).
60. 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (driver's license applicant brought class action against Alabama
state official and agency to enjoin enforcement of state policy that allegedly violated regulations
promulgated pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
61. 529 U.S. 576 (2000) (employees of county sheriff department brought class action
against county, seeking declaratory judgment that county policy violated Fair Labor Standards
Act).
62. 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (patients in state psychiatric hospital sued state officers, seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief, and alleging that Georgia's failure to place plaintiffs in
community-based treatment program violated the Americans with Disabilities Act).
63. 525 U.S. 266 (1999) and 519 U.S. 9 (1996) (Hispanic voters sued county for
declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that county's failure to obtain preclearance of local
ordinances violated section 5 of the Voting Rights Act).
64. 523 U.S. 740 (1998) (in response to announcements that state officials planned to
seek expedited review of federal habeas petitions under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act, death row prisoner filed class action against state officials, seeking declaratory
judgment that California did not qualify for expedited review under the Act).
65. 521 U.S. 979 (1997) (minority voters sued county for injunctive relief, alleging that
county's failure to obtain preclearance for new election procedures violated section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act).
66. 520 U.S. 329 (1997) (mothers of children eligible to receive state child support
services sued director of Arizona's child support agency, alleging that state program did not
comply with Tide IV-D of the Social Security Act, and seeking mandatory injunction to enforce
state compliance with federal statute).
67. 520 U.S. 273 (1997) (private plaintiffs sued Mississippi state officials to enjoin
implementation of new voter registration system on grounds that state had failed to obtain
preclearance, in violation of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000).
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right of action to enjoin enforcement of any change in any "voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure
,,69with respect to voting that has the purpose or effect "of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color."70 Relying on this
express statutory right of action, the Court reached the merits in all four
voting rights cases.7'
The Court also reached the merits of plaintiffs' claims in three other
Shaw violation cases: Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker,
Christensen v. Harris County, and Olmstead v. L. C.72 In Rucker, the lower court
held explicitly that plaintiffs had a private right of action against the
Director of the Oakland Housing Authority under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.73 In
Christensen, the plaintiffs had an express statutory right of action under the
Fair Labor Standards Act.74 And in Olmstead, the plaintiffs had an express
statutory right of action under the Americans with Disabilities Act.75 Thus, all
69. Id.
70. Id. The statute requires "covered jurisdictions" to obtain preclearance from the U.S.
Attorney General before implementing any change in voting procedures. It also says: "Neither
an affirmative indication by the Attorney General that no objection will be made, nor the
Attorney General's failure to object... shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of
such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure." Id. The statutory reference
to "subsequent action to enjoin enforcement" clearly envisions private suits to enjoin
implementation of any change in a voting practice or procedure that allegedly has the purpose
or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.
71. Branch v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 1429 (2003) (affirming district court order that enjoined
enforcement of state redistricting plan that had not been precleared by Attorney General);
Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 (1999) (holding that Monterey County was required to
obtain federal preclearance before implementing changes in its judicial election procedures);
Foreman v. Dallas County, 521 U.S. 979 (1997) (vacating lower court decision, which held that
Dallas County was not required to obtain preclearance for new election procedures, and
remanding case to district court); Young v. Fordice, 520 U.S. 273 (1997) (holding that
Mississippi violated Voting Rights Act by making changes in voter registration procedures
without obtaining federal preclearance).
72. See Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 136 (2002) (holding that
decision by Oakland Housing Authority to terminate plaintiffs' leases did not violate federal
low-income housing statute); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 578 (2000) (holding
that county policy did not violate Fair Labor Standards Act); Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 607
(1999) (holding that Americans with Disabilities Act required Georgia to provide community-
based treatment for persons with mental disabilities).
73. See Rucker v. Davis, 1998 WL 345403, *7 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
74. In Christensen, plaintiffs alleged a violation of 29 U.S.C. § 207(o) (5). See Christensen, 529
U.S. at 581. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) provides an express private cause of action for violations of §
207. Moreover, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a) (2) makes it unlawful to violate any of the provisions of § 207,
and 29 U.S.C. § 217 grants the district courts "jurisdiction, for cause shown, to restrain
violations of section 215."
75. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) states: "The remedies, procedures, and
rights set forth in section 794a of title 29 shall be the remedies, procedures, and rights this
subchapter provides to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation
of section 12132 of this tile." 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2000). Section 794a of title 29, in turn, refers
to the "remedies, procedures, and rights" set forth in section 706 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
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three cases are consistent with the thesis that the Court does not reach the
merits of Shaw violation cases unless plaintiffs can establish an explicit
statutory right of action.
In the remaining three Shaw violation cases-Alexander v. Sandova
Calderon v. Ashmus, and Blessing v. Freestone-plaintiffs sued to enforce federal
statutes that do not create an express private cause of action. In each of these
three cases, the Court declined to reach the merits of plaintiffs' claims.76
The pattern is clear. In Shaw violation cases, the Court does not reach the
merits of plaintiffs' claims unless plaintiffs can establish an express statutory
right of action, either under the federal statute that creates the substantive
right at issue, or under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This contrasts sharply with Shaw
preemption cases, where the Court decides the merits of cases without
considering whether plaintiffs have a private right of action under the
preemptive federal statute or § 1983.
B. OTHER PossIBLE EXPLANATIONS
The previous section suggests that the Court's willingness to reach the
merits of Shaw claims depends upon the nature of the state action that
plaintiffs are challenging. If a plaintiff alleges that state executive action
violates a federal statute, courts do not reach the merits of the claim unless
the plaintiff can establish an express statutory right of action. In contrast, if a
plaintiff alleges that state legislative action is preempted by a federal statute,
courts reach the merits of the claim, regardless of whether the federal
statute creates a private right of action. I will refer to this as the "state action"
theory.
One difficulty with the state action theory is that the conceptual line
distinguishing executive action from legislative action is blurry at the
margins. One of the Shaw cases that the Supreme Court decided between
October 1996 and June 2003-Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service
Commission of MarylandT--does not fit neatly into either the "preemption"
category or the "violation" category because the state action at issue was
(codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5). Section 706 provides an express private right of action for
"the person claiming to be aggrieved" to bring a civil action against "a [state] government,
governmental agency, or political subdivision." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1) (2000).
76. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (holding that plaintiffs lacked a private
right of action to enforce disparate impact regulations promulgated pursuant to Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964); Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740 (1998) (holding that the district
court lacked jurisdiction because plaintiff's declaratory judgment action was not a justiciable
case within the meaning of Article III); Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997) (holding that
42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide a private cause of action for suits alleging violations of Title
IV-D of the Social Security Act).
77. 535 U.S. 635 (2002) (telephone company sued members of Maryland Public Service
Commission to enjoin enforcement of adjudicative order issued by Commission that allegedly
violated Telecommunications Act).
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neither legislative nor executive in nature. 78 Thus, the state action theory
does not adequately account for the Supreme Court's decision in Verizon.
Except for Verizon, though, the state action theory provides an accurate
description of the Supreme Court's treatment of Shaw cases in the period
between October 1996 and June 2003. 79 In every case where plaintiffs sued
to enjoin enforcement of state legislation or regulations, the Court reached
the merits of plaintiffs' claims without reference to § 1983, and without
considering whether the allegedly preemptive federal statute accorded
plaintiffs a private right of action.80 In cases where plaintiffs sued to enjoin
state executive action, though, the Court did not reach the merits unless the
81plaintiff could establish an express statutory right of action.
Apart from the state action theory, there are at least three alternative
explanations of the distinction between Shaw preemption claims and Shaw
violation claims that merit consideration. The "linguistic theory" holds that
the Supreme Court's willingness to reach the merits of Shaw claims turns on
whether the Court uses the term "preemption" or "violation" to describe the
alleged conflict between the federal statute and the challenged state action.
If the Court uses the term "preemption," then the Court will reach the
merits of the claim, regardless of whether the federal statute creates a
private right of action. But if the Court uses the term "violation," it will not
reach the merits of the claim unless the plaintiff can establish an express
statutory right of action. In short, the linguistic theory suggests that the
Court relies heavily on labels as a substitute for analysis in Shaw cases.8 2
78. The state action at issue was an order issued by the Maryland Public Service
Commission that directed Verizon to pay reciprocal compensation to MCI WorldCom for
telephone calls made by Verizon's customers to the local access numbers of internet service
providers. See id. at 638-41. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, hinted in a footnote that the
Commission's order was properly characterized as "executive action." Id. at 644 n.3. In fact,
though, the order was more akin to judicial action because the Commission has statutory
authority to adjudicate disputes between private parties related to the Telecommunications Act,
see id. at 642 n.2, and the Commission issued its order in the context of exercising that
adjudicative authority.
79. Prior to 1996, there was one Shaw case that the Court treated as a "preemption" case,
even though the challenged state action was executive in nature. See Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors, 507 U.S. 218 (1993) (organization representing
nonunion employers sued Massachusetts state agency to enjoin enforcement of contract
between agency and private contractor that excluded nonunion entities from participating in
six billion dollar construction project). See infra note 160.
80. See supra notes 45-57 and accompanying text (discussing those cases).
81. See supra notes 58-76 and accompanying text (discussing those cases).
82. Numerous scholars have commented on the Court's tendency to use labels as a
substitute for analysis in other contexts. See, e.g., Robert Force, Choice of Law in Admiralty Cases:
"National Interests" and the Admiralty Clause, 75 TUL. L. REv. 1421, 1438 (2001) (criticizing the
Supreme Court's approach to choice of law issues in admiralty cases, and contending that
"[t]here are labels that courts attach to the conclusions they have reached as though they are a
substitute for analysis or policy choices").
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All twenty Shaw cases that the Supreme Court decided between October
1996 and June 2003 are consistent with the linguistic theory. All of the Shaw
preemption cases cited in Part II.A above use the term "preemption," rather
than "violation," to describe the alleged conflict between the federal statute
and the challenged state action. In all nine Shaw preemption cases, the
Court reached the merits of plaintiffs' claims.83 Conversely, all of the Shaw
violation cases cited in Part II.A above use the term "violation," rather than
"preemption," to describe the alleged conflict between the federal statute
and the challenged state action. In the Shaw violation cases, the Court did
not reach the merits of plaintiffs' claims unless plaintiffs could establish an
express statutory cause of action.8 4 Thus, the linguistic explanation is
entirely consistent with the Supreme Court's cases. In contrast, none of the
other theories discussed in this section is entirely consistent with the
85Supreme Court's decisions.
The Fourth Circuit decision in Verizon is consistent with the linguistic
theory because the Fourth Circuit used the term "violation" to describe the
alleged conflict between the state action and the federal statute,8 6 and it held
that the district court lacked jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim. Moreover, the
Supreme Court decision in Verizon is also consistent with the linguistic
theory because the Supreme Court used the term "preemption" to describe
the relationship between the state administrative order and the
Telecommunications Act,8 7 and it held that the district court had
88jurisdiction over plaintiffs claim. Thus, the linguistic theory provides a
more complete description of Supreme Court decisions than the state action
theory. However, the linguistic theory does not provide a justification for
those decisions. Indeed, a judicial doctrine in which the availability of an
83. See supra notes 45-57 and accompanying text (discussing these cases).
84. See supra notes 58-76 and accompanying text (discussing these cases).
85. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text; see infra notes 89-106 and accompanying
text (discussing the Supreme Court's decisions).
86. See Bell Ad. Md. v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279, 286 (4th Cir. 2001) ("Bell
Atlantic's complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the Maryland Public Service
Commission had violated the Telecommunications Act of 1996."); id. at 287 ("Bell Atlantic is
seeking only declaratory and injunctive relief against State officials to prevent an ongoing
violation of federal law."). The word "preemption" does appear several times in the Fourth
Circuit opinion. Id. at 290, 293, 300. However, nowhere in its opinion does the Fourth Circuit
use the term "preemption" to describe the alleged conflict between the Commission's order
and the Telecommunications Act.
87. SeeVerizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 642 (2002) ("Verizon
seeks relief from the Commission's order on the ground that such regulation is pre-empted by a
federal statute which, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, must prevail. . .
(internal quotations omitted).
88. The Supreme Court did not attempt tojustify its use of the term "preemption," rather
than "violation," to characterize Verizon's claim. Indeed, the Court provided almost no
rationale for its jurisdictional holding in Verizon, apart from quoting Shaw. See id. at 642.
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implied private right of action turns on empty linguistic distinctions is
indefensible.
The "realist theory" holds that the Court's willingness to reach the
merits in Shaw cases depends upon the identity of the plaintiff. Under the
realist view, the Court consistently reaches the merits of claims brought by
corporate plaintiffs, regardless of whether the federal statute creates a
private right of action. However, the Court refuses to reach the merits of
claims brought by individual plaintiffs, unless they can establish an express
statutory right of action. 9
The realist theory is largely, but not entirely, accurate as a descriptive
matter. All ten Shaw violation cases that the Court decided between October
1996 and June 2003 involved non-corporate plaintiffs; the Court declined to
reach the merits in those cases unless the plaintiffs had an express statutory
right of action.9° In contrast, eight of the nine Shaw preemption cases that
the Court decided during the same period, as well as Verizon, involved
corporate plaintiffs; the Court reached the merits in all those cases
regardless of whether the plaintiffs had a statutory right of action.9' The only
case that is inconsistent with the realist theory is Foster v. Love. In that case,
the Court reached the merits of a preemption claim brought by non-
corporate plaintiffs (Louisiana voters), despite the fact that the plaintiffs
lacked a statutory right of action.93 In light of Foster, it is clear that the
linguistic and state action theories both provide a more accurate description
of the Court's decisions in Shaw cases than does the realist theory.
94
Moreover, the realist theory fails to provide a rational justification for
current doctrine because the Court would not wish to defend a policy of
granting corporate plaintiffs more favorable procedural treatment than
individual plaintiffs.
89. Professor Meltzer has invoked a version of the realist theory as a partial explanation
for the contrast between the Court's "active" approach to preemption cases and its "passive"
approach to other cases. See Meltzer, supra note 3, at 371-75.
90. See supra notes 58-76 and accompanying text (discussing these cases).
91. See supra notes 45-57 and accompanying text (discussing these cases).
92. 522 U.S. 67 (1997).
93. In contrast to the Shaw violation cases that involved claims under the Voting Rights
Act, see supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text, the Foster plaintiffs did not have a statutory
right of action under the Voting Rights Act. For analysis of the source of the private right of
action in Foster, see Sloss, supra note 33, at 1179-80.
94. Proponents of the realist theory might argue that it is just as accurate as the state
action theory, because both theories account for nineteen of the twenty Shaw cases that the
Supreme Court decided between October 1996 and June 2003. However, the Court's decision
in Foster actually conflicts with the realist theory because the Court reached the merits even
though the realist theory claims that the Court should not have reached the merits. In contrast,
the Court's decision in Verizon does not conflict with the state action theory. Rather, the state
action theory fails to account for Verizon because the state action in Verizon does not fit within
the categories that the theory uses to explain the Court's decisions.
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The "Spending Clause theory" holds that the Court's willingness to
reach the merits in Shaw cases depends upon the nature of the federal
statute invoked by the plaintiff. If the federal statute was enacted pursuant to
Congress's Spending Power, then the Court will not reach the merits of the
claim unless the plaintiff can establish an express statutory right of action.
But if the federal statute was enacted pursuant to some other congressional
power, then the Court will reach the merits of the claim, regardless of
whether the federal statute creates a private right of action.
In contrast to the linguistic and realist theories-both of which describe
the case law without attempting to justify the case law-individual Justices
have invoked variants of the Spending Clause theory as a justification for
denying plaintiffs a right of action to enforce Spending Clause statutes.95
The policy implications of the Spending Clause theory are considered
below.96 Here, it is important to emphasize that the Spending Clause theory
does not provide an accurate description of Supreme Court decisions in
Shaw cases. For example, in Calderon v. Ashmus,97 the plaintiff sued to enjoin
state action that allegedly violated the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA), a federal statute that was not enacted pursuant to the
Spending Clause. 98 According to the Spending Clause theory, the Court
should have reached the merits of the plaintiffs claim because AEDPA is not
a Spending Clause statute. In fact, though, the Court declined to reach the
merits of plaintiffs claim.99
Conversely, in Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America v.
Walsh,'°° the plaintiff sued to enjoin enforcement of a state law that was
allegedly preempted by the Medicaid statute, a federal statute enacted
95. See infra notes 362-72 and accompanying text.
96. See infra notes 352-75 and accompanying text.
97. 523 U.S. 740 (1998).
98. The substance of plaintiff's claim in Calderon was based upon section 107 of AEDPA,
which added a new chapter, 154, to Title 28 of the U.S. Code. See Calderon, 523 U.S. at 742-43;
see also Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 107, 110
Stat. 1214, 1221-26. AEDPA is a complex statute, different portions of which were enacted
pursuant to different congressional powers. Section 107 of AEDPA, in particular, modified the
procedures in federal court for habeas petitions "brought by prisoners in State custody who are
subject to a capital sentence." 28 U.S.C. § 2261(a) (2000). Congress enacted section 107 of
AEDPA on the basis of its power to regulate the procedures governing suits in federal district
courts, which is inherent in the express power "[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the
supreme Court." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. Thus, section 107 of AEDPA, which was at issue in
Calderon, is not a Spending Clause statute.
99. See Calderon, 523 U.S. 740 (holding that district court lacked jurisdiction because
plaintiff's declaratory judgment action was not a justiciable case within the meaning of Article
III).
100. 123 S. Ct. 1855 (2003).
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pursuant to the Spending Clause.'0 ' According to the Spending Clause
theory, the Court should not have reached the merits of the plaintiff's claim
because the Medicaid statute is a Spending Clause statute and the plaintiff
did not have an express statutory right of action under the statute. °2 In fact,
though, the Court did reach the merits of the plaintiffs preemption
claim.'0 t The Court's decision in Pharmaceutical Research is significant because
the defendants contested the plaintiff's right to bring suit and the First
Circuit relied explicitly on the Supremacy Clause as the basis for the
plaintiff's right of action.' °4 Moreover, Justices Scalia and Thomas, in
separate concurrences, both advanced the Spending Clause theory in
support of their view that the plaintiff lacked a private right of action.
10 5
Nevertheless, the other seven Justices addressed the merits of the plaintiffs
claim, assuming sub silentio that the plaintiff had a right of action for its
claim that the Medicaid statute preempted state law.
10 6
101. See, e.g., Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 289 F.3d 852, 859 (6th Cir. 2002) (describing
Medicaid as a "federal-state cooperative program enacted under the Spending Power" (quoting
Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549, 561 (2001) (citations omitted))).
102. The Medicaid statute is codified in Subchapter XIX of Chapter 7 of Title 42 of the
U.S. Code, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v (2000). Medicaid is an exceptionally complex statute with a
wide variety of remedial provisions. For example, if the Secretary of Health and Human Services
determines that a "Medicaid managed care organization," as defined in § 1396b(m) (1), has
engaged in any of the "bad acts" enumerated in § 1396b(m)(5)(A), then the Secretary is
authorized to impose civil penalties, or to deny payment of certain medical assistance to the
State. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(m)(5)(B) (2000). Similarly, if the Secretary finds that a "nursing
facility," as defined in § 1396r(a), fails to satisfy any of the requirements mandated by
subsections (b) through (e) of § 1396r, and the Secretary determines that the facility's
deficiencies "immediately jeopardize the health or safety of its residents," then the Secretary
may deny payments to the State, impose civil penalties, or "appoint temporary management to
oversee the operation of the facility." See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(h) (3) (B) and § 1396r(h)(3) (C)
(2000). Although the Medicaid statute occupies more than 200 pages in the unannotated U.S.
Code, the statute does not create any express private cause of action. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-
1396v (2000).
103. See Pharm. Research, 123 S. Ct. at 1867-70 (holding that federal Medicaid statute does
not preempt Maine statute).
104. See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 72-74 (1st Cir. 2001).
105. See Pharm. Research, 123 S. Ct. at 1874 (Scalia, J., concurring); id at 1878 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
106. The Court produced five separate opinions in Pharmaceutical Research. Justice Stevens-
writing for himself, Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsburg-concluded that the federal Medicaid
statute did not preempt the Maine statute. Id. at 1867-70. Justice Breyer agreed with that
conclusion, but for different reasons. See id. at 1871-73 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice
O'Connor-writing for herself, Justice Kennedy, and the Chief Justice-concluded that the
federal Medicaid statute did preempt the Maine statute. See id. at 1878-82 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justices Stevens, Breyer, and O'Connor did not
explicitly address the private right of action issue.
Justice Thomas argued that the plaintiffs preemption claim should be rejected on the
merits. See id. at 1874-78 (Thomas, J., concurring). Additionally, he argued, the preemption
claim should be rejected because third-party beneficiaries may not sue to enforce Spending
Clause legislation. See id. at 1878 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Scalia did not address the
[2004]
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In sum, the linguistic theory provides an accurate description of
Supreme Court decisions in Shaw cases, but does not provide a justification
for those decisions. Likewise, the realist theory does not provide a
justification for Supreme Court decisions, and it is less descriptively accurate
than the linguistic theory. The Spending Clause theory lacks descriptive
accuracy, but does have some normative force.'0 7 Therefore, the state action
theory is the only theory that is both normatively defensible and
descriptively accurate. The normative arguments for and against the state
action theory, which uses the legislative-executive distinction as a basis for
determining whether to recognize an implied right of action in Shaw cases
will be discussed below. 18 First, though, it is important to explain the
doctrinal basis for federal jurisdiction over Shaw claims.
III. FEDERALJURISDICTION OVER SHAWCLAIMS
A. THE RELATION BETWEEN FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND A
PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION
Under the general federal question statute, federal courts have
jurisdiction over claims "arising under" federal law.' ° The phrase "arising
under" plays an important role in limiting the jurisdiction, and hence the
power, of federal courts. l0 Yet despite the importance of this phrase,
Supreme Court decisions reflect two sharply contrasting views concerning
the relationship between arising under jurisdiction and the requirement of a
private cause of action.
One view is associated with Justice Holmes's famous dictum that a "suit
arises under the law that creates the cause of action."1 ' Under this view, if
the plaintiff lacks a federal cause of action, then federal jurisdiction is also
lacking. The Court has adhered strictly to this view in cases such as Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson,"' where it held that federal
jurisdiction was lacking because the plaintiff asserted a cause of action
created by state law, not federal law.1
3
merits of plaintiff's preemption claim at all; he would have rejected the claim on the ground
that plaintiff lacked a right of action to enforce Maine's compliance with its obligations under
the Medicaid statute. See id. at 1874 (Scalia, J., concurring).
107. For analysis of the normative argument in favor of the Spending Clause theory, see
infra notes 352-75 and accompanying text.
108. See infra Part VI.
109. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
110. See generally John B. Oakley, Federal Jurisdiction and the Problem of the Litigative Unit: When
Does What "Arise Under" Federal Law , 76 TEx. L. REv. 1829 (1998).
111. Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).
112. 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
113. Seeid. at817.
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In contrast to Merrell Dow, there are two separate lines of cases in which
the Court has insisted that a federal cause of action is not a prerequisite for
the exercise of federal jurisdiction. In Smith'-a case, like Merrell Dow,
where state law created the plaintiff's cause of action-the Court upheld
federal jurisdiction on the grounds that the plaintiff's "right to relief
depends upon the construction or application of the Constitution or laws of
the United States."" 5 Six years ago, the Court reaffirmed the continuing
vitality of Smith." 6 The Smith line of cases flatly contradicts the Holmes
dictum and is difficult to reconcile with Merrell Dow."
7
In contrast to both Smith and Merrell Dow, there is a line of cases in
which the plaintiffs claim is based on federal law, not state law, but it is
uncertain whether federal law creates a private cause of action. In Bell v.
Hood," the Court held that federal courts have jurisdiction over such
cases-despite the uncertainty as to whether federal law creates a private
cause of action-unless the claim "clearly appears to be immaterial and
made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim
is wholly insubstantial and frivolous."1 9 The Supreme Court recently
reaffirmed Bell'
'It is firmly established in our cases that the absence of a valid (as
opposed to arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-
matter jurisdiction, i.e., the court's statutory or constitutional
power to adjudicate the case.' As we have said, 'the district court
has jurisdiction if "the right of the petitioners to recover under
their complaint will be sustained if the Constitution and laws of the
United States are given one construction and will be defeated if
they are given another"....,120
Whereas the Smith line of cases flatly contradicts Holmes's dictum, the
Bell line of cases is arguably consistent with that dictum. Under the Bell
approach, a federal court can exercise jurisdiction for the purpose of
determining whether the plaintiff has a valid (federal) cause of action. '21 If
114. Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
115. Id. at 199.
116. See City of Chi. v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 164 (1997).
117. The tension between Smith and Merrell Dow has generated extensive commentary. See,
e.g., Patti Alleva, Prerogative Lost: The Trouble with Statutory Federal Question Doctrine After Merrell
Dow, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1477 (1991); Kenneth Lee Marshall, Note, Understanding Merrell Dow:
Federal Question Jurisdiction for State-Federal Hybrid Cases, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 219 (1999); Note, Mr.
Smith Goes to Federal Court: Federal Question Jurisdiction Over State Law Claims Post Merrell Dow, 115
HARV. L. REV. 2272 (2002).
118. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
119. Id. at 682-83.
120. Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 642-43 (2002) (quoting
Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (citations omitted)).
121. See Bell 327 U.S. at 682. The Court stated:
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the court determines that the plaintiff lacks a valid cause of action, then the
claim will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Granted, under the Holmes approach, the claim would be
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but that is a mere difference
in terminology, not substance. Regardless of whether one follows Holmes or
Bell in cases where the plaintiff lacks a state law cause of action, plaintiffs
right to relief depends on whether he or she has a valid federal cause of
action.
The Smith line of cases has been criticized as jurisdictional overreaching
by the federal judiciary. 12 But that criticism does not apply to BelL In cases
such as Bell, where the claim is based on federal law but plaintiffs right of
action is contested, the central threshold question is whether federal law
creates either an express or implied private right of action. Federal
jurisdiction is appropriate because federal courts are generally better
positioned than state courts to answer that type of question, given their
greater expertise on matters of federal law. 1 3 If federal courts lacked
jurisdiction in such cases, then cases in which it is uncertain whether
plaintiff has a valid federal cause of action would have to be adjudicated in
state court, and state courts would assume primary responsibility for
determining whether a federal statute creates a federal cause of action. That
result makes no sense. Therefore, the remainder of this Article proceeds
from the premise that the Bell approach to jurisdiction is justified.
Specifically, in cases where a plaintiff asserts a right to relief based on federal
law, but it is uncertain whether the plaintiff has a valid federal cause of
action, federal courts have jurisdiction under § 1331, at least for the limited
purpose of determining whether the plaintiff has a valid federal cause of
action.
124
B. JURISDICTION OVER SHAW PREEMPTION CLAIMS
In Shaw, a group of employers filed suit in federal court, seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief against various New York state officials on
Whether the complaint states a cause of action on which relief could be
granted... must be decided after and not before the court has assumed
jurisdiction over the controversy. If the court does later exercise jurisdiction to
determine that the allegations in the complaint do not state a ground for relief,
then dismissal of the case would be on the merits, not for want ofjurisdiction.
Id,
122. See, e.g., Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1207, 1241-
45 (2001).
123. In contrast, in cases like Smith and Merrell Dow, the central question is how a federal
issue affects the resolution of a state law claim. There is no reason to think that federal courts
are systematically better able to address that type of question.
124. As noted, this is subject to the caveat in Bell that the federal claim must not be "wholly
insubstantial and frivolous." Bel4 327 U.S. at 682-83.
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the grounds that a New York statute that obligated them to provide
pregnancy-related disability benefits was preempted by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) .12' Although the Supreme Court
did not explicitly decide whether the plaintiffs had a private cause of action
under ERISA, 126 the Court did explicitly hold that federal courts have subject
matter jurisdiction over such claims:
It is beyond dispute that federal courts have jurisdiction over suits
to enjoin state officials from interfering with federal rights. A
plaintiff who seeks injunctive relief from state regulation, on the
ground that such regulation is pre-empted by a federal statute
which, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, must
prevail, thus presents a federal question which the federal courts
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve. 12 7
To appreciate fully the significance of the Court's jurisdictional holding
in Shaw, it must be viewed against the background of two early twentieth
century Supreme Court decisions: Louisville and Nashville Railroad v.
Mottley,12s and Ex parte Young.129 In Mottley, the plaintiffs sued a railroad
company for breach of contract. 3 ° Anticipating that the railroad would raise
an affirmative defense based upon a federal statute, the complaint alleged
that the statute did not affect the railroad's contractual obligation to the
Mottleys."3' The Court held that the plaintiffs' claim did not "arise under"
federal law because the federal issues in the case arose only by way of a
112defense and were not an essential ingredient of the plaintiffs' claim. Thus,
Mottley affirmed the "well-pleaded complaint" rule, which states that the
existence of federal question jurisdiction turns, in part, on whether the
federal question is "offensive" (i.e., an element of plaintiff's claim) or
"defensive" (i.e., an affirmative defense).
In Young, the Minnesota attorney general had threatened to institute
civil or criminal enforcement proceedings against various railroad
companies in state court if they failed to comply with state statutes that set a
ceiling on the rates they could charge."' Prior to commencement of any
state enforcement action, company stockholders filed suit against the
attorney general in federal court to enjoin enforcement of the state statutes
125. Shawv. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
126. In fact, the plaintiffs in Shaw did not have a private cause of action under ERISA. See
Sloss, supra note 33, at 1177-78.
127. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96 n.14 (citations omitted).
128. 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
129. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
130. 211 U.S. at 150-51.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 152-54.
133. 209 U.S. at 129-31.
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on the grounds that they conflicted with the Fourteenth Amendment.13 4 The
Court held that the plaintiffs' complaint gave rise to federal question
jurisdiction. 1 3  Thus, Young established that a claim for injunctive relief
against a state officer to block enforcement of a state statute that allegedly
conflicts with the Fourteenth Amendment is "offensive" for purposes of the
well-pleaded complaint rule. 136
The Shaw jurisdictional principle is essentially an extension of Ex parte
Young from constitutional to statutory preemption claims. 13 Young, in a
sense, was a preemption case. The logic of Young is that state officers cannot
enforce state statutes that conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment because
the Supremacy Clause mandates that the Constitution preempts conflicting
state laws, thereby rendering them unenforceable. Thus, from a
jurisdictional standpoint, Young and Shaw are identical, except that Shaw
involved a conflict between a federal statute and state law, whereas Young
involved a conflict between the federal constitution and state law. Since the
Supremacy Clause resolves all such conflicts in favor of federal law, it is no
surprise that the Shaw Court cited both Young and the Supremacy Clause insupprt o it jursditionl • 138
support of its jurisdictional holding. Moreover, since Young held that a suit
against a state officer to enjoin enforcement of an unconstitutional state law
is "offensive" for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule, it should be
no surprise, as the Court held in Shaw, that a suit against a state officer to
134. Id.
135. Id at 143-45.
136. It bears emphasis that Young could have been decided the other way. The Court might
well have said that the plaintiffs' claim in Young did not give rise to federal jurisdiction because
it merely raised a federal defense to an anticipated state enforcement action. Thus, although
Young is generally viewed as an Eleventh Amendment case, it also provides an important
corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule associated with Mottley For further discussion of
the relationship between Young and Mottley, see Collins, supra note 36, at 1512-14; Hart, supra
note 36, at 523-24; Hill, supra note 36, at 1124-27.
137. The author developed this point at greater length in a previous article. Sloss, supra
note 33, at 1156-58 and 1164-71.
138. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 185,96 n.14 (1983). One might object that Shaw
does not actually involve a conflict between state and federal law because Shaw is a "field
preemption" case, not a "conflict preemption" case. Moreover, some commentators have
argued that Congress's power of field preemption derives from Article I, not from the
Supremacy Clause. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 767,
773-83 (1994).
Although there is merit to this argument, the Supreme Court in Shaw referred specifically to
the Supremacy Clause as a basis for federal jurisdiction over Shaw preemption claims. Shaw, 463
U.S. at 96 n.14. Just last term, the Court reiterated its view that the Supremacy Clause provides a
basis for federal jurisdiction over Shaw preemption claims. Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 641-43 (2002). Thus, in terms of Supreme Court precedent,
there is a well-established link between preemption claims, the Supremacy Clause, and federal
jurisdiction.
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enjoin enforcement of a state law that is preempted by a federal statute is
also "offensive" for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule. 39
In sum, Shaw establishes that federal courts have jurisdiction over civil
suits by private plaintiffs who sue state officers for declaratory and/or
injunctive relief1 40 to block enforcement of a state statute that is allegedly
preempted by a federal statute. Since Shaw, the Supreme Court has decided
more than twenty preemption cases that fit within Shaw's jurisdictional
principle. Subsequent cases have expanded that principle to encompass:
(1) suits alleging preemption of state law by federal regulations;' 42 (2) suits
alleging preemption of state regulations by federal law; 43 and (3) suits
against local governments and officers alleging preemption of local
ordinances.144 Thus, the Shaw principle applies broadly to claims alleging
139. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96 n.14. The Shaw Court says "that federal courts have jurisdiction"
over such claims. Id. This necessarily means that such claims are "offensive" for purposes of the
well-pleaded complaint rule. Whether plaintiffs have a private cause of action to bring such
claims is a separate question.
140. With respect to the jurisdictional significance of the distinction between declaratory
and injunctive relief, see infra notes 171-81 and accompanying text.
141. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. 1855 (2003); Ky. Ass'n of Health
Plans Inc. v. Miller, 123 S. Ct. 1471 (2003); City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv.,
Inc., 536 U.S. 424 (2002); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); Crosby v. Nat'l
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000); Foster
v. Love, 522 U.S. 67 (1997); De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806
(1997); Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316
(1997); Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996); N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995); Anderson v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 143
(1995); Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors, 507 U.S. 218
(1993); Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992); Morales v. Trans World
Airlines, 504 U.S. 374 (1992); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S.
350 (1989); Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293 (1988); Cal. Coastal Comm'n v.
Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572 (1987); Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272
(1987); Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (1985); Capital Cities
Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984).
142. See, e.g., Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984) (cable television
operators sued Director of Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Board to enjoin enforcement
of state ban on broadcast advertising of alcoholic beverages that was allegedly preempted by
Federal Communications Commission regulations).
143. See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) (suit against Governor of
Washington to enjoin enforcement of oil tanker design, reporting, and operating regulations
promulgated by the state's Office of Marine Safety that were allegedly preempted by federal
statutes); Anderson v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 143 (1995) (recipients of federal funds sued Director
of California Department of Social Services to enjoin enforcement of state regulation that was
allegedly preempted by federal statute governing benefits under Aid to Families with
Dependent Children Program); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374 (1992) (airlines
sued state attorneys general to enjoin enforcement of state regulations that were allegedly
preempted by Airline Deregulation Act).
144. See, e.g., City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424 (2002);
Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (1985) (operator of blood
plasma centers sued county to enjoin enforcement of local plasma collection ordinance that
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preemption of state or local statutes, regulations, or ordinances by federal
• • 145
statutes or regulations.
C. JURISDICTION OVER SHAW VIOLA TION CLAIMS
Ten years after Young, in Greene v. Louisville & Interurban Railroad Co.,'
46
the Supreme Court extended Young's jurisdictional holding to apply not
only to claims alleging that a state law conflicts with the Constitution, but
also to claims alleging that state executive action violates the constitution. In
Greene, the constitutionality of the state law was uncontested, but the
plaintiffs alleged that state officers were administering the law in an
unconstitutional manner.147 Even so, the Court relied on Young to uphold
federal jurisdiction, stating that Young's jurisdictional "principle is not
confined to the maintenance of suits for restraining the enforcement of
statutes which, as enacted by the state legislature, are in themselves
unconstitutional." 4 8 In short, Greene extended Young from constitutional
preemption claims to constitutional violation claims, establishing that suits
to enjoin state executive action that allegedly violates the Constitution are
also "offensive" for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.
Thus, Young, Greene, and Shaw together establish that a suit against a
state officer to enjoin state action is "offensive" for purposes of the well-
pleaded complaint rule if the complaint alleges: (1) that a state law is
preempted by the Constitution (Young); (2) that a state law is preempted by
a federal statute (Shaw); or (3) that state executive action violates the
Constitution (Greene). Logically, it follows that a suit against a state officer to
enjoin state executive action that allegedly violates a federal statute is also
"offensive" for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule because the
characterization of a federal issue as "offensive" or "defensive" for purposes
of the well-pleaded complaint rule should not turn on whether the state
action being challenged is legislative or executive, or on whether the federal
law at issue is constitutional or statutory. Moreover, one could argue, per Bell
v. Hood, it follows that district courts have jurisdiction over such claims, even
in cases where it is uncertain whether the plaintiff has a valid cause of action
was allegedly preempted by federal regulations promulgated by Food and Drug
Administration).
145. Many of the relevant cases assume jurisdiction sub silentio, without deciding on
jurisdiction. It is well settled that the exercise of jurisdiction in a case where the issue was not
contested does not, without more, establish that the court actually had jurisdiction. Even so, the
defendant in Verizon did contest jurisdiction and the Court, when squarely presented with the
issue, unanimously reaffirmed Shaw's jurisdictional holding. Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 641-43 (2002). Therefore, the Court's decision in Verizon should
remove any lingering doubts about the continued vitality of Shaw.
146. 244 U.S. 499 (1917).
147. d. at 504-05.
148. Id. at 507.
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under the federal statute, provided that the plaintiffs claim is not "wholly
insubstantial and frivolous."
14 9
The Supreme Court has never explicitly endorsed this conclusion, 50 but
the Court came close to doing so in Verizon.15 ' The plaintiff in Verizon sued
individual members of the Public Service Commission of Maryland (a state
administrative agency), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to block
enforcement of an adjudicative order issued by the Commission that
allegedly violated the Telecommunications Act of 1996.152 The main issue
presented to the Supreme Court was "whether federal district courts have
jurisdiction over a telecommunication carrier's claim that the order of a
state utility commission... violates federal law." 53 The Court quoted Shaw
in support of its holding that the district court had subject matter
jurisdiction:
We have no doubt that federal courts have jurisdiction under §
1331 to entertain such a suit. Verizon seeks relief from the
Commission's order "on the ground that such regulation is pre-
empted by a federal statute which, by virtue of the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution, must prevail," and its claim "thus
presents a federal question which the federal courts have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve."154
The Commission objected "that since the [Telecommunications] Act
does not create a private cause of action to challenge the Commission's
order, there is no jurisdiction to entertain such a suit."'55 The Court replied
that it need not decide whether the Act creates a private cause of action
because "it is firmly established in our cases that the absence of a valid (as
opposed to arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter
jurisdiction."5 6 The Court cited Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment"57
in support of this proposition, which in turn cites Bell v. Hood.15 Thus,
Verizon extends Shaw's jurisdictional principle to cases in which plaintiffs
149. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946).
150. At least one lower federal court has applied Shaw to state executive action. See Legal
Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. Pegues, 904 F.2d 640, 643 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding, in a case
where plaintiffs sought to enjoin issuance of a permit by a state executive agency, that Young
and Shaw provided a basis for federal jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim that the state action was
preempted by a federal statute).
151. Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 655 (2002).
152. Id. at 638-41.
153. Id. at 638.
154. Id, at 642 (quoting Shaw).
155. Id.
156. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 642-43 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S.
83, 83 (1998)).
157. 523 U.S. 83, 83 (1998).
158. See id. at 89 (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)).
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challenge adjudicative orders issued by state administrative agencies.5 9 And
Verizon (indirectly) invokes Bell to support the conclusion that federal courts
have jurisdiction to adjudicate such claims, even in cases where it is
uncertain whether the plaintiff has a valid private cause of action.
Even post-Verizon, though, there is still no Supreme Court decision that
explicitly applies Shaw to a case in which a plaintiff sues to enjoin state
executive (as opposed to administrative) action that allegedly violates a
federal statute. 16° Therefore, in terms of Supreme Court precedent, one
could make a plausible argument that the Shaw jurisdictional principle
applies to cases in which plaintiffs challenge state legislative action, and to
many cases in which plaintiffs challenge state administrative action, but not
to cases in which plaintiffs challenge state executive action.
From a policy standpoint, this position might be justified as follows.
First, however desirable it might be to articulate neutral principles for
ascertaining when a claim "arises under" federal law, the reality is that
"section 1331 'has resisted all attempts to frame a single, precise definition
for determining which cases fall within' the jurisdiction it grants."' 61
Recognizing the futility of attempting to do so, courts must make policy
judgments about what types of claims should be deemed to "arise under"
federal law for purposes of federal question jurisdiction. In making those
policy judgments, it is reasonable to distinguish between federal
159. This extension of Shaw was arguably foreshadowed earlier in New Orleans Pub. Serv.,
Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989) (reversing Fifth Circuit decision to abstain
from exercising jurisdiction over suit against city by public utility to enjoin enforcement of local
regulatory order that was allegedly preempted by an order issued by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission). However, Verizon is the first case in which the Court relied explicitly
on Shaw to support jurisdiction over a challenge to an adjudicative order issued by a state
administrative agency.
160. In Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors, 507 U.S. 218
(1993), an organization representing nonunion construction industry employers sued a
Massachusetts state agency to enjoin enforcement of a contract between the agency and a
private contractor that effectively excluded nonunion entities from participating in a six billion
dollar construction project. See ic at 221-23. The plaintiff alleged that a particular contract
provision was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Id. at 223. The district
court denied the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction, but the First Circuit reversed,
holding that the NLRA preempted the contested contract provision. See id. at 223. The
Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit, holding that the contested provision was not
preempted. Id. at 232.
The basis for the initial exercise of jurisdiction by the district court remains unclear,
but the lower court may have relied implicitly on Shaw as a basis for federal jurisdiction. Both
the First Circuit and the Supreme Court assumed, sub silentio, that the district court had
jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiff's claim. Since the state action at issue (a contract between
a state agency and a private contractor) is clearly executive in nature, Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council is a case in which the Supreme Court may have relied implicitly on Shaw as the basis for
federal jurisdiction over a claim seeking to enjoin state executive action. Regardless, the Court
has never explicitly held that Shaw provides ajurisdictional basis for such claims.
161. Oakley, supra note 110, at 1834 (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8 (1983)).
HeinOnline  -- 89 Iowa L. Rev. 383 2003-2004
89 IOWA LA WREVIEW
constitutional and federal statutory claims because federal constitutional
claims typically involve fundamental rights, whereas statutory claims do
not. 162 Moreover, it is reasonable to distinguish between claims challenging
state legislative action and claims challenging state executive action because
state legislative action that conflicts with federal statutes can lead to
systematic deprivation of federal rights, whereas state executive action that
violates federal statutes typically results, at worst, in isolated or ad hoc
denials of federal rights. 16 ' Finally, although state administrative action may
be either "legislative" or "executive" in character, there is at least some range
of state administrative action that is sufficiently "legislative" that it should be
treated like legislative action for purposes of federal jurisdiction. On the
basis of these considerations, one might conclude that federal jurisdiction is
justified for all constitutional claims (regardless of whether the state action
being challenged is legislative, executive, or administrative), and for
statutory claims challenging state legislative (and some administrative)
action, but not for statutory claims challenging state executive action.
The preceding argument provides a facially plausible justification for
the current state of judicial doctrine. However, the argument has three
major flaws. First, it assumes that the policy considerations noted above,
which are admittedly very important, should guide the jurisdictional inquiry,
rather than the implied cause of action inquiry. One of the key advantages
of the Bell v. Hood approach is that it separates these two inquiries, thereby
enabling courts to make jurisdictional findings primarily on the basis of
analytically neutral principles (i.e., whether the federal issue is being raised
offensively or defensively) and to address policy considerations separately
when determining whether to recognize an implied private right of action.'
64
162. The premise that constitutional rights are more "fundamental" than statutory rights
provides a partial explanation for the contrast between the Court's willingness to recognize an
implied right of action for money damages for constitutional violations, and its reluctance to
recognize an implied right of action for money damages for statutory violations. Compare Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing
implied right of action for constitutional violation), with Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442
U.S. 560 (1979) (denying implied right of action for statutory violation).
163. See Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Judicial Federalism and the Administrative
States, 87 CAL. L. REV. 613, 682-87 (1999) (suggesting that the availability of federal question
jurisdiction over challenges to state administrative action may turn, in part, on whether the
"agency has engaged in a systematic [rather than merely ad hoc] denial of federal" rights).
164. Professor Cohen has argued that it is not possible to develop "a single, all-purpose,
neutral analytical concept which marks out federal question jurisdiction." William Cohen, The
Broken Compass: The Requirement that a Case Arise "Directly" Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV.
890, 907 (1967). Instead, he advocates a pragmatic, case-by-case approach to determining the
boundaries of federal jurisdiction.
His preferred approach, though, is incompatible with the twin principles that federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and that Congress controls the jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts. See generally WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 32, at 27-32. If federal district courts are
given broad discretion to determine the presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction on
a case-by-case basis, then congressional control is illusory, and the only limits on federal
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Second, the preceding argument assumes that legislative action is
"systemic," whereas executive action is more "ad hoc."1 65 While this may be
true as a general rule, there are many examples of "systemic" executive
action, and of "ad hoc" legislative action. The English-only policy at issue in
Sandoval had widespread systemic effects, even though it was clearly
executive in nature.'6 Conversely, to take an extreme example, Congress
recently amended a federal statute for the sole and express purpose of
reviving the claims of the plaintiffs in a single lawsuit. 167 Thus, although the
distinction between systemic and ad hoc violations of federal rights is an
important distinction with significant policy implications, the legislative-
executive distinction that underlies current judicial doctrine is a poor proxy
for addressing those policy issues.
Finally, in Shaw cases-all of which, by definition, involve claims for
prospective declaratory and/or injunctive relief-courts do not need a proxy
to address the distinction between systemic and ad hoc violations. The Court
has held that "the 'irreducible constitutional minimum of standing' contains
three •' They are "injury in fact," causation, and
redressability. 169 Redressability is defined as "a likelihood that the requested
relief will redress the alleged injury."170 If the term "systemic violation" is
understood to include cases where there is a significant threat of future
violations, and the term "ad hoc" is understood to exclude such cases, then
plaintiffs who are victims of ad hoc violations do not have standing to sue for
prospective injunctive relief because there is no likelihood that the
requested relief will redress the ad hoc injury that has already occurred.
Thus, in Shaw cases, the nature of the relief sought precludes suits for ad
jurisdiction are those that federal courts choose to impose on themselves. Thus even if, as
Professor Cohen claims, there is no "single, all-purpose, neutral analytical concept" that
determines the boundaries of federal jurisdiction, there are still sound arguments in favor of
insulating jurisdictional questions from policy considerations, to the extent possible. Cohen,
supra, at 907.
165. The distinction between "systemic" and "ad hoc" violations is drawn from Professors
Woolhandler and Collins. See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 163, at 682-87.
166. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
167. See Pub. L. No. 107-77, § 626(c), 115 Stat. 748, 803 (2001) ("Amend 28 U.S.C. §
1605 (a) (7) (A) by inserting at the end, before the semicolon, the following: 'or the act is related
to Case Number 1:00CV03110 (ESG) in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.'"). The subject lawsuit was a suit against Iran by U.S. nationals who were held
hostage by Iran from November 1979 to January 1981. The U.S. Government intervened in the
suit, claiming that the plaintiffs' claims had been extinguished by an international agreement
between the U.S. and Iran. The statutory amendment was designed to override that
international agreement. See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 461, 463-68 (2002).
168. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998) (quoting Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
169. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 103.
170. Id.
HeinOnline  -- 89 Iowa L. Rev. 385 2003-2004
89 IOWA LA WREVIEW
hoc violations, both as a constitutional matter (due to the lack of
redressability) and as a practical matter (because plaintiffs do not request
prospective relief to remedy ad hoc violations that have already occurred).
Therefore, Shaw's jurisdictional principle should be construed to encompass
claims against state officers in which plaintiffs seek prospective relief to
enjoin state executive action that allegedly violates a federal statute.
D. JURISDICTION OVER DECLARA TORYJUDGMENTACTIONS
The preceding argument demonstrates that federal courts have
jurisdiction over claims for injunctive relief against state and local
government officers in which plaintiffs seek to enjoin enforcement of state
legislative or executive action that allegedly conflicts with a federal statute.
There is conflicting authority, though, as to whether that jurisdiction
extends to cases in which plaintiffs seek only declaratory, but not injunctive,
relief.
In Public Service Commission v. Wycoff Co.,171 the Court stated that a
declaratory judgment action against state government officers to forestall a
state enforcement action did not give rise to federal question jurisdiction:
Where the complaint in an action for declaratory judgment seeks
in essence to assert a defense to an impending state court action, it
is the character of the threatened action, and not of the defense,
which will determine whether there is federal-question jurisdiction
in the District Court. If the cause of action, which the declaratory
defendant threatens to assert, does not involve a claim under
federal law, it is doubtful if a federal court may entertain an action
for a declaratory judgment establishing a defense to that claim. 7
Taken literally, this language would preclude federal jurisdiction over a case
in which a private plaintiff sued a state officer for a declaratory judgment
that an impending state enforcement action is preempted by federal law.
Thus, Wycoff appears to bar Shaw preemption claims in which plaintiffs seek
only declaratory relief.173
To understand Wycoff properly, though, it is necessary to distinguish
between two types of cases: those in which the traditional requirements for
injunctive relief are satisfied, and those where injunctive relief is not
possible. Wycoff was a case in which the plaintiff could not have obtained
injunctive relief "because there is no proof of any threatened or probable act
of the defendants which might cause the irreparable injury essential to
171. 344 U.S. 237 (1952).
172. Id at 248.
173. Other commentators have noted the tension between Shaw and Wycoff See FALLON ET
AL., supra note 32, at 902-03; Monaghan, Federal Statutory Review, supra note 34, at 237-41.
[20041
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equitable relief by injunction.7 The plaintiff's failure to establish
irreparable injury not only undermined the plaintiffs case for injunctive
relief-it also meant that the case was not ripe for judicial review. In the
court's words: "[T]his dispute has not matured to a point where we can see
what, if any, concrete controversy will develop."
1 7 5
Thus, Wycoff suggests that federal courts may not exercise jurisdiction
over Shaw preemption claims where plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment
that a state law is preempted by a federal law, and where plaintiffs fail to
allege any threatened or ongoing action by the defendant that would cause
irreparable harm to the plaintiff. That result should not be surprising.
Ordinarily, if a state or local officer has not actually done anything that
causes or threatens harm to the plaintiff, a claim against that officer will not
•176
satisfy Article III case or controversy requirements.
A very different situation is presented if a Shaw preemption claim
alleges threatened or ongoing action by the defendant that would cause
irreparable harm to the plaintiff. In such a case, the plaintiff could bring a
claim for injunctive relief but might choose to seek only declaratory relief.
There is no principled basis for a doctrine that would deny federal
jurisdiction over claims for declaratory relief in such cases. Such a doctrine
would merely encourage plaintiffs to assert claims for injunctive relief in
order to obtain federal jurisdiction, even if a declaratory judgment would
suffice. That creates a perverse incentive structure. 77 One of the central
objectives of the Declaratory Judgment Act was to promote the use of
declaratory judgments as a milder alternative to an injunction. 7 1 In suits
against state officers, in particular, declaratory judgments can often achieve
174. Wycoff 344 U.S. at 240-41. The plaintiff in Wycoff initially sought injunctive relief, and
the complaint alleged action by the defendant that caused or threatened harm to the plaintiff.
See id. at 239. However, by the time the case was presented to the Supreme Court, the plaintiff
had "offered no evidence whatever of any past, pending or threatened action by the"
defendant, and plaintiff had "abandoned the suit as one for injunction.. . ." Md at 240-41.
175. Id. at 245.
176. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (holding that "the
irreducible constitutional minimum" of Article III standing requires that the plaintiff must have
suffered an "invasion of a legally-protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and
(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical...." (citations omitted)). Both the
Article III "injury in fact" requirement and the traditional equitable requirement for
"irreparable harm" are flexible standards that courts apply differently in different situations.
Accordingly, it is theoretically possible that there might be a case in which a plaintiff who seeks
prospective, declaratory relief satisfies the Article III standing requirement even though he
cannot demonstrate irreparable harm. However, it is difficult to conceive of a concrete example
that satisfies these criteria.
177. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32, § 3566, at 99 ("But to hold that a federal court would
have jurisdiction of a suit to enjoin enforcement of a state statute, but not of a suit for a
declaration that the statute cannot be enforced, would be to turn somersaults with both history
and logic.").
178. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 466 (1974) ("Congress plainly intended declaratory
relief to act as an alternative to the strong medicine of the injunction .... ").
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the same objectives as an injunction, but pose less of an affront to state
sovereignty.'79 Although the Supreme Court has never held explicitly that
Shaw's jurisdictional principal extends to cases in which plaintiffs seek only
declaratory relief, there is some Supreme Court authority supporting that
conclusion.180
Thus, the "tension between Wycoff and Shaw"' I1 is more apparent than
real. In Shaw preemption cases where the allegations in the complaint would
support a claim for injunctive relief, but the plaintiff chooses to seek only
declaratory relief, federal courts can exercise jurisdiction under Shaw.
However, in Shaw preemption cases where the complaint does not allege any
action by the defendant that causes or threatens irreparable harm to the
plaintiff, Wycoffsuggests that jurisdiction is probably lacking, because in most
such cases plaintiffs will lack Article III standing.
E. LIMM ONSHAW 'S JURISDICTIONAL PRINCIPLE
The conclusion that Shaw's jurisdictional principle extends both to
declaratory judgment actions and to claims challenging state executive
action does not mean that Shaw creates federal jurisdiction for all claims
alleging federal statutory violations. There are four important limitations on
Shaw, three of which relate to the fact that Shaw is a direct descendant of Ex
parte Young.
18 2
179. See Mann, supra note 30, at 904.
180. In Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School District, 469 U.S. 256 (1985), the plaintiff
filed suit in federal court, seeking a declaratory judgment that a state statute was preempted by
the Payment in Lieu of Taxes Act. See id. at 259 n.6. The Eighth Circuit held that the claim did
not give rise to federal jurisdiction. Lawrence County v. South Dakota, 668 F.2d 27, 31 (8th Cir.
1982). The Supreme Court disagreed, quoting Shaw in support of the proposition that the
district court did have jurisdiction. Lawrence County, 469 U.S. at 259 n.6. Since the plaintiff in
Lawrence County sought only declaratory relief, not injunctive relief, the case arguably extended
Shaw to claims for declaratory relief. On the other hand, the Supreme Court's comment on
jurisdiction was clearly dictum because the plaintiff re-filed in state court after the Eighth
Circuit dismissed the claim, and the Supreme Court was reviewing a decision by the South
Dakota Supreme Court. See id. at 259-60.
In California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction, Inc., 519
U.S. 316 (1997), the plaintiffs sued for declaratory relief only, claiming that a provision of the
California Labor Code was preempted by federal statutes. See Complaint, Dillingham Constr.
Inc. v. County of Sonoma (N.D. Cal. 1991) (No. 90-1272-FMS) (seeking a declaratory judgment,
but not an injunction) (on file with author). The district court relied explicitly on Shaw as a
basis for federal question jurisdiction. Dillingham Constr., Inc. v. County of Sonoma, 778 F.
Supp. 1522, 1526 (N.D. Cal. 1991). The Ninth Circuit agreed that "[t]he district court had
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331," but did not explain its reasoning. Dillingham
Constr., Inc. v. County of Sonoma, 57 F.3d 712, 716 (9th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court
addressed the merits without commenting on the jurisdictional issue. See Dillingham, 519 U.S.
316. Thus, the Court in Dillingham apparently assumed, but did not hold, that Shaw's
jurisdictional principle extends to claims for declaratory relief.
181. Monaghan, Federal Statutory Review, supra note 34, at 239.
182. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). On the relationship between Shaw and Young, see supra notes
125-45 and accompanying text.
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First, with respect to potential defendants, Shaw applies only to suits
against state officers or local governments or officers.'" Shaw does not
provide a jurisdictional basis for suits against private defendants, nor does it
permit suits against state governments, as such. Granted, injunctive relief
against a state officer is functionally equivalent to injunctive relief against
the state. Even so, the Court has consistently indulged the legal fiction that a
suit for injunctive relief against a state officer in his or her official capacity is
not a suit against the state.184
Second, with respect to the relief sought, Shaw applies only to claims for
prospective declaratory and/or injunctive relief. Shaw does not apply to
claims for money damages.8 5 Since plaintiffs cannot obtain prospective
relief for past violations, this means that the Shaw jurisdictional principle
applies only to cases in which plaintiffs allege a threatened or ongoing
violation of a federal statute. 16 Moreover, plaintiffs who seek injunctive
relief must satisfy the traditional equitable requirements for injunctive relief.
In particular, plaintiffs must show that they have no adequate remedy at law,
and that they will suffer irreparable harm if they do not obtain equitable
relief.'87
Third, the availability of federal jurisdiction under Shaw is ultimately
subject to congressional control. The Court held in Seminole Tribe v. Florida:
"[W]here Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for the
enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right, a court should
hesitate before casting aside those limitations and permitting an action
against a state officer based upon Exparte Young."' 88 Since Shaw is a doctrinal
descendant of Young, the Seminole Tribe limitation on Young applies equally to
Shaw. In effect, this means that Shaw establishes a presumption in favor of
federal jurisdiction over Shaw claims, but a defendant in a specific case can
183. With respect to suits against local governments and officers, see supra note 144 and
accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104-17 (1984). But
see Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (holding that Ex parte Young did not
apply to a case in which an Indian tribe sought to enjoin Idaho officials from interfering with
the tribe's possession of submerged lands).
185. Claims for money damages against the state, per se, are barred by sovereign immunity.
See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, at 402-10. Claims for money damages against state
officers, or against local governments or officers, can be brought under § 1983. See id. at 474-
523.
186. See Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (stating
that Ex parte Young applies when a "complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and
seeks relief properly characterized as prospective." (quoting Coeur D'Alene, 521 U.S. at 296
(O'Connor, J. concurring in part and concurring in the judgment))).
187. See generally DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY, RESTITUTION 86-97
(2d ed. 1993).
188. 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996).
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rebut that presumption by showing that Congress intended to bar federal
jurisdiction over claims derived from a particular federal statute. 189
Finally, in accordance with Bell v. Hood,'90 the fact that federal courts
have jurisdiction over Shaw claims does not necessarily mean that plaintiffs
have a private cause of action that enables them to bring such claims. Parts
IV through VI below discuss private rights of action for Shaw preemption
claims and Shaw violation claims.
IV. DOCTRINAL SUPPORT FOR AN IMPLIED RIGHT OFACTION FOR
SHAWPREEMPTION CLAIMS
The leading treatise on federal practice and procedure contends that
the Supremacy Clause creates an implied cause of action that is broad
enough to encompass Shaw preemption claims.' 9' In addition, several lower
federal courts have explicitly held that the Supremacy Clause creates an
implied cause of action for Shaw preemption claims.19 2 The Supreme Court
189. The Court has imposed a similar constraint on suits against state officers under § 1983.
See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85, 284 n.4 (2002) (stating that federal
statutes that create individual rights are "presumptively enforceable by § 1983," but that a
defendant may rebut the presumption "by showing that Congress 'specifically foreclosed a
remedy under § 1983'" (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1004-05 n.9 (1984))).
190. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
191. See 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32, § 3566, at 102 ("The best explanation of Ex
parte Young and its progeny is that the Supremacy Clause creates an implied right of action for
injunctive relief against state officers who are threatening to violate the federal Constitution and
laws.") (emphasis added).
192. See, e.g., Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 73 (1st Cir.
2001); St. Thomas-St. John Hotel & Tourism Ass'n v. Virgin Islands, 218 F.3d 232, 241 (3d Cir.
2000) (holding that a plaintiff has a right of action for a preemption claim "even when the
[allegedly preemptive] federal law secures no individual substantive rights for the party arguing
preemption"); Burgio & Campofelice, Inc. v. NYS Dep't of Labor, 107 F.3d 1000, 1006 (2d Cir.
1997) ("[T]he Supremacy Clause creates an implied right of action for injunctive relief against
state officers who are threatening to violate the federal Constitution or laws.") (quoting WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 32, § 3566); Indian Oasis-Baboquivari Unified Sch. Dist. v. Kirk, 91 F.3d 1240,
1256 (9th Cir. 1996) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting on other grounds) (stating, in a case where
plaintiffs sought injunctive relief against enforcement of state law that was allegedly preempted
by federal statute, that "it is the Supremacy Clause itself that provides plaintiffs with the right to
sue" and "[m]oreover, a plaintiff may sue directly under the Supremacy Clause even if the
assertedly preemptive federal statute does not provide a cause of action or give rise to
enforceable rights that could serve as the basis for a § 1983 suit on preemption grounds.");
Guar. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Gates, 916 F.2d 508, 512 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[T]he Supremacy Clause
creates an implied right of action for injunctive relief against state officers who are threatening
to violate the federal Constitution or laws.") (quoting WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32, § 3566);
Sprint Corp. v. Evans, 818 F. Supp. 1447, 1453 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (discussing preemption claims
and the Supremacy Clause, and concluding that "the U.S. Supreme Court has not questioned
the propriety of allowing a cause of action for preemption claims even when the federal statute
whose preemptive power is at issue cannot be the source of the plaintiffs cause of action");
Storer Cable Communications v. City of Montgomery, 806 F. Supp. 1518, 1529-30 (M.D. Ala.
1992) (same). But see Legal Envtl. Assistance Found. Inc. v. Pegues, 904 F.2d 640, 643-44 (11 th
Cir. 1990) (holding, in a suit against state official to enjoin state action that was allegedly
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has never explicitly recognized such an implied cause of action. However,
Part IV demonstrates that the Supreme Court has tacitly assumed that there
is an implied right of action under the Supremacy Clause for Shaw
preemption claims.1
9 3
The Supreme Court has decided at least ten cases since Shaw in which
the Court granted declaratory and/or injunctive relief to plaintiffs who
raised Shaw preemption claims. 19 4 Exhaustive analysis of all ten cases would
be tedious. The following analysis of two of the cases-Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly,19' and Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council -demonstrates that
the Court is willing to grant relief in Shaw preemption cases even if the
plaintiff lacks a private right of action under the preemptive federal statute,
and without regard to whether the statute creates individual rights that are
enforceable pursuant to § 1983.
A. LORILLARD
In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, a group of tobacco manufacturers and
retailers filed suit to enjoin enforcement of Massachusetts regulations
governing the advertisement and sale of cigarettes and other tobacco
products. 197 The complaint in the Lorillard case raised claims under the
Commerce Clause, the First Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment,
as well as a § 1983 claim and a preemption claim. 98 The substance of the
preemption claim was that the Massachusetts regulations were preempted by
the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA).' 99 The
complaint did not explicitly identify the source of the private right of action
for the plaintiff's preemption claim.200 Although the defendant vigorously
preempted by federal statute, that court had subject matterjurisdiction under Shaw, but that no
private cause of action could be implied from Supremacy Clause).
193. An alternative explanation for the Court's decisions in Shaw preemption cases is that
the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, creates a private fight of action for Shaw
preemption claims. See infra notes 310-36 and accompanying text for discussion of the
DeclaratoryJudgment Act.
194. See infra notes 195-96, 248.
195. 535 U.S. 525 (2001).
196. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
197. 535 U.S. 525 (2001).
198. The Lorillard case, as it was presented to the Supreme Court, involved a consolidated
appeal of three separate lawsuits. See Consol. Cigar Corp. v. Reilly, 218 F.3d 30, 37 (1st Cir.
2000). The complaint referenced herein is the complaint in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 84 F.
Supp. 2d 180 (D. Mass. 2000) (No. 99-11118-WGY) [hereinafter, Lorillard Complaint] (on file
with author).
199. See Consol. Cigar, 218 F.3d at 37.
200. Paragraph 3 of the complaint alleges that the challenged regulations "violate the
Supremacy Clause." Lorillard Complaint, 1 3. Paragraph 37 alleges that the "[r]egulations are
null and void by reason of Article VI, Section 2 of the United States Constitution ('Supremacy
Clause') in that they are preempted by FCLAA." Lorillard Complaint 37. Thus, one might
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contested the merits of the preemption claim, the defendant never
challenged the existence of a private cause of action that enabled the
201plaintiffs to bring the preemption claim. In short, the parties in Lorillard
all tacitly assumed the existence of a generally available private cause of
action for Shaw preemption claims that did not depend upon either the
preemptive federal statute or 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The district court in Lorillard held that the FCLAA preempted one
section of the challenged regulations and that the remainder of the
202
regulations were severable. The First Circuit reversed in part, holding that
the FCLAA does not preempt the Massachusetts regulations.203 The Supreme
Court reversed the First Circuit in part, holding that "the Attorney General's
outdoor and point-of-sale advertising regulations targeting cigarettes are
pre-empted by the FCLAA. ",2 4 None of the published opinions explicitly
discusses the source of the private cause of action for plaintiffs' preemption
claim. As is typical in Shaw preemption cases, the courts simply assumed the
availability of a private cause of action, without questioning the source of
that right of action.
The FCLAA authorizes civil suits by United States attorneys to enforce
205its provisions and makes it a criminal misdemeanor to violate the
statute. 2° 6 However, the FCLAA does not create an express private cause of
action. Moreover, the only lower federal court that has explicitly addressed
the issue held that there is no implied private right of action under the
207FCLAA. That conclusion is clearly correct. The Supreme Court has
consistently emphasized that courts should not imply a private right of
action under a statute unless there is affirmative evidence of congressional
infer that the plaintiff believes that the Supremacy Clause supplies a private right of action for
the preemption claim.
201. See, e.g., Answer of Defendant Thomas F. Reilly, Attorney General of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Lorillard (No. 99-CV-11119-WGY) (on file with author)
(denying most of the specific allegations in the complaint, but not contesting the availability of
a private right of action for plaintiffs preemption claim); Defendant's Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment on Preemption Grounds, Lorillard (No. 99-CV-
11118-WGY) (on file with author) (contending that the FCLAA does not preempt the
challenged regulations, but not contesting the availability of a private right of action for
plaintiff's preemption claim); Brief of Defendant-Appellee, Consol. Cigar Corp. (No. 00-1117)
(on file with author) (same); Brief for Respondent, Lorillard (Nos. 00-596, 00-59) (arguing that
regulations that restrict the location of tobacco advertising are not preempted but not
challenging the assumption that the plaintiffs have a private cause of action for their
preemption claim).
202. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 76 F. Supp. 2d 124, 133-34 (D. Mass. 1999).
203. Consol. Cigar Corp. v. Reilly, 218 F.3d 30, 38-41 (1st Cir. 2000).
204. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 551 (2001).
205. 15 U.S.C. § 1339 (2000).
206. 15 U.S.C. § 1338 (2000).
207. Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 793 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
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intent to create a private cause of action.'O° Neither the text2°9 nor the
legislative history210 of the FCLAA manifests a congressional intent to create
a private cause of action. Therefore, the Lorillard plaintiffs did not have a
private right of action under the FCLAA.
Whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 might have supplied a private right of action
for the plaintiffs' preemption claim is a closer question. The Supreme Court
has held that § 1983 provides a private cause of action against state officers
for violations of some federal statutes.211 To bring a federal statutory claim
under § 1983, the plaintiff must show that "Congress intended to create a
212federal right" when it enacted the statute . To make the requisite showing,
a plaintiff must ordinarily show that the statute contains "rights-creating
language."213
The FCLAA states: "No requirement or prohibition based on smoking
and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising
or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in
conformity with the provisions of this chapter. "2 14 The Lorilard plaintiffs
could have argued that the FCLAA is enforceable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 because the quoted language manifests Congress's intent to grant
208. See, e.g., Karahalios v. Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 489 U.S. 527, 532-33 (1989);
Univs. Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 770 (1981); see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 32,
at 781-82. Some commentators have questioned the wisdom of a doctrine that relies on
congressional intent as the sole criterion for determining whether to imply a private right of
action from a federal statute. See, e.g., Stabile, supra note 37. However, in recent years the
Supreme Court has not expressed any willingness to incorporate factors other than
congressional intent into its implied right of action analysis.
209. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (2000).
210. Congress first enacted the FCI.AA in 1965. See Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965).
The Act has been amended three times since 1965. In 1970, Congress passed the Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970). The main purpose of the
1970 amendment was to ban television and radio broadcasting of cigarette advertisements. In
1973, Congress passed the Little Cigar Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 83-109, 87 Stat. 352, which
extended the advertising ban to cover little cigars. In 1984, Congress passed the Comprehensive
Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2204 (1984). Nothing in the legislative
history of the FCLAA, or of the subsequent amendments, manifests a congressional intention to
create a private cause of action. For legislative history, see H.R. Rep. No. 98-805 (1984), reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3718; S. Rep. No. 93-103 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2040; S.
Rep. No. 91-566 (1969), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652; H.R. Rep. No. 89-449 (1965),
reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2350.
211. See, e.g., Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994); Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496
U.S. 498, 508-10 (1990); Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S.
418, 423 (1987); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1980).
212. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002).
213. Id. at 277. The Court's opinion in Gonzaga appears to impose a heightened
requirement for plaintiffs who seek to establish that a federal statute creates a federal right
within the meaning of § 1983. Prior cases indicate that plaintiffs could demonstrate the
existence of a federal right under § 1983 by showing that Congress "intended that the provision
in question benefit the plaintiff." Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997).
214. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2000).
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companies a federal right to advertise cigarettes, without interference from
state regulation, provided that the companies comply with federal labeling
requirements. The Lorillard defendants, on the other hand, could have
argued that the FCLAA is not enforceable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
because the FCLAA "lack[s] the sort of 'rights-creating' language critical to
showing the requisite congressional intent."
21 5
Regardless of how this issue might have been decided, two points are
clear. First, the Lorillard plaintiffs never alleged that § 1983 provided a
private right of action for their FCLAA preemption claim.21 6 Second, the
Supreme Court granted relief without even considering whether the
plaintiffs had a private cause of action under § 1983.1 Since the plaintiffs
clearly did not have a private cause of action under the FCLAA itself, the
best explanation is that the Supreme Court tacitly assumed that there is a
generally available right of action for Shaw preemption claims that is not
derived either from the preemptive federal statute or from § 1983.
B. CROSBY
In Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, a nonprofit corporation
representing companies engaged in foreign commerce filed suit to enjoin
enforcement of a Massachusetts law that barred government procurement of
goods and services from companies doing business with Burma."" The
215. Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 287. If one applies the previous "intended beneficiary" test,
see Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340, which was the doctrinal test in place at the time Lorillard was
decided, it strengthens the plaintiffs' case for an enforceable right under § 1983. Regardless,
the plaintiffs in Lorillard did not assert a right of action under § 1983 for their FCLAA
preemption claim.
216. The complaint in Lorillard does include one count for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See Lorillard Complaint, supra note 198, 45-48 (on file with author). However, nothing in the
complaint, or in any of the other documents filed with the court, indicates that the plaintiffs
relied on § 1983 to provide a private right of action for their preemption claim. Moreover, none
of the opinions published by the district court, the First Circuit, or the Supreme Court suggests
that the plaintiffs' private right of action depends upon § 1983.
217. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 535 U.S. 525, 540-50 (analyzing a FCLAA
preemption claim without any reference to § 1983). The Supreme Court opinion does not
explicitly discuss the question of an appropriate remedy. The plaintiffs sought both declaratory
and injunctive relief, see Lorillard Complaint, supra note 198, but the initial district court
opinion granted only declaratory relief. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 76 F. Supp. 2d 124,
133 (D. Mass. 1999). Neither the First Circuit opinion nor the Supreme Court opinion discusses
the possibility of injunctive relief. Accordingly, the Supreme Court's decision to remand the
case "for further proceedings consistent with this opinion," Lorillard, 535 U.S. at 571, appears to
require only a declaratory judgment.
218. 530 U.S. 363 (2000). Crosby has been the subject of extensive commentary. See, e.g.,
Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the One-Voice Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations, 46 VILL. L. REV. 975
(2001); Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 SuP. Cr. REv. 175; Sanford
Levinson, Compelling Collaboration with Evil? A Comment on Crosby v. National Foreign Trade
Council, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 2189 (2001); Edward T. Swaine, Crosby as Foreign Relations Law,
41 VA.J. INT'L L. 481 (2001); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Whither Zschernig?, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1259
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complaint alleged that the Massachusetts Burma law "intrudes upon the
federal government's exclusive foreign-relations powers"2 9 and "violates the
,,220Foreign Commerce Clause. Additionally, the complaint alleged that a
federal statute imposing sanctions on Burma22 1  preempted the
Massachusetts Burma law.22 The complaint does not explicitly identify the
source of the private right of action for plaintiff's preemption claim.2 23 The
defendant vigorously contested the merits of the preemption claim but
never challenged the existence of a private cause of action that enabled the
224plaintiffs to bring the preemption claim. In short, the parties in Crosby all
tacitly assumed the existence of a generally available private cause of action
for Shaw preemption claims that does not depend upon either the
preemptive federal statute or 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The district court did not rule on the plaintiff's preemption claim; it
enjoined enforcement of the Massachusetts Burma Law on the grounds that
it "impermissibly infringes on the federal government's power to regulate
foreign affairs." 2 5 The First Circuit affirmed the grant of injunctive relief,
holding that the state law "is an impermissible intrusion into the foreign
affairs power of the national government,"2 26 that it "violates the Foreign
Commerce Clause,"22 7 and that the federal Burma statute preempted the
state law.2 28 The Supreme Court affirmed on preemption grounds, without
addressing the other two issues.2 29 None of the published opinions explicitly
(2001). However, none of the commentators have discussed the source of the private cause of
action for the preemption claim in Crosby.
219. Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Other Relief at 1 51, Nat'l Foreign Trade
Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 1998) ( No. 98-CV-10757-JLT) [hereinafter
Crosby Complaint], affd sub nom Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir.
1999) (on file with author).
220. Id. 57.
221. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570, 110 Stat. 3009-166 (Sept. 30, 1996).
222. See Crosby Complaint, supra note 219, 1 58-63.
223. The complaint refers both to the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Supremacy Clause
but does not specifically allege that either provision provides a private right of action. See id 1 6
("This Court has authority to grant declaratory relief pursuant to the DeclaratoryJudgment Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2201."); id. 1 59 (citing Supremacy Clause in support of preemption claim); prayer
for relief (requesting a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201).
224. See, e.g., Defendants' Answer, Baker (No. 98-CV-10757-JLT) (on file with author) (not
contesting the availability of a private cause of action for plaintiff's preemption claim);
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment, Baker (No. 98-
CV-10757-JLT) 31-63 (on file with author) (contending that federal law does not preempt
the Massachusetts Burma law, but not challenging the availability of a private cause of action for
plaintiff's preemption claim); Brief For Defendants-Appellants, Natsios (No. 98-2304) (on file
with author) (same); Petitioner's Brief, Crosby (No. 99-474) (on file with author) (same).
225. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 289 (D. Mass. 1998).
226. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 55 (lst Cir. 1999).
227. Id. at 67.
228. Id. at 71-77.
229. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
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discuss the source of the private cause of action for the plaintiff's
preemption claim. As is typical in Shaw preemption cases, the courts simply
assumed the availability of a private cause of action, without questioning the
source of that right of action.
The federal Burma statute that provided the basis for the plaintiffs
230preemption claim does not contain an express private cause of action.
Neither the text nor the legislative history of the statute manifests a
congressional intent to create a private cause of action.2 3 1 The subsequent
executive order, which imposed additional sanctions in accordance with
section 570(b) of the Act, states explicitly: "Nothing contained in this order
shall create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by
any party against the United States... or any other person."23 2 The
regulations enacted pursuant to the Burma statute do not contain an
233
express private cause of action. In short, neither the federal Burma
statute, the executive order, nor the implementing regulations provided the
Crosby plaintiff a private right of action.
Nor did 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provide the Crosby plaintiff a private right of
action.234 As noted above, a plaintiff who brings suit under § 1983 to enforce
a federal statute must show that "Congress intended to create a federal
right" when it enacted the statute. 235 The language of the federal Burma
statute does not manifest a congressional intent to create a federal right.2
36
The statute has six parts. The first part restricts bilateral and multilateral
assistance to Burma and directs the President not to grant entry visas to
237Burmese government officials. The second part authorizes the President
to prohibit U.S. persons from making new investments in Burma.2 38 The
230. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570, 110 Stat.
3009 (1996).
231. See id. The legislative history of the Burma sanctions provision is sparse because the
provision was adopted as part of an omnibus appropriations bill. The conference report on the
relevant portion of that bill does not provide any indication of a congressional intention to
create a private right of action. See CONF. REP. on H.R. 3610, Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 1997, 104 CONG. REC. HI1644, 11914 (Sept. 28, 1996).
232. Exec. Order No. 13,047, § 7, 62 Fed. Reg. 28,301 (May 20, 1997).
233. See 31 C.F.R. pt. 537 (2003).
234. The initial complaint in Crosby does not mention § 1983. See Crosby Complaint, supra
note 219. The plaintiff added a reference to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in a subsequent amendment to
the complaint. See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Other Relief, Baker
(No. 98-CV-10757 (JLT)) (on file with author). However, the purpose of the amendment was to
support a claim for attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, not to provide a private right of
action for the preemption claim. See Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, Baker (No. 98-CV-
10757 (JLT)) (on file with author).
235. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002).
236. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570, 110 Stat.
3009 (1996).
237. Id. § 570(a).
238. Id. § 570(b).
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third part directs the President to develop a comprehensive, multilateral
strategy to improve human rights practices in Burma.2 39 The fourth and fifth
parts, respectively, impose a reporting requirement and grant the President
authority to waive sanctions.24° The final part contains definitions of key
terms. 24' There is simply nothing in the language of the statute that suggests
that Congress intended to create a federal right when it enacted the
statute.242
One rationale supporting the Supreme Court's preemption holding in
Crosby was that the Massachusetts law sought to restrict commerce with
243Burma that the federal law permitted. In light of this rationale, one might
argue that the federal Burma statute is enforceable pursuant to § 1983
because Congress intended, when it enacted the statute, to preserve the
right of U.S. companies to engage in any trade with Burma that was not
explicitly prohibited by the federal statute. This argument is unpersuasive.
The federal Burma statute expressly limits the right of U.S. persons to
244
engage in foreign commerce with Burma. Of course, any statute that
expressly limits a pre-existing right preserves that pre-existing right to the
extent that it is not expressly limited. But it is illogical to contend that a
statute that restricts a pre-existing right was "intended to create afederal right 245
within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 simply because the statute does not
eliminate the right altogether. That contention is plainly inconsistent with
239. Id. § 570(c).
240. Id, §570(d)-(e).
241. Id. § 570(f).
242. At the time Crosby was decided, the doctrinal test for determining whether a federal
statute created a federal right enforceable under § 1983 was whether Congress "intended that
the provision in question benefit the plaintiff." Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997).
Application of the old standard would not alter the analysis significantly because the federal
Burma statute was not intended to benefit the National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) (the
named plaintiff in Crosby). The NFTC is a nonprofit corporation that acts as "a leading
spokesman on behalf of the private sector for an open international trade and investment
regime." Crosby Complaint, supra note 219, 1 18. The primary purpose of the federal Burma
statute is to promote "progress toward democratization in Burma" and to improve "the quality
of life of the Burmese people." Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570(d), 110 Stat. 3009-167 (1996).
Although the NFTC's members might benefit indirectly from democratization in Burma,
insofar as democratization might lead to expanded opportunities for international trade, that
hardly qualifies the NFTC as an intended beneficiary of the statute.
243. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 377-80 (2000).
244. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570(b), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (stating that the President
"shall prohibit United States persons from new investment in Burma"); Exec. Order 13,047, § 1,
62 Fed. Reg. 28,301 (May 20, 1997) (prohibiting new investment in Burma by U.S. persons,
"[e]xcept to the extent provided in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued
in conformity with section 570 of the Act and pursuant to this order"); 31 C.F.R. § 537.201
(2002) (same).
245. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002).
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Supreme Court jurisprudence, which has deliberately limited the availability
of § 1983 as a mechanism for enforcing federal statutes. 2 46
In addition to Crosby and Lorillard, the Supreme Court has decided
several pre-Shaw cases,247 and at least eight post-Shaw cases, in which the
Court granted declaratory and/or injunctive relief to plaintiffs who raised
Shaw preemption claims.2 48 In all those cases, the grant of relief necessarily
implies that the plaintiffs had a valid cause of action. In all eight post-Shaw
cases, though, it is clear that the preemptive federal statute does not create an
express private cause of action.249 It is true that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 might
246. See, e.g., id. at 276-77 (holding that key provisions of Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act of 1974 "create no personal rights to enforce under 42 U.S.C. § 1983"); Blessing v.
Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997) (holding that Title IV-D of the Social Security Act is not
enforceable by means of private lawsuits brought under § 1983).
247. See, e.g., Ray v. Ad. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978) (affirming an injunction against
the Governor of Washington to prevent enforcement of a state statute that was preempted by a
federal statute); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (affirming order enjoining
Illinois Attorney General from instituting enforcement proceedings against respondents, on
grounds that the state law to be enforced was preempted by federal statute); Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (affirming order enjoining Pennsylvania Secretary of Labor
from enforcing Pennsylvania statute on grounds that it was preempted by federal statute).
248. See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) (holding that Oil Pollution Act of 1990
and other federal statutes preempt State of Washington's oil tanker design, reporting, and
operating regulations); Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67 (1997) (holding that federal election statutes
preempt Louisiana's open primary statute); Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996)
(holding that federal banking statute preempts Florida law that prohibits banks from selling
insurance); Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992) (holding that
Occupational Safety and Health Act preempts Illinois health and safety statute); Morales v.
Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374 (1992) (holding that Airline Deregulation Act preempts
deceptive advertising laws of thirty-four states, as applied to advertising of fares by airlines);
Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293 (1988) (holding that Natural Gas Act
preempts Michigan statute regulating public utilities); Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch.
Dist., 469 U.S. 256 (1985) (holding that Payment in Lieu of Taxes Act preempts South Dakota
statute regulating distribution of federal funds); Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691
(1984) (holding that FCC regulations preempt Oklahoma law prohibiting advertising of
alcoholic beverages on cable television).
249. In United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000), the Supreme Court held that Title II of the
Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, as amended by the Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978,
created a field preemption rule so that "only the Federal Government may regulate the 'design,
construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel qualification,
and manning' of tanker vessels." Locke, 529 U.S. at 111. The Court held specifically that 46
U.S.C. § 3703(a) preempted Washington statutes governing the operation and manning of
tanker vessels, as well as personnel qualifications and training requirements for tanker crews.
Locke, 529 U.S. at 112-14. 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a) is part of Chapter 37 of Title 46 of the U.S. Code.
Chapter 37 imposes civil and criminal penalties for violations. See 46 U.S.C. § 3718 (2000).
However, Chapter 37 does not contain any express private cause of action. See 46 U.S.C. §§
3701-3719 (2000). Similarly, the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, as amended by the
Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978, imposes civil and criminal penalties for violations. See Pub.
L. No. 95-474, 92 Stat. 1471, 1478 (1978). The Act also provides that U.S. "district courts shall
have jurisdiction to restrain violations of this Act." Id. at 1478-79. However, neither the Ports
and Waterways Safety Act nor the Port and Tanker Safety Act creates an express private cause of
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action. See Ports and Waterways Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-340, 86 Stat. 424 (1972); Port and
Tanker Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 95-474, 92 Stat. 1471 (1978).
In Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 74 (1997), the Supreme Court held that Louisiana's open
primary statute was preempted by federal statutes that regulate the timing of elections. 2 U.S.C.
§§ 1, 7. When the Supreme Court decided Foster, neither of the specific statutory sections at
issue in that case, nor any other provision of Chapter 1 of Title 2 of the U.S. Code, contained
any express private cause of action. See2 U.S.C. §§ 1-9 (1994).
In Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1996), the Supreme
Court held that a Florida statute that prohibits certain banks from selling most kinds of
insurance was preempted by a specific section of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 92 (2000).
When the Supreme Court decided Barnett Bank, the National Bank Act provided for civil
penalties for violations. 12 U.S.C. § 93(b) (1994). However, the Act did not contain any express
private cause of action. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-216 (1994).
In Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmnt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 109 (1992), the Supreme Court
held that Illinois licensing statutes were preempted by the Occupational Safety and Health Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2000), "to the extent they establish occupational safety and health
standards for training those who work with hazardous wastes." When the Supreme Court
decided Gade, the Occupational Safety and Health Act contained a variety of remedial
provisions, including: administrative enforcement procedures, 29 U.S.C. § 659 (1988);
authorization for aggrieved persons to obtain judicial review of orders issued by the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1988); authorization
for the Secretary of Labor to enjoin employment conditions deemed to be imminently
dangerous, 29 U.S.C. § 662(a) (1988); authorization for injured employees to obtain a writ of
mandamus against the Secretary of Labor if he or she arbitrarily or capriciously fails to restrain
dangerous employment conditions, 29 U.S.C. § 662(d) (1988); various civil and criminal
penalties, 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1988); and authorization for States to obtain judicial review of
certain decisions by the Secretary of Labor, 29 U.S.C. § 667(g) (1988). However, the Act did not
contain an express private cause of action to enjoin enforcement of state laws preempted by the
Act. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988).
In Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 391 (1992), the Supreme Court held
that numerous state deceptive advertising laws, as applied to advertising by airlines, were
preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1557. When the Supreme
Court decided Morales, the Airline Deregulation Act contained a variety of remedial provisions,
including: authorization for persons to file complaints with the Secretary of Transportation or
the Civil Aeronautics Board, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1482(a) (1988); authorization for the Secretary or
the Board to compel compliance with the Act, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1482(c) (1988); procedures for
judicial review of orders issued by the Board or the Secretary, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1486 (1988); and
authorization for the Board or Secretary to bring suit in federal district court to enjoin
violations of the Act, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1487 (1988). The Act also contained an express
preemption provision. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a) (1988). However, the Act did not contain an
express private cause of action to enjoin enforcement of state laws preempted by the Act. See 49
U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1557 (1988).
In Scheidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 306-09 (1988), the Supreme Court
held that a Michigan statute regulating public utilities was preempted by the Natural Gas Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 7 17-71 7 z (2000). When the Supreme Court decided Schneidewind, the Natural Gas
Act imposed penalties for violations of its provisions, 15 U.S.C. § 717t (1988). It also authorized
the Federal Power Commission to bring an action in federal district court to enjoin violations of
the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 717s (1988). However, the Act did not contain any express private cause of
action. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717z (1988).
In Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School District, 469 U.S. 256, 258-68 (1985), the
Supreme Court held that a South Dakota statute regulating the distribution of federal funds was
preempted by the Payment in Lieu of Taxes Act, 31 U.S.C. § 6902 et seq. When the Supreme
HeinOnline  -- 89 Iowa L. Rev. 399 2003-2004
89 IOWA LAWREVIEW
supply a private right of action for some Shaw preemption claims. However,
in all eight post-Shaw cases in which the Supreme Court granted relief,
neither the Supreme Court opinion nor any published lower court opinion
indicates that the plaintiffs had a private cause of action under § 1983. 25
The Court's decision to grant relief in these cases (in addition to Crosby
and Lorillard) yields two possible conclusions. Either the decision to grant
relief was erroneous because plaintiffs lacked a valid right of action, or there
is a generally available private cause of action for Shaw preemption claims
that does not depend upon the preemptive federal statute or 42 U.S.C. §
1983.' 5' Such a generally available right of action might be derived either
Court decided Lawrence County, the Payment in Lieu of Taxes Act did not contain any express
private right of action. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6906 (1982).
In Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 705-06 (1984), the Supreme Court held
that an Oklahoma law prohibiting advertisements for alcoholic beverages on cable television
was preempted by regulations promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) under the authority of Chapter 5 of Title 47 of the U.S. Code, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-610.
When the Supreme Court decided Capital Cities, Chapter 5 of Title 47 contained extensive
remedial provisions. For example, if a person failed to obey an FCC order, the statute
authorized "any party injured thereby" to bring suit for an injunction in federal district court.
47 U.S.C. § 401(b) (1982). The statute also authorized private actions for writs of mandamus
against "carriers" (defined in § 153(h)) who committed specified statutory violations. 47 U.S.C.
§ 406 (1982). Additionally, the statute authorized the FCC to conduct adjudicative hearings. 47
U.S.C. § 409 (1982). However, the statute did not create an express private cause of action for
individuals to enjoin enforcement of state laws that are preempted by federal communications
laws or by FCC regulations. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-610 (1982).
250. See generally United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) (holding that Oil Pollution Act
of 1990 and other federal statutes preempt State of Washington's oil tanker design, reporting,
and operating regulations), rev'Intertanko v. Locke, 148 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 1998), and affJg in
part and rev'g in part Intertanko v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D. Wash. 1996); Foster v. Love,
522 U.S. 67 (1997) (holding that federal election statutes preempt Louisiana's open primary
statute), aftg Love v. Foster, 90 F.3d 1026 (5th Cir. 1996); Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25
(1996) (holding that federal banking statute preempts Florida law that prohibits banks from
selling insurance), rev' Barnett Bank v. Gallagher, 43 F.3d 631 (11th Cir. 1995); Gade v. Nat'l
Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992) (holding that Occupational Safety and Health Act
preempts Illinois health and safety statute), affg Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v. Killian, 918
F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1990); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374 (1992) (holding that
Airline Deregulation Act preempts deceptive advertising laws of thirty-four states, as applied to
advertising of fares by airlines), afjg in part and rev 'g in part Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox,
897 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1990), and affg Trans World Airlines v. Mattox, 712 F. Supp. 99 (W.D.
Tex. 1989); Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293 (1988) (holding that Natural Gas
Act preempts Michigan statute regulating public utilities), affg ANR Pipeline Co. v.
Schneidewind, 801 F.2d 228 (6th Cir. 1986), and rev'gANR Pipeline Co. v. Schneidewind, 627 F.
Supp. 923 (W.D. Mich. 1985); Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256
(1985) (holding that Payment in Lieu of Taxes Act preempts South Dakota statute regulating
distribution of federal funds), rev' Lawrence County v. South Dakota, 668 F.2d 27 (8th Cir.
1982), and vacating Lawrence County v. South Dakota, 513 F. Supp. 1040 (D.S.D. 1981); Capital
Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984) (holding that FCC regulations preempt
Oklahoma law prohibiting advertising of alcoholic beverages on cable television), revg Okla.
Telecasters Ass'n v. Crisp, 699 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1983).
251. One might object that the Supreme Court's silence on the private right of action issue
merely indicates that the parties did not present the issue to the Court. However, the decision
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from the Supremacy Clause or from the Declaratory Judgment Act. Part V
provides a policy justification for a Supremacy Clause right of action for
Shaw preemption claims.
V. AN IMPLIED RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
Part V presents a policy justification for an implied right of action under
the Supremacy Clause for Shaw preemption claims. The argument is divided
into three sections. The first section articulates the broad policy goals that
are served by permitting private plaintiffs to bring Shaw preemption claims.
The second section analyzes the marginal benefit to be gained by
recognizing an implied right of action under the Supremacy Clause for Shaw
preemption claims, in light of the broad range of other remedial
mechanisms that are potentially available for obtaining judicial decisions on
preemption issues. The final section considers whether a Supremacy Clause
right of action should extend to Shaw claims in which a plaintiff alleges that
a federal Spending Clause statute preempts a state law or regulation.
A. BROAD PoLicY GOALS
Explicit recognition of an implied right of action under the Supremacy
Clause would serve two broad policy goals: promoting the rule of law and
ensuring the supremacy of federal law. Under the Articles of Confederation,
laws enacted by the Continental Congress were theoretically binding on the
states. However, if a particular state chose to disregard a particular federal
law, the Articles of Confederation did not provide any mechanism for
securing state compliance with federal law. As Alexander Hamilton observed
with respect to laws enacted by the Continental Congress: "though in theory
their resolutions ... are laws, constitutionally binding on the members of
the Union, yet in practice they are mere recommendations which the States
observe or disregard at their option."2 52 The Framers adopted the
Supremacy Clause to remedy this "great and radical vice"2 5 in the Articles of
Confederation. By its terms, the Supremacy Clause embeds a fundamental
conflict of laws rule in the text of the Constitution: courts are instructed to
apply federal law in the event of a conflict between state and federal law.254
to grant relief necessarily presupposes that the plaintiffs had a valid cause of action. Therefore,
unless those eight decisions were erroneous, the plaintiffs must have had some right of action.
The Court may have relied implicitly on § 1983 as a source for the right of action in some cases,
but reference to § 1983 does not provide an adequate explanation or justification for the
Court's decisions.
252. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 32 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy R. Fairfield ed., 2d ed.
1981).
253. Id. at 31.
254. The Supremacy Clause provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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Thus, the Supremacy Clause was designed to remedy one of the chief defects
in the Articles of Confederation by instructing courts to resolve state-federal
conflicts in favor of federal law, thereby helping to ensure that federal law
would be supreme over state law, notjust in theory, but also in practice.
Private rights of action that enable plaintiffs to bring Shaw preemption
claims help promote the federal interest in the supremacy of federal law.
Granted, there are many other remedial mechanisms that also help promote
this policy objective. But claims alleging preemption of state law by federal
law are closely linked to federal supremacy interests because the Supremacy
Clause creates a constitutional rule that federal statutes preempt conflicting
state laws.255 The close link between Shaw preemption claims and federal
supremacy interests is evidenced by the fact that courts and commentators
have identified the Supremacy Clause as the source of the Shaw right of
216action.
Shaw preemption claims also help to promote the rule of law. Although
the precise meaning of the phrase "rule of law" is disputed, most courts and
commentators would agree that the rule of law ideal requires that
individuals have some access to courts in order to challenge conduct by
government officials that allegedly violates the law.257 It is not possible, and
not even desirable, for courts to provide judicial remedies for every
infraction committed by government officers.25 8 But if the rule of law is to be
a practical reality, the overall system ofjudicial remedies "must be adequate
to keep government generally within the bounds of law." 259 Shaw preemption
claims-that is, private suits against state and local government officers to
enjoin enforcement of state and local laws that are preempted by federal
statutes-promote the rule of law by helping to ensure that state and local
governments remain within the bounds of federal law.
In addition to keeping government within the bounds of law, the rule of
law ideal also aims to "allow people to plan their affairs with reasonable
confidence that they can know in advance the legal consequences of various
255. See, e.g., Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) ("But under
the Supremacy Clause, from which our pre-emption doctrine is derived, '"any state law, however
clearly within a State's acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law,
must yield."'" (citing Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988) (citation omitted))).
256. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
257. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse,
97 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1997) (identifying five elements that constitute the rule of law,
including the notion that "[t]he law should rule officials.., as well as ordinary citizens," and
the idea that "[clourts should be available to enforce the law.").
258. In recognition of the fact that it is not desirable to provide judicial remedies for every
infraction by government officers, the Supreme Court has crafted the doctrine of official
immunity to limit the individual liability of government officers. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note
31, at 493-523.
259. Meltzer, supra note 35, at 2559.
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actions."260 Shaw preemption cases also implicate this aspect of the rule of
law ideal. In the United States, companies and individuals are subject to
both state and federal regulation. If federal law permits what state law
prohibits, or state law permits what federal law prohibits, it may be difficult
for companies and individuals subject to both state and federal regulation to
determine the legal consequences of their actions. Shaw preemption claims
promote the rule of law by enabling companies and individuals to obtain
authoritative judicial decisions about the relationship between state and
federal law so that they can understand the legal consequences of their
actions.
I consider below the extent to which Shaw preemption claims are
necessary, in light of other available remedial mechanisms, to vindicate
federal supremacy interests and protect the rule of law. At present, it is
sufficient to note that Shaw preemption claims constitute one available
remedial mechanism that helps to promote the practical realization of
federal supremacy and rule of law objectives.
B. OTHER AVAILABLE REMEDIAL MECHANISMS
Regardless of whether there is an implied right of action under the
Supremacy Clause for Shaw preemption claims, there are five other remedial
mechanisms that could be utilized to obtain judicial resolution of
preemption controversies between states and private parties:2
6)
* Suits initiated by the federal government to enjoin
enforcement of a state law, or to obtain a declaration that a
state law is preempted;
" Suits initiated by state governments to obtain a judicial
declaration that a state law is not preempted;
* Suits initiated by state governments to enforce state laws, in
which the defendant raises a federal preemption defense;
* Suits filed by private plaintiffs who rely on a federal statutory
cause of action, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or the Declaratory
Judgment Act;
* Suits filed by private plaintiffs who rely on a state law cause of
action, such as a state declaratory judgment statute.
260. Fallon, supra note 257, at 7-8.
261. Preemption issues often arise as a defense in a state tort law case in which the plaintiff
and defendant are both private parties. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S.
861, 893-94 (2000). Cases involving preemption disputes between private parties are outside
the scope of this Article. The focus, here, is on cases in which state and/or local government
officials are parties.
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The policy argument for an implied right of action under the
Supremacy Clause must be evaluated in light of these alternative remedial
mechanisms. The following section briefly explains why the first three
options are inadequate to promote the federal supremacy and rule of law
objectives outlined above. The remaining sections address the following
potential sources of a private right of action: the preemptive federal statute,
42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Declaratory Judgment Act, and state law rights of
action.
1. Suits Initiated by Governments
Suits initiated by the federal government are an inadequate remedial
mechanism because the federal government does not have sufficient
litigation resources to police all, or even most, of the preemption disputes
between states and private parties. Exclusive reliance on this mechanism
would result in judicial resolution of only a small fraction of such disputes.
Without judicial resolution of such controversies, there would be lingering
262uncertainty regarding the validity of state laws. Uncertainty about the
validity of state laws would undermine the rule of law, because private actors
would not know the legal consequences of their actions. Additionally, absent
judicial resolution of preemption disputes, states would presumably
continue to enforce state laws that might be invalid. 261 On-going
enforcement of invalid state laws undermines federal supremacy and is
inconsistent with the goal of keeping government within the bounds of law.
Therefore, exclusive reliance on suits initiated by the federal government is
not an effective mechanism for addressing the rule of law and federal
supremacy goals outlined above.
Suits initiated by state governments to obtain a judicial declaration that
a state law is not preempted are subject to similar criticisms. State
governments, like the federal government, have limited litigation resources.
In light of resource constraints, a state attorney general is far more likely to
attempt to resolve uncertainties about whether a state law is preempted by
initiating a judicial proceeding to enforce the state law, and responding to a
potential preemption defense, rather than suing for a declaratory judgment
that the state law is not preempted.264 Thus, declaratory judgment actions
initiated by state governments are not an adequate remedial mechanism for
accomplishing the broad policy goals at stake in Shaw preemption cases.
262. In the United States legal system, courts are the only institutions capable of providing
authoritative resolution of preemption disputes between states and private parties.
263. State executive officials generally have a duty to enforce state laws. Absent a judicial
order declaring the state law invalid, or ajudicial order enjoining enforcement of the law, state
officials will presumably carry out their duty to enforce the law.
264. In Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983),
California did both at once. A state agency filed suit in state court to enforce the state law, and
to obtain ajudicial declaration that the state law was not preempted. See id. at 5-6.
[2004]
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Enforcement actions initiated by state governments are a more effective
remedial mechanism for obtaining judicial resolution of preemption
disputes between states and private parties. If a state government chooses
not to initiate an enforcement action, then the preemption "dispute" may be
resolved, as a practical matter, through government inaction. If the
government does initiate an enforcement action, then the defendant has the
option of raising a federal preemption defense. If the federal preemption
defense prevails, the state government will be barred from enforcing the
265
state law. Therefore, in cases where a federal statute does preempt state
law, the federal interest in the supremacy of federal law will arguably be
vindicated either by a state government's decision not to enforce the state
law or by ajudicial decision barring enforcement.
However, the preceding argument in favor of state enforcement actions
ignores three crucial points. First, even on its own terms, the argument fails
to address the broad policy objective of allowing "people to plan their affairs
with reasonable confidence that they can know in advance the legal
consequences of various actions." 266 Indeed, if the only remedial option
available to private parties is to await government enforcement action so that
they can raise a federal preemption defense, then they cannot know in
267advance the legal consequences of their actions.
Second, if a private party must await state enforcement action to obtain
judicial resolution of its preemption claim, the private party might
reasonably decide to comply with the state law, even though it believes that
the state law is invalid, rather than risk the sanctions that would be imposed
268if its preemption defense fails. Consequently, if the sanctions for
noncompliance with a state law are sufficiently severe, and the costs of
compliance are relatively small, a state government might be able to enforce
compliance with an invalid law because the law would never be challenged
in court. On-going state enforcement of an invalid law threatens the
265. If the state government attempted to enforce the state law in a subsequent action
against a different party, the defendant in the subsequent action could raise an issue preclusion
defense. This is known as "non-mutual defensive issue preclusion." The validity of such a
defense in state court is governed by state law. However, since the Supreme Court's decision in
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971), the trend
has been in favor of recognizing this type of preclusion defense. See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, CIVIL
PROCEDURE PRECLUSION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 106-09 (2001).
266. Fallon, supra note 257, at 7-8.
267. See EDWIN BORCHARD, DECLARATORYJUDGMENTS 966-67 (2d ed. 1941).
268. This consideration is central to the rationale underlying Ex parte Young and its
progeny. SeeExparteYoung, 209 U.S. 123, 144-45 (1908). The Court stated that the plaintiffs'
property is liable to be taken without due process of law because [the company] is
only allowed a hearing upon the claim of the unconstitutionality of the acts and
orders in question, at the risk, if mistaken, of being subjected to such enormous
penalties... that rather than take such risks the company would obey the laws....
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supremacy of federal law and fails to keep state government within the
bounds of federal law.
Third, there are some cases where a preemption claim cannot be raised
defensively in a state enforcement action. Recall Crosby v. National Foreign
Trade Council 269 Massachusetts enacted a law that barred government
procurement of goods and services from companies doing business with
Burma.27 ° Under the law, denial of government contracts was the "sanction"
imposed on companies that continued to do business with Burma. The
government of Massachusetts has the power to impose that sanction without
initiating any judicial proceeding. Therefore, in cases like Crosby, if private
parties do not have some sort of remedial mechanism that allows them to
raise their preemption claim offensively, they will be unable to obtain a
judicial decision concerning the validity of the state law that is allegedly
preempted. Consider the predicament of a hypothetical company that does
one million dollars worth of business annually with Burma, and one million
dollars annually with the State of Massachusetts. If the company had no
opportunity to raise its preemption claim offensively, then Massachusetts
could effectively deprive the company of one million dollars worth of
business by enforcing a law whose validity would completely escape judicial
review."'
In light of the above considerations, it is evident that government-
initiated lawsuits do not provide an adequate remedial mechanism for
resolving preemption disputes between state governments and private
parties. To provide sufficient protection for the federal supremacy and rule
of law values that are at stake in Shaw preemption cases, there must be one
or more remedial mechanisms that allow private parties to raise preemption
claims offensively against state officers. Those remedial mechanisms are
discussed below.
2. Rights of Action Based on the Preemptive Federal Statute
One option for plaintiffs who wish to raise Shaw preemption claims
against state officers is to allege a right of action under the preemptive
federal statute. However, most federal statutes that are at issue in Shaw
preemption cases do not create an express private cause of action for
269. 530 U.S. 363, 363 (2000). See supra notes 218-46 and accompanying text.
270. See 530 U.S. at 366-68.
271. Under the scenario described here, a company that decided to continue doing
business with Burma, and that was denied a contract with the State of Massachusetts as a result,
could potentially raise a constitutional due process claim challenging the validity of the
Massachusetts law. But even assuming that the claim would succeed, which is far from certain,
an after-the-fact due process remedy would not provide the company advance notice of the
legal consequences of its actions. In light of the risks, the company might reasonably decide to
discontinue business with Burma, thereby enabling Massachusetts to continue enforcing its
invalid law.
[2004]
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injunctive relief against state officers.271 Other statutes that do create an
express private cause of action for a limited class of plaintiffs are silent with
respect to other potential plaintiffs who may wish to bring Shaw preemption
claims.27' Therefore, if an express statutory cause of action in the preemptive
federal statute were the only remedial option available for Shaw preemption
plaintiffs, many Shaw preemption claims that have heretofore been litigated
in federal court would have to be litigated in state court.
Plaintiffs might attempt to overcome the absence of an express private
cause of action by asserting an implied cause of action under the preemptive
statute, but this approach is unlikely to succeed. In the Cort v. Ash line of
cases, the Supreme Court has adopted a strong presumption against
implication of private rights of action in suits to enforce federal statutes. 74
Plaintiffs can overcome that presumption by providing affirmative evidence
of congressional intent to create a private cause of action.275 However, the
absence of an express private cause of action in a statute is generally viewed
as prima facie evidence that Congress did not intend to create a private
cause of action. Thus, a plaintiff who seeks to overcome the presumption
against implication of private rights of action must provide clear evidence of
congressional intent.
One could argue that the Shaw line of cases should be rejected because
Shaw's unstated presumption in favor of implied rights of action to enforce
federal statutes is inconsistent with Cort's explicit presumption against
implied rights of action to enforce federal statutes. I contend, though, that
Shaw and Cort are distinguishable, and that both lines of cases generally
make sense. Specifically, Cort v. Ash and its progeny support a presumption
against a statutory implied right of action for claims against private
defendants. 216 Shaw and its progeny support a presumption in favor of a
272. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
273. This was true in Shaw, where ERISA creates a private cause of action, but the express
right of action in the statute did not apply to the plaintiffs in Shaw. See Sloss, supra note 33, at
1177-78.
274. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), identified four factors for courts to consider when
deciding whether to imply a private cause of action for a federal statute. Congressional intent to
create a private cause of action was only one of the four factors. See id. However, Cort
represented a shift towards a more cautious approach to implied rights of action. See FALLON ET
AL., supra note 32, at 781-82. Subsequent cases, following that more cautious approach, have
generally refused to recognize implied rights of action for federal statutes, absent clear
evidence of congressional intent to create a private cause of action. See, e.g., Karahalios v. Nat'l
Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 489 U.S. 527, 532-33 (1989); Univs. Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S.
754, 770 (1981); TransAmerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979).
275. See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
276. Cort v. Ash cases typically involve claims against private defendants. See, e.g., Karahalios
v. Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 489 U.S. 527 (1989) (suit against labor union); Univs.
Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981) (suit against non-profit consortium of
universities); TransAmerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (shareholder
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Supremacy Clause right of action for claims for injunctive relief against state
or local governments or officers.
There are three considerations that justify opposing presumptions in
the two types of cases. First, in suits for injunctive relief against state and
local government officers, the Shaw presumption in favor of an implied right
of action is justified by the federal interest in promoting the supremacy of
federal law and keeping state governments within the bounds of law. 7 In
contrast, claims against private defendants charged with federal statutory
violations do not implicate federal supremacy concerns because there are no
2781state government interests at stake. Similarly, such cases have no relevance
to the goal of keeping government within the bounds of law because
government conduct is not at issue. Thus, whereas the presumption in favor
of an implied right of action for Shaw preemption claims is justified by rule
of law and federal supremacy objectives, the presumption against an implied
right of action in suits against private defendants is justified, in part, because
those cases do not implicate rule of law and federal supremacy goals to
nearly as great a degree.
Second, the Cort line of cases is concerned with statutory rights of action.
The presumption against an implied statutory right of action is justified by a
separation of powers rationale: the task of creating statutory rights of action
is primarily a task for Congress, not the courts.179 In contrast, Shaw cases
tacitly assume a constitutional right of action. Granted, the substantive law at
issue in Shaw preemption cases is statutory, not constitutional law. But the
derivative action); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (suit against
accountants); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (suit by stockholder against corporate directors).
In more than twenty-five years since Cort, there have been only two cases in which the
Supreme Court has unambiguously applied the Cot v. Ash approach to claims for injunctive
relief against government officers. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (suit for
injunctive relief against Alabama government officer); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287
(1981) (suit for injunctive relief against California government officials). This Article contends
that Sandovalwas wrongly decided because it should have been treated as a Shaw case, not a Cot
case. See infra notes 403-18 and accompanying text. I made a similar argument with respect to
Sierra Club in a previous article. See Sloss, supra note 33, at 1187-89.
In addition to Sierra Club and Sandava4 a portion of the Court's opinion in Suter v. Artist M., 503
U.S. 347 (1992), arguably applies the Cort v. Ash test to a claim for prospective relief against a
state government officer. Id, at 363-64. However, the Court devoted most of its opinion in Suter
to the plaintiffs' § 1983 claims. See id. at 355-63. Thus, although the Court's opinion in Suter is
open to differing interpretations, Suter is perhaps best explained as an early precursor of
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002), which limited the availability of § 1983 as a remedial
mechanism for enforcing federal statutory fights.
277. See supra notes 252-60 and accompanying text.
278. Some claims for money damages between private parties do implicate federal
supremacy issues. One example is a case in which the plaintiff files a state tort action and the
defendant raises a federal preemption defense. However, cases in which a private party seeks to
enforce a federal statute against another private party have no relevance to federal-state
relations.
279. See, e.g., TransAmerica Mortgage Advisors, 444 U.S. at 15-16; Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 578.
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remedy in Shaw preemption cases is a constitutional remedy, rooted in the
Supremacy Clause. That Supremacy Clause remedy applies only to claims
against state and local officers because claims against those defendants
implicate federal supremacy interests in a way that claims against private
defendants do not. Whereas the task of creating statutory rights of action is
primarily a legislative function, the task of crafting constitutional remedies is
primarily a judicial function. Hence, separation of powers considerations
support a different approach in Shaw cases than in Coyt cases.
Application of opposing presumptions in the two categories of cases
also accords with likely congressional intent. In federal statutory claims
against private defendants, if the statute does not provide an express private
right of action against private parties then the presumption that Congress
did not intend to provide such a remedy generally accords with legislative
reality. This is especially true for statutes enacted within the past twenty-five
years. Beginning with Coil v. Ash,"'0 the Supreme Court has effectively given
Congress notice that if Congress wants to create a private cause of action
against private defendants, it must say so explicitly.
In contrast, in Shaw preemption cases, if the federal statute does not
create an express private right of action for injunctive relief against state
officers the presumption that Congress did not intend to provide such a
remedy does not accord with legislative reality. To the contrary, the Supreme
Court's consistent practice in Shaw preemption cases justifies a
congressional assumption that an express private cause of action for Shaw
preemption claims is unnecessary because courts provide injunctive relief in
meritorious Shaw preemption cases, regardless of whether the preemptive
federal statute creates an express private cause of action .2' Granted, it is fair
to assume that Congress would not want a court to provide a remedy in a
Shaw preemption case if the plaintiff lacked Article III standing,8 2 if the
283
requirements for injunctive relief were not satisfied, or if the preemption
claim lacked merit. But if the plaintiff does have Article III standing, the
requirements for equitable relief are satisfied, and the preemption claim is
meritorious, denial of a judicial remedy would undermine federal
supremacy and subvert the rule of law by enabling state officers to proceed
with enforcement of an invalid state law, to the detriment of private parties.
Thus, it defies reality to presume that congressional silence on the question
280. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
281. See supra notes 247-51 and accompanying text.
282. In a federal statutory case, the plaintiff has Article III standing only if the plaintiff has
suffered "injury in fact," the defendant's statutory violation caused the injury, and there is a
likelihood that the requested relief will redress the injury. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
283. To obtain injunctive relief a plaintiff must show that he has no adequate remedy at
law, and that he will suffer irreparable harm if injunctive relief is denied. See DOBBS, supra note
187, at 86-92.
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of injunctive relief against state officers manifests a congressional intent to
deny such relief.
2 4
In sum, neither express nor implied statutory rights of action based on
the preemptive federal statute provide an adequate remedial mechanism for
Shaw preemption plaintiffs. The Cort v. Ash implied right of action doctrine
is appropriate for federal statutory claims against private defendants. But
Shaw preemption plaintiffs should not be constrained by Cort's narrow focus
on congressional intent to create a private cause of action. For Shaw
preemption claims, judicial implication of a constitutional right of action is
justified by federal supremacy and rule of law objectives. Indeed, judicial
reticence to imply a Supremacy Clause right of action for Shaw preemption
claims would be contrary to Congress's presumed intent to ensure that state
and local government officers do not systematically violate federal statutes. 5
3. Section 1983 and Shaw Preemption Claims
Thus far, Part V has suggested that there should be one or more
remedial mechanisms that allow private parties to raise preemption claims
offensively against state officers in order to provide sufficient protection for
the federal supremacy and rule of law values that are at stake in Shaw
preemption cases. The preceding section showed that statutory rights of
action based on the preemptive federal statute are inadequate remedial
mechanisms due to a presumption against implied rights of action under
federal statutes. Hence, the question arises whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983
provides an adequate remedial mechanism for Shaw preemption claims.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorizes both "action[s] at law" and "suit[s] in
equity" against state and local government officers who subject any person
"to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws." 28 6 Section 1983 provides a cause of action against
state officers not only for violations of constitutional rights, but also for
284. Justice Souter makes a similar point in his dissent in Seminole Tribe.
I do not in theory reject the Court's assumption that Congress may bar
enforcement [of a federal statute] by suit [for injunctive relief] against a state
official. But because in practice, in the real world of congressional legislation, such
an intent would be exceedingly odd, it would be equally odd for this Court to
recognize an intent to block the customary application of Ex parte Young
without... a clear statement [of] congressional purpose to [do so].
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 175 (1996) (SouterJ., dissenting).
285. Scholarly literature justifies the presumption against implied rights of action, in part,
by noting that Congress may be wary of over-enforcement of federal statutes. See, e.g., Frankel,
supra note 37, at 572-78. That argument does not apply to Shaw claims, though. The Shaw right
of action provides a remedy for systematic violations of federal law by state officers. Assuming
that Congress is wary of over-enforcement of federal statutes, that concern does not apply to
systematic violations of federal law by state officers.
286. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
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violations of federal statutory rights.187 Therefore, § 1983 provides a private
cause of action for some Shaw preemption claims.2'8
However, the Court has emphasized that, to obtain redress under §
1983, "a plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely a
violation of federal law."289 Hence, even assuming that a plaintiff has a
meritorious argument for preemption of state law by federal law, that
plaintiff might still lose a Shaw preemption claim brought under § 1983 on
the grounds that the preemptive federal statute does not create a federal
right.290 Therefore, analysis of the policy implications of an implied right of
action under the Supremacy Clause must assess the marginal benefit of
providing a private cause of action for Shaw preemption claims that would
not succeed under section 1983 because the preemptive federal statute does
not create a "federal right."
2 91
To address that question, it is helpful to consider a concrete example.
292In Gonzaga University v. Doe, a former student sued Gonzaga University
under § 1983 for an alleged violation of the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act (FERPA).2" FERPA states, in relevant part: "No funds shall be
made available.., to any educational agency or institution which has a
policy or practice of permitting the release of education records.., of
students" without the written consent of the student or a parent.294 Plaintiff
had hoped to get ajob as a public school teacher in the State of Washington
after graduating from Gonzaga. However, without plaintiffs consent, the
University released certain damaging information to the state agency
287. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1980).
288. See, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of LA., 493 U.S. 103 (1989) (holding that
preemption claim against city was enforceable under § 1983).
289. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997).
290. Of course, even if the Supreme Court explicitly recognizes an implied cause of action
under the Supremacy Clause for Shaw preemption claims, some Shaw plaintiffs with meritorious
preemption claims will invariably lose on other grounds, such as lack of standing. But those
other grounds also apply to claims brought under § 1983. The only factor that distinguishes a §
1983 claim from a Supremacy Clause claim is that plaintiffs must establish a "federal tight" to
bring a Shaw preemption claim under § 1983.
291. Even where a statute creates a federal right, a remedy is not available under § 1983 if
Congress specifically foreclosed the remedy. See supra note 189. A similar limitation applies to
claims based on an implied right of action under the Supremacy Clause. See supra notes 188-89
and accompanying text.
292. 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
293. In light of the fact that § 1983 is generally available only for claims against state
officers, readers may wonder why the plaintiff in Gonzaga Univ. was able to bring a 1983 claim
against Gonzaga, a private university. The Supreme Court provides the answer. "The
Washington Court of Appeals and the Washington Supreme Court found [defendants] to have
acted 'under color of law' for purposes of § 1983 when they disclosed [plaintiffs] personal
information to state officials. . . ." Id. at 277 n.1.
294. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (2000). The statute does authorize release of education
records to certain designated officials without the written consent of the student or parent. See
20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (A)-(J) (2000).
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responsible for teacher certification. As a result, he was unable to obtain
certification. Plaintiff alleged a violation of his right, protected under
FERPA, not to have education records released without his consent.296 The
Supreme Court held that plaintiff could not bring a claim under § 1983
because FERPA does not create a "federal right."
29 v
Suppose, hypothetically, that the State of Washington enacted a law
compelling private universities, such as Gonzaga, to release to state agencies
certain education records that FERPA prohibits universities from disclosing.
Assume, further, that the state statute imposes a penalty on any university
that refuses to disclose the necessary information. 29' A university might seek
to bring a Shaw preemption claim to enjoin enforcement of the state law on
the grounds that FERPA prohibits the disclosures that state law requires.
The university could not bring suit directly under FERPA because FERPA
does not create a private cause of action. 299 Similarly, the university could
not bring suit under § 1983 because the Supreme Court held that FERPA is
not enforceable under § 1983.30 Thus, the question arises whether the
university has an implied right of action under the Supremacy Clause.
If there is no remedial mechanism that permits the university to raise a
claim offensively, then the university must either: (1) disclose the
information in violation of federal law; or (2) refuse disclosure, refuse to pay
the penalty, and plan on raising a federal preemption defense in a
subsequent state enforcement proceeding; or (3) refuse disclosure and pay
the penalty. The first two options both subject the university to the
uncertainty of not knowing the legal consequences of its actions. Disclosure
295. 536 U.S. at 277.
296. Id. at 277.
297. See id. at 286-91.
298. This hypothetical case is similar to United States v. Miami University, 294 F.3d 797 (6th
Cir. 2002). In that case, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus, based on state law,
compelling Miami University to release certain student records to a student newspaper. Id. at
803. The university sought U.S. Supreme Court review, but the Court denied certiorari. Id.
Subsequently, the U.S. Department of Education determined that the university would be
violating FERPA if it complied with the Ohio Supreme Court's order. Id. at 804. Accordingly,
the United States brought suit in federal court against the university to prevent disclosure of the
student records that the Ohio Supreme Court had ordered the university to disclose. Id. at 804-
05.
299. The Supreme Court's analysis in Gonzaga University makes clear that the conclusion
that FERPA does not create a federal right necessarily means that there is no private cause of
action under the statute. See Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 282-85.
300. Id. at 286-90. One might attempt to distinguish this hypothetical case from Gonzaga
Univ. by noting that the plaintiff in Gonzaga University was a student, whereas the plaintiff in this
hypothetical is a university. That distinction is unavailing, though, because the purpose of the
statutory provision at issue is to protect the privacy rights of students and parents. Hence, given
that the statute does not create a "federal right" for students and parents, it is untenable to
claim that it creates a "federal right" for universities.
[2004]
HeinOnline  -- 89 Iowa L. Rev. 412 2003-2004
CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES FOR STATUTORY VIOLATIONS 413
risks a possible federal sanction.30 ' Non-disclosure and refusal to pay the
penalty risks a possible state sanction (if the university's federal preemption
defense fails). The only option that enables the university to determine with
confidence the legal consequence of its actions is to refuse disclosure and
pay the penalty. But-assuming that FERPA actually preempts the state
law-that option undermines federal supremacy and fails to keep state
government within the bounds of law because it allows the state, in practice,
to disregard supreme federal law and enforce its own (invalid) law.
Moreover, the third option is incompatible with rule of law values because a
private entity should not be forced to pay a penalty for its refusal to comply
with an invalid law.
The preceding example demonstrates that a remedial system that
provides no option for plaintiffs to raise Shaw preemption claims offensively
is incompatible with important federal supremacy and rule of law ideals.
Since there are a range of potential Shaw preemption claims involving
statutes, such as FERPA, that are not enforceable under § 1983, there is a
clear need for a general right of action for Shaw preemption claims that is
not tied to § 1983. Therefore, the Supreme Court should hold explicitly that
the Supremacy Clause creates an implied cause of action for Shaw
302preemption claims.
One possible response to the preceding argument is that it should be
re-cast as a critique of the Supreme Court's current interpretation of § 1983.
If the Court construed § 1983 to provide a private cause of action for suits to
enforce all federal laws, not just those that create federal rights, then there
would be no need for an implied right of action under the Supremacy
Clause.
The difficulty with this argument is that § 1983 applies both to claims
for money damages and to claims for injunctive relief. There are sound
reasons for applying one set of remedial criteria to claims for money
damages against state officers, and a different set of remedial criteria to
303claims for injunctive relief against state officers. As noted above, claims for
301. FERPA bars federal funds for any educational institution that "has a policy or practice
of permitting the release of education records...." 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (2000). In this
hypothetical case, even a single decision to release information for the purpose of ensuring
compliance with state law might constitute a "policy" of permitting release that would trigger
termination of federal funds.
302. One potential objection to this argument is that there are state law causes of action
that enable plaintiffs to raise Shaw preemption claims offensively. For a response to this
objection, see infta notes 337-51 and accompanying text.
303. Indeed, the Court already does this. For example, claims for retrospective money
damages against state officers in their official capacities are considered claims against the state
and are barred by sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985);
Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of the Treasury, 323 U.S. 459
(1945). However, claims for prospective injunctive relief against state officers in their official
capacities are not considered claims against the state and are not barred by sovereign immunity.
See, e.g., Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); ExparteYoung, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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prospective injunctive relief, which are necessarily forward-looking, provide an
important mechanism to "allow people to... know in advance the legal
consequences of various actions."0 04 In contrast, claims for retrospective money
damages, which are necessarily backward-looking, are less useful for
promoting this rule of law ideal.
Moreover, claims for prospective injunctive relief typically address
systemic violations, as opposed to ad hoc violations. In fact, plaintiffs who are
victims of ad hoc violations generally do not have standing to sue for
prospective injunctive relief.30 5 A remedial system that is expected to "keep
government generally within the bounds of law"30 6 and to protect the federal
interest in the supremacy of federal law can tolerate a certain amount of ad
hoc violations by state officers, but it cannot tolerate systemic violations of
federal law by state officers. The availability of prospective injunctive relief
against state officers is essential to remedy systemic violations of federal law
by state officers.0 7 In contrast, although claims for money damages can also
be used to remedy systemic violations in some cases, the availability of a
damages remedy is less crucial for promoting the rule of law and federal
supremacy goals discussed above.
One might legitimately ask how, if at all, the distinction between
injunctive relief and money damages relates to the preceding distinction
between statutes that create "federal fights," which are enforceable under §
1983, and statutes that do not create "federal rights," which are not
enforceable under § 1983. The answer to this question begins with the
recognition that there are two distinct sources of a private cause of action for
federal statutory claims against state officers (apart from the statute, itself).
The Supremacy Clause creates a private cause of action for injunctive relief
(but not money damages) that is useful for remedying systemic violations
(but not ad hoc violations). In light of the limitations on the Supremacy
Clause remedy, the crucial function of § 1983 is to provide a damages
remedy to address ad hoc (and some systemic) violations.
For the purpose of damages claims under § 1983, the rule of law and
federal supremacy principles that govern remedies under the Supremacy
Clause play at most a secondary role, and a different remedial principle
assumes central importance. That principle is that "there should be
individually effective redress for violations of" federal rights, but the need
for redress can sometimes "be outweighed by practical imperatives.
"008
Insofar as § 1983 provides a damages remedy for violations of federal rights,
it helps ensure that there is individually effective redress for such violations.
304. Fallon, supra note 257, at 7-8.
305. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
306. Meltzer, supra note 35, at 2559.
307. See generally OWEN M. Fiss, THE CIVL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978).
308. Meltzer, supra note 35, at 2559.
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But the limitation that § 1983 cannot be utilized to enforce federal law
generally, in the absence of federal rights, reflects a recognition that the
need for individual redress is sometimes outweighed by practical
imperatives.
309
In sum, by limiting the § 1983 cause of action to cases where the federal
statute creates a "federal right," but recognizing an implied right of action
for injunctive relief under the Supremacy Clause, the Court can ensure the
availability of remedies for systemic violations (under the Supremacy
Clause), while restricting the availability of remedies for ad hoc violations
(which can only be pursued under § 1983).
4. The Declaratory Judgment Act and Private Rights of Action
The Declaratory Judgment Act provides: "In a case of actual controversy
within its jurisdiction.., any court of the United States, upon the filing of
an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of
any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief
is or could be sought."3 10 If a plaintiff wins a declaratory judgment, the Act
authorizes courts to grant "[flurther necessary or proper relief," includingS 311
injunctive relief, if appropriate. There are several Shaw preemption cases
in which the complaint appears to state a claim under the Declaratory
Judgment Act.' Hence, the question arises whether the Declaratory
Judgment Act (DJA) creates a federal cause of action for Shaw preemption
claims.
The two leading cases on the DJA are Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum
Co.313 and Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust.314 Skey
Oil involved a contract in which Phillips had agreed to purchase natural gas
produced by Skelly for resale to the Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line
Company. The contract gave Skelly the right to terminate if Michigan-
Wisconsin failed to secure a permit from the Federal Power Commission by
309. Note, too, that the conclusion that a statute creates a federal right suggests that the
need for individual redress is particularly strong. In contrast, the conclusion that the statute
does not create a federal right suggests that the need for individual redress is comparatively
weak.
310. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000).
311. 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (2000).
312. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Permanent Injunctive
Relief 2, Love v. Edwards (M.D. La. 1996) (No. 95-788-B-MI), ("Plaintiffs seek declaratory
relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 ... and permanent injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2202 ... .") (on file with author); Complaint of Intertanko for Declaratory Relief and
Permanent Injunction, 1 2, Int'l Ass'n of Ind. Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v. Lowry, 947 F.
Supp. 1484 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (No. C95-1096) ("This action presents an actual case or
controversy appropriate for declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).") (on file with
author).
313. 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
314. 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
HeinOnline  -- 89 Iowa L. Rev. 415 2003-2004
89 IOWA LA WPREVIEW
a specified date, provided that Skelly gave Phillips written notice "before the
issuance of such" a permit.31 5 The Federal Power Commission issued the
permit on November 30, 1946, "but the actual content of the order was not
made public until December 2, 1946.'016 Meanwhile, also on December 2,
Skelly provided written notice of termination to Phillips. Phillips then sued
Skelly in federal court, invoking the DJA and seeking "a declaration that the
contracts were still in effect and binding upon the parties thereto. " 3i1
The Supreme Court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction
because the plaintiff's claim did not arise under federal law, even though the
plaintiff had asserted a right of action under the DJA. Absent the DJA,
Phillips would have had a state law breach of contract claim against Skelly.
However, that claim would not "arise under" federal law because the only
federal issue-whether Skelly provided written notice prior to issuance of
the Federal Power Commission permit-would emerge as a reply to Skelly's
right of termination defense.3 ' 8 Therefore, absent the DJA, the well-pleaded
complaint rule would bar exercise of federal jurisdiction over plaintiffs
claim. Moreover, the Court reasoned, the DJA "enlarged the range of
remedies available in the federal courts but did not extend their
jurisdiction." 19 Therefore, since federal courts could not exercise
jurisdiction over plaintiffs claim in the absence of the DJA, plaintiff could
not establish federal jurisdiction by invoking the DJA as a basis for a federal
cause of action.
320
Shaw preemption cases are distinguishable from Skelly Oil because Shaw
preemption claims are "offensive" for purposes of the well-pleaded
complaint rule.3 ' Therefore, judicial recognition of a private right of action
under the DJA for Shaw preemption claims would not be inconsistent with
Skelly OiL Moreover, the legislative history of the DJA supports judicial
recognition of a private right of action under the DJA for Shaw preemption
claims.322
315. Skelly Oil, 339 U.S. at 669.
316. Id. at 670.
317. Id. at 671 (internal quotation marks omitted).
318. See id. at 672.
319. Id. at 671.
320. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32, § 3566, at 89 ("[T]he present rule is that an action
for a declaratory judgment is within federal question jurisdiction only if the coercive action that
would have been brought were declaratory judgments not available would have been within that
jurisdiction.").
321. See supra notes 125-45 and accompanying text.
322. See Donald L. Doernberg & Michael B. Mushlin, The Trojan Horse: How the Declaratory
Judgment Act Created a Cause of Action and Expanded Federal Jurisdiction While the Supreme Court
Wasn't Looking, 36 UCLA L. REV. 529, 532-33 (1989) (contending that Supreme Court doctrine
is contrary to congressional intent because Congress intended for the DeclaratoryJudgment Act
to expand the scope of federal jurisdiction).
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In Franchise Tax Board, the California agency responsible for enforcing
the state income tax law (FTB) was trying to collect overdue tax payments
from the Construction Laborers Vacation Trust (CLVT); CLVT was an
"'employee welfare benefit plan' within the meaning of... ERISA."3 23 CLVT
claimed that it "lack[ed] the power to honor the levies made upon [it] by
324the State of California" because ERISA preempted state law. FTB raised a
claim under California's Declaratory Judgment Act,12 5 seeking a declaration
that ERISA did not preempt state law. When the case reached the Supreme
Court, the central issue was whether FTB's claim arose under federal law.
Despite the fact that FTB brought suit under a state declaratory judgment
statute, the Supreme Court framed the issue as follows: "The question... is
whether a federal district court could take jurisdiction of appellant's
declaratoryjudgment claim had it been brought under" the DJA.326
The Supreme Court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction over
FTB's declaratory judgment claim because federal district courts do not have
jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions in which state agencies seek a
declaration that federal law does not preempt state law.s1 7 The Court expressly
distinguished cases in which private entities seek a declaration that federal
3211law does preempt state law. If CLVT had brought a declaratory judgment
action in federal court, said the Court, then:
CLVT might have been able to obtain federal jurisdiction under
the doctrine applied in some cases that a person subject to a
scheme of federal regulation may sue in federal court to enjoin
application to him of conflicting state regulations, and a
declaratory judgment action by the same person does not
329
necessarily run afoul of the Skelly Oil doctrine.
Thus, Franchise Tax Board is arguably consistent with the thesis that plaintiffs
have a right of action under the DJA for Shaw preemption claims.3 0
323. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1983).
324. Id at 6-7.
325. Id. at 13.
326. Id at 19. FTB brought suit in state court. CLVT removed the case to federal court. The
Supreme Court noted that the well-pleaded complaint rule did not preclude the exercise of
federal jurisdiction because the ERISA preemption issue was "a necessary element of the
declaratoryjudgment claim." Id. at 14. Hence, the Court acknowledged that its prior decision in
Skelly Oil was not directly controlling. Even so, the Court decided that "fidelity to [the] spirit" of
Skelly Oil should bar federal jurisdiction over state declaratory judgment actions if the federal
courts could not exercise jurisdiction over a claim brought under the federal DJA. Id. at 18-19.
327. Id. at 19-22.
328. See id. at 19-20.
329. Id. at 20 n.20.
330. Indeed, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court perceived any inconsistency between
Shaw and Franchise Tax Board because the Court decided both cases on the same day.
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If the Supreme Court held explicitly that the DJA creates a private cause
of action for Shaw preemption claims, the practical result would be the same
as an explicit holding that the Supremacy Clause creates an implied right of
action for Shaw preemption claims. Either way, plaintiffs who wished to
bring Shaw preemption claims in federal court could proceed with their
claims, secure in the knowledge that they did not need to establish a private
right of action under the preemptive federal statute or under § 1983.
However, there are several reasons why it is preferable to anchor a Shaw
right of action in the Supremacy Clause, rather than the Declaratory
Judgment Act.
First, as noted above, federal supremacy interests form an essential
ingredient of the policy rationale in favor of a federal cause of action for
Shaw preemption claims.33 An explicit Supreme Court holding in favor of a
Supremacy Clause right of action for Shaw preemption claims would
promote transparency by making clear that a federal cause of action for
Shaw preemption claims is necessary to vindicate the federal interest in the
supremacy of federal law. In contrast, a Supreme Court decision to link
the Shaw right of action to the DJA is more likely to obscure the policy
rationale supporting that right of action.
Second, a decision to ground the Shaw right of action in the DJA would
foster the mistaken impression that Congress created the right of action
when it enacted the DJA in 1934. In fact, the Shaw right of action has deeper
historical roots, which can be traced to a "class of cases, which commonly
were brought in the courts of equity in which a single individual sues not for
individual redress, but to preserve the structural limitations found in our or
any other constitutional order."3 33 By holding that the Supremacy Clause
creates a private right of action for Shaw preemption claims, the Court could
emphasize that Shaw is a descendant of a venerable lineage of equity
jurisprudence in which the judiciary, not the legislature, assumed primary
responsibility for shaping remedies to address structural problems that cause
"a great many individuals [to be] injured by some small but perceptible
amount."
3 31
331. See supra notes 252-56 and accompanying text.
332. See, e.g, Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) ("[Tlhe availability of prospective
relief of the sort awarded in Ex parte Young gives life to the Supremacy Clause. Remedies
designed to end a continuing violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate the federal
interest in assuring the supremacy of that law.").
333. Richard A. Epstein, Standing and Spending-The Role of Legal and Equitable Principles, 4
CHAP. L. REv. 1, 9 (2001) (emphasis in original). Professor Epstein is not addressing Shaw
claims, as such, but his point about the historical role of courts of equity in enforcing structural
limitations is directly applicable to Shaw claims.
334. Id. at 10.
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Finally, an explicit holding that the Supremacy Clause creates a private
right of action for Shaw preemption claims would help counteract the myth
of 'judicial passivity."31 As Professor Meltzer has noted:
[T] he Court sounds the theme that its power (or, more generally,
that of the federal courts) is sharply limited and that Congress has
primary, if not exclusive, responsibility for fleshing out the
operation of schemes of federal regulation.... On the other hand,
while the Court frequently articulates the supposed limits of its role
quite forcefully, it does not consistently operate within those
limits."3 6
A holding that the DJA creates a right of action for Shaw preemption claims
would be intellectually dishonest because it would perpetuate the illusion
that the Court is acting as a mere agent for Congress, which created the
remedy. In contrast, an explicit holding linking the Shaw right of action to
the Supremacy Clause might prompt the Court to acknowledge that its
remedial power is not nearly as limited as it often pretends. Such an
acknowledgment would be welcome because it would encourage lower
courts to discuss explicitly the normative judgments that guide their
decisions about remedies, rather than shielding those judgments behind a
veil of feignedjudicial passivity.
5. State Law Rights of Action
If the Supreme Court holds that neither the Supremacy Clause nor the
DJA creates a private right of action for Shaw preemption claims, then
plaintiffs who lack a private right of action under § 1983 or the preemptive
federal statute could still bring Shaw preemption claims in state court on the
basis of a state law cause of action. 337 Most states provide a declaratory
judgment procedure that would enable plaintiffs to bring Shaw preemption
338claims offensively in state court.
The adequacy of state law remedial mechanisms implicates the
ideological debate over parity.339 Parity skeptics (who, in Professor Fallon's
335. I borrow the term "judicial passivity" from Professor Meltzer. See Meltzer, supra note 3.
336. Id. at 343-44 (footnote omitted).
337. Additionally, some plaintiffs could bring Shaw preemption claims in federal court on
the basis of diversity jurisdiction.
338. As of 1949, every state except Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Oklahoma had a
state declaratory judgment act. See Note, Developments in the Law: Declaratory Judgments-i 941-
1949, 62 HARV. L. REv. 787, 791 & n.39 (1949).
339. There is extensive literature on parity. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and
Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605 (1981); Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity
Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233 (1988); Gerald Gunther,
Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate,
36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105 (1977);
Burt Neuborne, Parity Revisited: The Uses of a Judicial Forum of Excellence, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. 797
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terms, are nationalists) 340 will argue that state courts cannot do as good ajob
as federal courts in promoting the federal supremacy and rule of law
interests at stake in Shaw preemption cases. Those who believe in parity
(who, in Professor Fallon's terms, are federalists) will argue that state courts
are equally capable of adjudicating Shaw preemption claims. Indeed, it is
tempting to conclude that the Supreme Court's ultimate decision to grant
or deny a Supremacy Clause right of action for Shaw preemption claims will
turn entirely on the ideological debate between federalists and nationalists.
However, even if one accepts the federalist premise that state courts can
and will provide adequate protection for the federal supremacy and rule of
law interests at stake in Shaw preemption cases, there are several arguments
that weigh in favor of a Supremacy Clause right of action. First, explicit
rejection of a Supremacy Clause right of action for Shaw preemption claims
would upset a substantial body of precedent in which the Supreme Court
has tacitly assumed that there is a generally available right of action for Shaw
preemption claims that is not derived from the preemptive statute or from §
1983. This precedent includes a number of pre-Shaw cases, 34 1 Shaw itself,
34 1
and at least ten post-Shaw cases in which the Court has ruled in favor of the
preemption plaintiff.3 43 It also includes several post-Shaw cases in which the
Court held that the state law at issue was not preempted, but did not
question the plaintiffs' right to bring the suit in federal court.3 44 Although
explicit rejection of a Supremacy Clause right of action for Shaw preemption
claims would not technically overrule all of these cases, it would overrule
some of them, and it would disturb settled expectations that have developed
on the basis of these precedents.345 Therefore, the Court should not upset
this body of precedent without a compelling reason to do so.
(1995); Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law
of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REV. 609 (1991).
340. See Richard H. Fallon,Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141, 1151-
64 (1988) (contending that the Supreme Court tends to oscillate between "federalist" and
"nationalist" models ofjudicial federalism).
341. See Sloss, supra note 33, at 1159-60.
342. Shawv. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
343. See supra notes 194-96, 248 and accompanying text.
344. See, e.g., Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. 1855 (2003); Ky. Ass'n of
Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 123 S. Ct. 1471 (2003); City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker
Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424 (2002); De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S.
806 (1997); Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316
(1997); N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S.
645 (1995); Anderson v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 143 (1995); Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v.
Associated Builders & Contractors, 507 U.S. 218 (1993); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council
of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989); Cal. Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572
(1987); Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987); Hillsborough County v.
Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (1985).
345. The fact that expectations are settled is evidenced by the fact that defendants in Shaw
preemption cases do not challenge the plaintiffs' right of action. See supra notes 201, 224 and
accompanying text.
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Second, Shaw preemption claims frequently involve complex issues of
• 346
federal statutory interpretation. Federal judges generally have greater
expertise than state judges on matters of federal statutory interpretation
because federal judges handle such issues routinely.147 Therefore, explicit
recognition of a Supremacy Clause cause of action for Shaw preemption
claims is likely to promote more consistent and efficient judicial decision-
making by ensuring the availability of a federal forum for adjudication of
such claims.
Third, one of the main factors that supports a parity argument in other
contexts is not applicable in the context of Shaw preemption claims. In
Younger abstention cases, courts have invoked parity considerations to
348
support a general policy against enjoining state criminal prosecutions. In
habeas cases, courts and commentators have invoked parity arguments to
support a deferential approach to federal habeas review of state criminal
convictions.349 In both contexts, a more interventionist federal approach
would arguably impugn the dignity of the state court by interfering with
ongoing or completed state criminal proceedings. Shaw preemption cases
are different because there is no ongoing or completed state judicial
proceeding. A Shaw right of action merely provides plaintiffs the option of
choosing whether to bring their federal preemption claims in state or
federal court. Hence, Shaw cases pose much less of a threat to the
independence of state courts than do Younger or habeas cases.
Finally, even if the Supreme Court holds explicitly that there is an
implied right of action under the Supremacy Clause for Shaw preemption
claims, that right of action would be constitutionally presumed, not
constitutionally compelled.3 5 0 Therefore, a Supremacy Clause cause of action
is entirely compatible with federalist views concerning congressional power
to control the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. 5
346. See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) (preemption case involving analysis
of the Tank Vessel Act of 1936, the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990, and "a significant and intricate complex of international treaties and maritime
agreements bearing upon the licensing and operation of vessels"); Cal. Div. of Labor Standards
Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. 316 (1997) (suit to enjoin enforcement of
California law on the grounds that it was allegedly preempted by both the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)).
347. State courts frequently adjudicate federal preemption defenses to state tort claims. In
that context, state courts are required to interpret federal statutes. Even so, it remains true, as a
general proposition, that federal courts have greater expertise on federal statutory
interpretation issues.
348. SeeYoungerv. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
349. See, eg., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
350. See supra note 35 and infta notes 364-65 and accompanying text.
351. For a federalist perspective, see, for example, Paul Bator, Congressional Power Over the
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030 (1982).
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Whether Shaw preemption claims are brought in state court or federal
court matters far less than the availability of some cause of action that allows
plaintiffs to bring Shaw preemption claims offensively. Assuming that all
states provide some such cause of action, exclusive reliance on state courts to
adjudicate Shaw preemption claims would be generally consistent with the
rule of law and federal supremacy interests at stake. Even so, for the reasons
noted above, the balance of considerations tips in favor of an implied right
of action under the Supremacy Clause for Shaw preemption claims.
C. SPENDING CLAUSE STATUTES AND SHAW PREEMPTION CLAIMS
In its most recent Shaw preemption decision, the Supreme Court held
that the federal Medicaid statute (a Spending Clause statute) did not
preempt the Maine Act to Establish Fairer Pricing for Prescription Drugs. 52
The majority of the Court assumed, sub silentio, that plaintiffs had a right of
action for their preemption claim.3 5' However, Justices Scalia and Thomas,
in separate concurrences, both suggested that private plaintiffs cannot sue to
enforce Spending Clause legislation .1 4 Their separate concurrences squarely
present the following question: Assuming that private plaintiffs have an
implied right of action under the Supremacy Clause for Shaw preemption
claims, should that right of action extend to preemption claims based upon
federal statutes enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause?
Professor Engdahl has argued that Spending Clause statutes never
preempt state law because Spending Clause statutes are not "among the
'Laws'... to which the Supremacy Clause applies."355 In his view, federal
funding conditions, including those embodied in a statute or regulation,
"have no force as 'law'; their only force is contractual." 56 If his view is
correct, then a Supremacy Clause right of action would not extend to claims
based on Spending Clause statutes because Spending Clause statutes would
not be the "Law of the Land" under the Supremacy Clause.
However, the Supreme Court has never endorsed Professor Engdahl's
position. The Court has said that "legislation enacted pursuant to the
spending power is much in the nature of a contract."' 5' But the fact that
352. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. 1855 (2003).
353. See supra notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
354. See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. Of Am., 123 U.S. at 1873-74 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at
1878 (Thomas, J., concurring). For further discussion of Justice Scalia's and Justice Thomas's
views, see infra notes 362-75 and accompanying text.
355. David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 71 (1994). See infra note 361.
356. Engdahl, supra note 355.
357. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). Such legislation is
"in the nature of a contract" because a typical "contract" between the federal government and a
state government under a federal funding statute is formed by means of: (1) a state
implementation plan submitted to the federal government (the offer); and (2) federal approval
of that plan (the acceptance). The exchange involves a state promise to comply with federal law
and a federal promise to provide funding.
[20041
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obligations undertaken by federal funding recipients are "in the nature of a
contract" does not mean that those obligations lack the force of law. In
other words, the categories of legal obligation and contractual obligation are
not mutually exclusive.
A typical contract between the federal government and a federal
funding recipient includes three types of provisions. The first type of
provision is purely voluntary, in the sense that the contracting parties can
choose either to include it or omit it. Such provisions are entirely
contractual in nature. The second type of provision is inserted to fulfill a
statutory mandate. Spending Clause statutes (or federal regulations
promulgated to implement Spending Clause statutes) frequently include
provisions stipulating, in effect: "If you accept federal funding, then the
contract regulating the use of those funds must include the following
358provision. A clause that is included in a state plan to fulfill that type of
federal mandate is contractual, in the sense that the funding recipient is not
legally obligated to accept federal funding. However, such a clause is not
merely contractual; it is also legally binding, as a matter of federal law,
because a state plan that omitted the required provision would be in
violation of federal law.
The third type of "contract provision" is not actually included in any
written agreement. For example, suppose Congress enacts a statute that says:
"A state that accepts federal funding under this statute shall not penalize
anyone for the practice of midwifery."059 Georgia decides to accept funding
under the statute, but the state plan does not include a written midwifery
provision. A court might reasonably say that the federal midwifery provision
is an implied term of the contract between Georgia and the federal
government. But it is fallacious to claim that the implied contract term is
merely contractual and lacks the force of law. If, indeed, the midwifery
provision is an implied term of the contract, it is only because federal law
prohibits Georgia from imposing sanctions on individuals who practice
midwifery.360 The fact that the prohibition applies only to states that choose
358. For example, the Medicaid statute authorizes funding for "making payments to States
which have submitted, and had approved by the Secretary, State plans for medical assistance."
42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000). The state plans must comply with detailed federal statutory
requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a). Thus, the federal statutory requirements for the state
plans effectively dictate the terms of the contract between a state government and the federal
government.
359. This hypothetical statutory provision is a variant of an example that Professor Engdahl
uses. See Engdahl, supra note 355, at 77 (discussing a hypothetical federal statute that provides
funding for midwives).
360. This assumes that the hypothetical funding condition is a valid condition. In South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), the Supreme Court articulated four rather loose limits on
the Spending Power. First, "the exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of the
'general welfare.'" Id. at 207 (citations omitted). Second, "if Congress desires 'to condition the
States' receipt of federal funds, it 'must do so unambiguously.. . .'" Id. (citations omitted).
Third, "conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated 'to the federal
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to accept federal funding under the relevant statute does not detract from
its status as supreme federal law. Legislative bodies routinely draft
prohibitions that apply only to a specified class of persons. If a person can
choose to opt in or opt out of the class to which the prohibition applies, that
361does not transform the statutory prohibition into a contractual obligation.
In contrast to Professor Engdahl, neither Justice Scalia nor Justice
Thomas claims that Spending Clause statutes lack the status of federal law
under the Supremacy Clause. However, they both claim that the plaintiff in
Pharmaceutical Research lacked a private right of action to enforce the
Medicaid statute. Justice Scalia contends that termination of federal funding
is the exclusive remedy "for the State's failure to comply with the obligations
it has agreed to undertake under the Medicaid Act. ... 362 There are two
plausible interpretations of Justice Scalia's brief concurrence. He might be
interest in particular national projects or programs.'" Id (citations omitted). Fourth, "other
constitutional provisions may provide an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal
funds." Id. at 208. If Congress adopted the hypothetical midwifery funding condition in the
context of a federal program designed to promote low-cost, high-quality health care for
pregnant women, there is little doubt that the condition would survive constitutional scrutiny
under the Dole test.
361. Professor Engdahl might object that the preceding argument overlooks the crucial
distinction between ends that are within an enumerated power and ends that are not within any
enumerated power, which he calls "extraneous ends." See Engdahl, supra note 355, at 16-18.
Engdahl contends that Congress can use its Spending Power to achieve extraneous ends, but
Spending Clause legislation that is designed to achieve extraneous ends, and that is
unsupported by any other enumerated power, lacks the status of supreme federal law. See id, at
20-22. To hold otherwise, he claims, would vitiate the principle of enumerated powers because
Congress could use its Spending Power to circumvent the constitutional limits on its
enumerated powers.
Engdahl does an admirable job of presenting and defending his thesis, but his
argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, Engdahl's distinction between extraneous ends
and ends that are within an enumerated power is ultimately incoherent because it confuses the
categories of means and ends. There is no such thing as "an end within an enumerated power"
because a power is a means, not an end. Moreover, the phrase "end within an enumerated
power," in Engdahl's usage, does not mean "an end that can be accomplished by means of an
enumerated power" because he insists that Congress can use its enumerated powers to achieve
extraneous ends. Thus, the central distinction that he uses to frame his analysis makes no sense.
Second, Engdahl's argument is plagued by an internal contradiction because he
cannot decide whether the Spending Power is an enumerated power. His claim that Congress
can use the Spending Power to achieve extraneous ends presupposes that the Spending Power
is an enumerated power. But his claim that Spending Clause legislation lacks the status of
supreme federal law if it is beyond the scope of Congress's enumerated powers presupposes
that the Spending Power is not an enumerated power.
362. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. 1855, 1874 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Justice Scalia concedes that a private plaintiff might have a cause of action against
the Secretary of Health and Human Services under the Administrative Procedure Act if the
Secretary's refusal to terminate funding is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law." Id. at 1874 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (2000)). Even
so, his position is tantamount to the denial of any judicial remedy for private parties because
the Secretary has no legal obligation to terminate funding, even if a recipient fails to comply
with funding conditions.
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saying that Congress, when it enacted the Medicaid statute, implicitly
foreclosed the possibility of private suits against state officers by prescribing
"a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a
statutorily created right ....,,363 If that is what Justice Scalia intended, then
there is nothing particularly novel in his concurrence; he is simply applying
a rule that the Court articulated in Seminole Tribe and in Middlesex County
Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers to the particular circumstances of
the Medicaid statute. 64 The Sea Clammers-Seminole Tribe rule would not bar all
private remedies for violations of Spending Clause statutes. Rather, courts
would examine the remedial scheme associated with a particular statute to
365determine whether Congress intended to bar private remedies. This
approach has considerable merit.
However, Justice Scalia's concurrence does not cite either Sea Clammers
or Seminole Tribe. Instead, he cites Pennhurst66 and his concurring opinion in
Blessing.36 7 These citations suggest that Justice Scalia may be advancing a
broader thesis: termination of federal funding is the exclusive remedy in
every case where a state fails to comply with its obligations under a federal
funding statute. If that is Justice Scalia's position, then his concurring
opinion in Pharmaceutical Research does not articulate a supporting rationale.
Even so, one could construct a supporting rationale by referring to Justice
Scalia's concurring opinion in Blessing and to Justice Thomas's concurring
363. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996).
364. In Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1 (1981), the Court held that a private plaintiff cannot utilize
42 U.S.C. § 1983 to bring suit against a state officer for an alleged violation of a federal statute if
"the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive.., to
demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983." Id. at 20. In
Seminole Tribe, the Court held that, in cases where a private plaintiff seeks injunctive relief
against a state officer for an alleged violation of a federal statute, the plaintiff cannot invoke Ex
parte Young to overcome a sovereign immunity defense if the statute prescribes "a detailed
remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right." Seminole
Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74. Therefore, if a federal statute creates a sufficiently comprehensive
remedial scheme, Sea Clammers bars suits against state officers in their individual capacities
under § 1983 and Seminole Tribe bars suits against state officers in their official capacities under
Ex parte Young.
365. There are two variants of this rule, as applied to Shaw preemption claims. Under one
variant, courts would presume that private remedies are available for Shaw preemption claims,
unless Congress manifests a contrary intent. That is the Court's current approach to Shaw
preemption claims. Under the second variant, courts would presume that private remedies are
not available, unless Congress manifests a contrary intent. Justice Scalia might be suggesting
that courts should adopt a presumption against private remedies for Shaw preemption claims
based on Spending Clause statutes, even though they typically adopt a presumption in favor of
private remedies for Shaw preemption claims based on other statutes. However, Justice Scalia's
concurrence in Pharmaceutical Research does not present a coherent rationale for distinguishing
between Spending Clause statutes and other statutes.
366. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
367. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 349-50 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).
HeinOnline  -- 89 Iowa L. Rev. 425 2003-2004
89 IOWA LAWREVIEW
opinion in Pharmaceutical Research.36' The argument can be distilled to four
propositions: (1) Spending Clause legislation is "in the nature of a contract,"
where the federal government and state governments are the contracting
parties;369 (2) private beneficiaries of Spending Clause legislation are like
third-party beneficiaries of a contract;370 (3) the common law limits the right
of third party beneficiaries to sue to enforce a contract;3 7' (4) therefore,
third parties cannot sue to enforce Spending Clause legislation in the
372absence of a statutory right of action.
This argument is problematic because it begins with a premise that
obscures more than it clarifies. Granted, Spending Clause legislation is "in
the nature of a contract.3 7 3 Even so, one must still inquire whether
Spending Clause statutes are supreme federal law under the Supremacy
Clause. Justices Scalia and Thomas both stop short of the bold claim that
Spending Clause statutes lack the status of supreme federal law.374 But if
Spending Clause statutes are supreme federal law, then the third-party
beneficiary analogy is entirely beside the point. If Spending Clause statutes
are the "law of the land" under the Supremacy Clause, and if the Supremacy
Clause creates an implied right of action for Shaw preemption claims, then
there is no apparent reason why that Supremacy Clause right of action
should not apply to Shaw preemption claims in which the plaintiff alleges
that a state law is preempted by a Spending Clause statute.
7 5
368. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am., 123 S. Ct. 1855, 1878 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Part I.D of Justice Thomas's concurrence in Pharmaceutical Research closely tracks
Justice Scalia's concurrence in Blessing.
369. See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 349 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that a federal-state funding
agreement is "in the nature of a contract" (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17)); Pharm. Research,
123 S. Ct. at 1878 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that Spending Clause legislation is "in the
nature of a contract" (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17)).
370. See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 349 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("In contract law, when ... A
promises to pay B money, in exchange for which B promises to provide services to C... C is
called a third-party beneficiary."); Pharm. Research, 123 S. Ct. at 1878 (ThomasJ, concurring).
371. See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 349-50 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Until relatively recent times,
the third-party beneficiary... could not sue upon" a contract); Pharm. Research, 123 S. Ct. at
1878 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("In contract law, a third party to the contract... may only sue
for breach if he is the 'intended beneficiary' of the contract.").
372. See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 349-50 (Scalia, J., concurring); Pharm. Research, 123 S. Ct. at
1878 (ThomasJ, concurring).
373. SeePennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
374. See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 349 (Scalia, J., concurring); Pharm. Research, 123 S. Ct. at 1878
(Thomas,J, concurring).
375. The First Circuit opinion in Pharmaceutical Research highlights one significant
distinction between Spending Clause statutes and other statutes that bears on preemption
analysis. The First Circuit suggests that the doctrine of "field" preemption does not apply to "a
cooperative federal and state program," like Medicaid, that is enacted pursuant to the Spending
Power. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 74 n.6 (1st Cir. 2001). In
other words, Congress can use its Spending Power to preempt conflicting state law, but Congress
cannot use its Spending Power to "occupy a field" and displace non-conflicting state law. This
suggestion seems eminently reasonable. Note, though, that this distinction relates to substantive
(2004]
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VI. EXTENDING THE RIGHT OF ACTION TO CLAIMS
CHALLENGING STATE EXECUTIVE ACTION
Part VI proceeds from the assumption that the Supremacy Clause
creates an implied right of action for injunctive relief against state officers to
enjoin enforcement of state laws that are preempted by federal statutes
(Shaw preemption claims). Given that premise, Part VI considers whether
the right of action should be extended to include claims in which plaintiffs
seek to enjoin state executive action that allegedly violates federal statutes
(Shaw violation claims). The first section presents a policy justification for
extending the Shaw right of action to Shaw violation claims. The second
section analyzes two Shaw violation cases to illustrate the practical
implications of extending the right of action to Shaw violation claims.
A. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
1. Legislative Primacy
The principle of legislative primacy suggests that federal courts should
be at least as deferential to state legislative bodies as they are to state
executive officials. 76 Current judicial doctrine, which recognizes an implied
right of action for Shaw preemption claims but not Shaw violation claims,
3 7
achieves precisely the opposite result. The Supreme Court's tacit assumption
that the Supremacy Clause creates an implied right of action for Shaw
preemption claims ensures that federal courts address the merits of claims
for injunctive relief against state officers that challenge state legislative
action. However, the Court's apparent refusal to extend that right of action
to Shaw violation claims prevents federal courts from reaching the merits of
cases in which plaintiffs seek to enjoin state executive action that allegedly
violates a federal statute,s 78 even in cases where the executive action at issue
is functionally equivalent to a law. By shielding state executive action from
federal judicial review, current doctrine provides a perverse incentive for
states to codify rules in the form of executive policies, rather than laws.
Crosby provides an excellent example.3 79 As previously discussed, in
Crosby the Supreme Court held that federal law preempted a Massachusetts
preemption analysis; it does not affect the remedial mechanisms plaintiffs utilize to bring
preemption claims.
376. I borrow the term "legislative primacy" from Professor Purcell. See EDWARD A.
PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: EmRE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND
THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 165-68 (2000)
(contending that Brandeis believed in the constitutional primacy of the legislature).
377. See supra notes 45-76 and accompanying text.
378. More specifically, courts will reach the merits in cases where plaintiffs have a right of
action under § 1983, or under the statute that was allegedly violated, but not in other cases. See
supra notes 58-76 and accompanying text.
379. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
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law that barred government procurement of goods and services from
companies doing business with Burma. ss° Suppose that the Governor of
Massachusetts responded to the Supreme Court decision by adopting an
executive policy barring government procurement of goods and services
from companies that do business with Burma. The executive policy would
have precisely the same effect as the Massachusetts law that the Supreme
Court held to be invalid."' But if the Crosby plaintiff filed suit in federal
court to enjoin enforcement of the Governor's policy, and if the Court
declined to extend the Supremacy Clause right of action to a claim
challenging state executive action, then the plaintiffs claim would have to
be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted"
3 2
because the plaintiff would not have a private cause of action under § 1983
or under the federal Burma statute. 3 Ajudicial doctrine that produces such
bizarre results is seriously flawed.
Granted, the plaintiff in this hypothetical case could still bring a claim
in state court, or the federal government could sue to enjoin enforcement of
the state policy. However, a state law remedy is particularly unsuitable to
384address a case where a state governor blatantly disregards federal law. An
enforcement action by the federal government would be a more suitable
remedy. Even so, a remedial system that permits private suits to enjoin state
legislative action, but requires private individuals to enlist the aid of the
Justice Department to enjoin state executive action, is at odds with the
principle of legislative primacy.
380. See id. at 366.
381. See 1996 Mass. Acts 239, ch. 130 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS §§ 7:22G-7:22M, 40F
1/2 (1997)).
382. FED.R.Ctv.P. 12(b)(6).
383. See supra notes 230-46 and accompanying text.
384. Consider, for example, United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225
(1969). In that case, after reciting the history of its decision in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954), the Court noted:
The record shows that neither Montgomery County nor any other area in Alabama
voluntarily took any effective steps to integrate the public schools for about 10
years after our Brown I opinion. In fact the record makes clear that that state
government and its school officials attempted in every way possible to continue the
dual system of racially segregated schools in defiance of our repeated unanimous
holdings that such a system violated the United States Constitution....
Consequently, if Negro children of school age were to receive their constitutional
rights as we had declared them to exist, the coercive assistance of courts was
imperatively called for.
Montgomery County Bd., 395 U.S. at 228. For obvious reasons, an effective remedy required the
coercive assistance of federal courts, not state courts.
[2004]
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2. Preemption
Current doctrine, which assumes a right of action under the Supremacy
Clause for Shaw preemption claims but not Shaw violation claims, may be
founded in part upon a misunderstanding of the concept of preemption
that is embodied in the text of the Supremacy Clause. The Supremacy
Clause, among other things, codifies a hierarchical principle: federal law
ranks higher than state law in the constitutional hierarchy of legal rules. 385
Therefore, whenever there is a conflict between state and federal law,
federal law preempts state law.
Of course, state law has its own hierarchy of legal rules. A state
constitution ranks higher than a state statute; a state statute ranks higher
than state common law; and, most importantly, a state statute ranks higher
than a legal rule embodied in a state executive policy. Since federal law
ranks higher than state statutes (as a matter of federal law), and state
statutes rank higher than state policies (as a matter of state law), it follows
that federal law ranks higher than state policies. Therefore, in the event of a
conflict between a federal law and a state policy, federal law preempts the
state policy. In short, the concept of preemption applies not only to conflicts
between federal law and state legislative action, but also to conflicts between
federal law and state executive action, at least insofar as state executive
• 386
action codifies a legal rule.
One might object that federal law cannot preempt state policies
because preemption doctrine is rooted in the Supremacy Clause, and the
text of the Supremacy Clause refers only to state constitutions and laws, not
387
state policies. However, the Supreme Court has applied the Supremacy
Clause to federal preemption claims challenging state administrative
• 38838
regulations, state common law, 9 and adjudicative orders issued by state
385. Professor Nelson refers to this as a "rule of priority." See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86
VA. L. REv. 225, 250-54 (2000). In his view, the Supremacy Clause also establishes a "rule of
applicability" and a "rule of construction." See id. at 245-60.
386. For detailed discussion of legal rules created by non-legislative bodies, see KENNETH
CULP DAVIS & RICHARDJ. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 6.1, 6.2 (3d ed. 1994 &
Supp. 2000).
387. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (providing that judges are bound by federal law, "any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding").
388. See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) (holding that federal statutes
preempt regulations promulgated by Washington Office of Marine Safety pertaining to oil
tanker design, reporting, and operating requirements); Anderson v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 143
(1995) (holding that federal statute does not preempt California Department of Social Services
regulation concerning benefits under Aid to Families with Dependent Children).
389. See, e.g., Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002) (holding that Federal Boat
Safety Act did not preempt state common law tort action seeking damages from manufacturer
of outboard motor); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (holding that federal
standard promulgated by Department of Transportation under National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act preempts common law tort action against auto manufacturer).
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administrative agencies. The Supreme Court has even applied preemption
doctrine to a claim alleging a conflict between a federal statute and a
specific provision of a contract between a state agency and a private
contractor. 39' If the phrase "or Laws" in the Supremacy Clause is broad
enough to encompass all these non-statutory legal rules, then it is surely
broad enough to include legal rules embodied in state executive policies.
3. Setting Intelligent Limits
Assuming that there is an implied right of action under the Supremacy
Clause for claims against state officers, it is important to establish clear limits
on the scope of that implied right of action. Indeed, without clear limits,
judicial creation of a Supremacy Clause right of action would be inconsistent
with the principle of legislative primacy because a key corollary of the
principle of legislative primacy is the notion that Congress, not the courts,
392has primary responsibility for crafting remedies for statutory violations.
Consider three possible options for limiting the scope of the Supremacy
Clause right of action. The first option is to limit the scope of the right of
action by excluding claims challenging state executive action. This is
essentially current doctrine. A possible explanation for this option is that
executive action tends to be ad hoc, rather than systemic, whereas the policy
objective underlying the Supremacy Clause right of action is to ensure the
availability of a remedy for systemic violations. Although this is a plausible
explanation for the current state of judicial doctrine, it is not a persuasive
justification. As noted above, the distinction between legislative and
executive action is a poor proxy for the distinction between ad hoc and
systemic violations.39 3 Even if a state legislature has not enacted a law that
conflicts with a federal statute, the state executive might adopt a policy that
conflicts with (and is therefore preempted by) the statute. Consistent
implementation of a state policy that is preempted by a federal statute yields
systemic violations of federal law by state officers. By limiting the Supremacy
Clause right of action to claims challenging state legislative action and
excluding claims challenging state executive action, current doctrine fails to
address an entire class of cases involving systemic violations of federal law by
state officers.
390. See, e.g., Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635 (2002) (holding
that district court had jurisdiction to adjudicate preemption claim challenging adjudicatory
order issued by state administrative agency); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New
Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989) (holding that it was error for lower court to abstain from
adjudicating preemption claim challenging local regulatory order issued by City of New
Orleans).
391. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors, 507 U.S. 218
(1993).
392. See, e.g., TransAmerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16, 19 (1979);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979).
393. See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
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A second option recognizes that the Shaw right of action is a doctrinal
descendant of Ex parte Young. Since the Young doctrine applies only to
claims for prospective relief to address on-going and/or threatened
violations, 95 the Shaw right of action (i.e., an implied right of action under
the Supremacy Clause) should also apply only to claims for prospective relief
to address on-going and/or threatened violations. By distinguishing between
completed violations and ongoing or threatened violations, and by limiting a
Supremacy Clause right of action to claims alleging ongoing and/or
threatened violations, the Court would effectively preclude use of a
Supremacy Clause remedy to address ad hoc violations. At the same time,
though, the Court would ensure the availability of a constitutional remedy
that addresses all systemic violations of federal statutes by state officers.
The main advantage of the second option is that it addresses all
systemic violations of federal statutes by state and local government officers.
However, precisely because of its broad scope, the second option also raises
the specter of excessive interference by the federal judiciary in state
executive action.396 To minimize those concerns, the Court might wish to
consider a third option. That option would build on the current distinction
between "preemption claims" and "violation claims" but expand the concept
of preemption to encompass claims challenging legal rules promulgated by
state executive branch officials. Under this approach, if the state executive
action at issue does not codify a "legal rule," then the concept of preemption
is inapplicable, and a Supremacy Clause remedy would not be available.
However, if the state action being challenged establishes a "legal rule," then
the concept of preemption applies-regardless of whether the state action is
characterized as legislative, executive, administrative, or judicial-and a
Supremacy Clause remedy for prospective injunctive relief is potentially
available. 397 This approach is consistent with the preceding interpretation of
394. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
395. SeeEdelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-71 (1974).
396. The problem of federal judicial interference with state executive action is twofold.
First, separation of powers principles suggest that judicial intervention is not appropriate in
cases where an executive officer has made a tentative, non-final decision, or where he is acting
within the limits of his discretionary authority. Accordingly, federal judicial review of federal
administrative action is generally available only for "final agency action." 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000).
Moreover, judicial review is precluded if agency action is "committed to agency discretion by
law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2000). There are sound reasons for imposing similar limits on
federal judicial review of state executive action.
Additionally, federal judicial review of state executive action raises federalism issues, as well as
separation of powers issues. States arguably have a sovereignty interest in avoiding excessive
federal judicial oversight of state executive programs. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,
741-42 (1974) (reversing award of injunctive relief in school desegregation case, in part
because of the "deeply rooted" tradition of "local control over the operation of schools").
397. To flesh out the details of this approach, one could draw on a large body of federal
administrative law in which courts have analyzed the question of when action by a federal
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the Supremacy Clause, which emphasized that the Clause establishes a
hierarchical relationship between federal law and state "legal rules,"
198including legal rules promulgated by non-legislative bodies.
The third option is problematic, though, because state officers
sometimes engage in systemic violations of federal law without promulgating
"legal rules" in any form-legislative, executive, administrative, or judicial.
Indeed, there are many cases in which plaintiffs allege a "pattern or
practice" of executive branch activity that systematically violates federal
law.3 99 Systemic violations of federal law by state officers threaten the
supremacy of federal law, and undermine the goal of keeping government
within the bounds of law, regardless of whether the officer is acting pursuant
to a "rule" of state law. Given that the purpose of an implied right of action
under the Supremacy Clause is to protect federal supremacy and promote
the rule of law, a Supremacy Clause right of action that is limited to claims
challenging state "legal rules" would arguably be excessively narrow because
it would not reach claims alleging a "pattern or practice" of executive
branch activity.
Thus, there is a trade-off between the second and third options. The
third option minimizes the risks of federal judicial interference with state
executive action by limiting the Supremacy Clause right of action to claims
challenging "legal rules" promulgated by state actors. 400 The chief
disadvantage of this option is that some systemic violations of federal statutes
by state officers-violations involving a "pattern or practice" that does not
constitute a "legal rule"-would be beyond the scope of the Supremacy
Clause remedy. The main advantage of the second option is that it provides
a comprehensive remedy for all systemic violations of federal statutes by state
officers. However, the second option imposes fewer constraints on federal
judicial interference with state executive action.4°'
In my judgment, the second option is preferable. The Supreme Court
should hold explicitly that the Supremacy Clause creates an implied right of
administrative agency creates a "rule" that is subject to judicial review. DAVIS & PIERCE, supra
note 386, §§ 6.1, 6.2.
398. See supra notes 385-91 and accompanying text.
399. See, e.g., Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997). For a fuller discussion of Blessing,
see infra notes 421-47 and accompanying text.
400. The second option gives federal district courts fairly broad discretion to determine, on
a case-by-case basis, whether equitable relief is appropriate. In contrast, the third option limits
that discretion by precluding equitable relief in cases where plaintiffs sue to enjoin state
executive action that is not codified in some sort of "legal rule." Thus, the third option
minimizes interference with state executive action by limiting the discretion of federal district
courts.
401. Another potential criticism of the second option is that the argument in favor of the
second option largely ignores the fact that one of the policy objectives at stake in Shaw
preemption cases is to provide individuals notice of the legal consequences of their actions.
That objective is not implicated by state government action unless the action is manifested in
some legal "rule."
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action for all claims that fall within the scope of the Ex parte Young exception
to sovereign immunity: i.e., all claims in which plaintiffs seek prospective
relief to remedy an ongoing or threatened violation of federal law by state or
local officers. However, the Court should instruct the federal judiciary to
make wise use of its equitable discretion, on a case-by-case basis, to fashion
equitable remedies for systemic violations of federal law, while avoiding
excessive interference with state executive action.4° ' The next section
analyzes two specific cases to illustrate the application of this general
approach.
B. SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS
Broadly speaking, systematic violations of federal statutes by state
executive officials come in two forms: (1) official policies that establish a
legal rule; and (2) a "pattern or practice" of activity that is not based upon
any official policy or legal rule. This section analyzes one case of each type to
illustrate the application of the principles discussed above.
1. Alexander v. Sandoval
In the early 1990s, the Alabama Department of Public Safety adopted an
official policy of administering driver's license examinations only in
103English. The policy effectively established a legal rule: any applicant who
wishes to obtain a driver's license in Alabama must take the exam in
English.4 °4 Martha Sandoval filed a class action in federal court on behalf of
"all present and future legal residents of Alabama who have been or may be
denied the opportunity to obtain a driver's license in the state because of
their inability to speak or read English fluently."40 5 Ms. Sandoval raised both
an intentional discrimination claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, and
406
a disparate impact claim under Title VI and its implementing regulations.
402. One might object that a case-by-case approach is undesirable because it would
replicate the problems associated with the courts' inconsistent treatment of Shaw violation
claims and Shaw preemption claims. That objection misses its mark. Under the approach
recommended here, the Supreme Court would recognize a Supremacy Clause right of action
that applies to all Shaw claims, including violation claims as well as preemption claims. The case-
by-case approach would not limit that right of action. Rather, it would give district courts
flexibility in fashioning appropriate remedies in individual cases.
403. Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1243-44 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
404. In fact, the complaint in Sandoval characterizes the policy as a rule. See Complaint, 11
10-12, Sandoval (No. 96-D-1875-N) (on file with author).
405. Id. 7 (on file with author).
406. Id. 1 23-25 (on file with author). The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only
intentional discrimination. Similarly, section 601 of Title VI reaches only intentional
discrimination. However, regulations promulgated under section 602 of Title VI also prohibit
state actions that have a disproportionate adverse impact on protected groups, regardless of
whether those actions are motivated by a discriminatory purpose. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532
U.S. 275, 279-82 (2001).
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She sought declaratory and injunctive relief,4 7 naming as defendants the
Alabama Department of Public Safety and its director.
40 8
The District Court granted the defendants' motion for judgment as a
matter of law on the intentional discrimination claim.40 9 However, the court
ruled in favor of the plaintiff class on the disparate impact claim, declaring
"that the Department's English-Only Policy violates Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.",41 The court permanently enjoined the department and
its director from enforcing the policy. 41' On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit,
the defendants argued that there was neither an express nor an implied
private cause of action for the plaintiffs to enforce the disparate impact
regulations promulgated under § 602 of Title VI.412 The court of appeals
disagreed, holding that "an implied private cause of action exists under
section 602 of Title VI." 41 3 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
judgment on the merits and sustained the award of declaratory and
injunctive relief.41
4
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether there is a
private cause of action to enforce disparate impact regulations promulgated
under Title VI. 4 5 The Court concluded that the plaintiff class in Sandoval
416lacked a private right of action to pursue its disparate impact claim.
Therefore, notwithstanding the lower courts' uncontested holding that the
Alabama policy violated federal regulations,41 7 the Supreme Court reversed
the Eleventh Circuit's judgment, thereby dissolving the injunction, and
effectively authorizing Alabama to resume implementation of its
(presumably) illegal policy.
The Court invoked separation of powers principles in support of its
decision, claiming that "private rights of action to enforce federal law must
be created by Congress. 4 's But the Court has never permitted this
407. Complaint, Prayer for Relief, Alexander (No. 99-1908) (on file with author).
408. Id. 5, 6 (on file with author).
409. Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 489 (11 th Cir. 1999).
410. Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1315 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
411. Id.
412. See Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 502 (1 1th Cir. 1999). Defendants also argued that
the suit was barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that the English-only policy did not violate
Title VI. See id. at 492-501, 507-11.
413. Idat507.
414. Id. at 511.
415. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 278 (2001).
416. Id. at 292-93.
417. On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, the defendants did challenge the trial court's
holding that the Alabama policy violated federal regulations. See Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d
484, 507-11 (11th Cir. 1999). However, in their Supreme Court brief, the defendants focused
exclusively on the private cause of action issue and did not contest the merits. See Petitioner's
Brief, Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (No. 99-1908).
418. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286.
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separation of powers principle to impede judicial creation of private rights
of action on behalf of plaintiffs who seek to enjoin enforcement of state laws
that are allegedly preempted by federal statutes or regulations. 419 And the
Court failed to explain why the judicially created private cause of action that
it consistently applies in Shaw preemption cases should not also apply to
cases where plaintiffs sue to enjoin enforcement of state policies that are
preempted by federal statutes or regulations.42 °
Assuming that the Alabama policy does violate federal law, the Supreme
Court's decision undermines the supremacy of federal law and subverts the
rule of law by tacitly endorsing an ongoing violation of federal law by state
officers. Alabama cannot claim a legitimate state sovereignty interest in
being able to implement its policy because the policy is (presumably) illegal.
Moreover, a federal injunction barring implementation of the policy is not
an unwarranted intrusion into the realm of executive discretion - again,
because the policy is illegal. In short, assuming that the policy actually does
violate federal law, there is no good reason to refrain from granting an
injunction to prevent implementation of the policy.
Sandoval also illustrates a broader point. If the Court recognizes an
implied right of action under the Supremacy Clause for Shaw preemption
claims, there is no persuasive argument against extending that right of
action to encompass claims, like Sandoval, alleging that an official executive
policy violates, or is preempted by, a federal statute or regulation. Even
under the third option discussed above, which would extend the Shaw right
of action only to cases in which plaintiffs challenge a "legal rule," the
plaintiffs in Sandoval would have a private right of action under the
Supremacy Clause because the policy at issue in Sandoval created a legal rule
that allegedly conflicted with federal law.
2. Blessing v. Freestone
In Blessing, a group of mothers sued the director of Arizona's child
support agency under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.42 ' The complaint alleged that
Arizona's systemic failure to assist with the collection of child support from
"deadbeat dads" violated various provisions of Title IV-D of the Social
422Security Act and its implementing regulations. The complaint did not
allege that Arizona had an official policy of refusing to collect child support.
Rather, the complaint alleged a systemic "pattern or practice" of failing to
419. See supra Part IV.
420. The policy is "preempted" because it establishes a "legal rule" that driver's license
applicants must take the exam in English, and the lower courts found that that legal rule
conflicted with federal regulations prohibiting state actions that have a disproportionate
adverse impact on protected groups.
421. See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 332-33 (1997).
422. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Freestone v. Cowan, 68 F.3d 1141
(9th Cir. 1995) (No. 93-16697) [hereinafter Blessing Complaint] (on file with author).
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comply with federal requirements. The Ninth Circuit summarized the
complaint succinctly as follows: "The stories told by the five named plaintiffs
document a range of administrative abuses extending from simple
incompetence and bureaucratic bungling to shockingly callous
indifference."423 Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to remedy
the alleged violations.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant,
holding that § 1983 did not provide a cause of action for private
enforcement of Title IV-D.424 The Ninth Circuit reversed, but the Supreme
Court agreed with the district court, holding that plaintiffs could not bring
their claim under § 1983 because "Title IV-D does not give individuals a
federal right to force a state agency to substantially comply with Title IV-
D."425 Unfortunately for potential Shaw plaintiffs, the Supreme Court
reached the right result for the wrong reasons. Analysis of the Court's
opinion illustrates both the intellectual poverty of the Court's current
approach, and the proper application of the framework proposed herein.
Title IV-D authorizes appropriations "[f] or the purpose of enforcing the
support obligations owed by absent parents to their children.., and
assuring that assistance in obtaining support will be available under this part
to all children.. . for whom such assistance is requested. ' 4 26 The statute
directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services to "establish such
standards for State programs for locating absent parents, establishing
paternity, and obtaining child support... as he determines to be necessary
to assure that such programs will be effective." 4 27 Pursuant to this statutory
authorization, the Secretary promulgated detailed regulations that establish
comprehensive federal standards for State child support enforcement
428programs.
The Supreme Court's analysis of whether the plaintiffs had a "federal
right" under Title IV-D began by identifying three factors that determine
"whether a particular statutory provision gives rise to a federal right." 421 One
factor is that "Congress must have intended that the provision in question
benefit the plaintiff."4' ° The Court relied expressly on this "intended
beneficiary" factor to justify its holding. Specifically, the Court said: "[T] he
423. Freestone v. Cowan, 68 F.3d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 1995).
424. See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 338.
425. Id. at 333.
426. 42 U.S.C. § 651 (2000).
427. 42 U.S.C. § 652(a)(1) (2000).
428. See 45 C.F.R. pts. 301-307 (1993). All citations in this section to the Code of Federal
Regulations are to the 1993 version, because the Blessing complaint was filed in 1993.
429. Blessingv. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997).
430. Id. The other two factors are that the asserted right "is not so vague and amorphous
that its enforcement would strain judicial competence," and that "the statute must
unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States." Id. at 340-41.
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requirement that a State operate its child support program in 'substantial
compliance' with Title IV-D was not intended to benefit individual children
and custodial parents, and therefore does not constitute a federal right."43'
This statement is astonishing because the statute says explicitly that it is
intended to benefit individual children and custodial parents.4 2
The Court's conclusion can be partially explained by its distinction
between specific statutory requirements, which might "give rise to individual
rights,"433 and the more generalized requirement for a state to achieve
"substantial compliance" with Title IV-D, which the Court says does not
create individual rights. Indeed, the Court's rationale is based on the
premise that the plaintiffs merely alleged violations of "Title IV-D as an
undifferentiated whole" but failed "to identify with particularity the rights
they claimed." 4M In fact, though, this premise is demonstrably false. The
complaint alleged systemic violations of eleven specific provisions of the
Code of Federal Regulations,435 including, inter alia, a regular and consistent
failure to:
* "establish a system for and carry out periodic reviews of low
priority or inactive cases at least annually or on receipt of new
information, as required by 45 C.F.R. §303.10(B) (6)';436
* "immediately repeat attempts to locate absent parents whenever
new information becomes available and to repeat location
attempts at least quarterly, even if no new information is
available, as required by 45 C.F.R. §303.3(B) (5)";437
431. Id. at 343.
432. See 42 U.S.C. § 651 (2000) (stating that the statute is enacted "[flor the purpose of
enforcing the support obligations owed by absent parents to their children and the spouse (or
former spouse) with whom such children are living").
433. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 345 ("We do not foreclose the possibility that some provisions of
Title IV-D give rise to individual rights.").
434. Id. at 342. The court stated:
It was incumbent upon respondents to identify with particularity the rights they
claimed, since it is impossible to determine whether Title IV-D, as an
undifferentiated whole, gives rise to undefined "rights." Only when the complaint
is broken down into manageable analytic bites can a court ascertain whether each
separate claim satisfies the various criteria we have set forth for determining
whether a federal statute creates rights.
Id
435. Blessing Complaint, supra note 422, 1 143.
436. Id., 143(a). See 45 C.F.R. § 303.10(b) (6) (1993).
437. BlessingComplaint, supra note 422, 143(c). See 45 C.F.R. § 303.3(b) (5) (1993).
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" "file actions for paternity determinations or complete service of
process to establish paternity within ninety days of locating
putative fathers, as required by 45 C.F.R. §303.5(a) (1) ",;438
* "take appropriate action pursuant to state law to enforce child
support obligations that have become delinquent, as required
by 45 C.F.R. §§ 305.26 and 303.6";4 31
* "maintain sufficient staff, including attorneys, to adequately
represent [the State] in court with respect to the establishment
and enforcement of support orders, and to provide an effective
program of child support services, as required by 45 C.F.R.
§303.20(F)."44'
Given that the plaintiffs alleged specific violations of specific regulatory
provisions, why did the Court treat plaintiffs' claim as a generalized
allegation that Arizona had failed to achieve substantial compliance with
Title IV-D? And given that the express purpose of Title IV-D and its
implementing regulations is to benefit mothers and children, like the
plaintiffs in Blessing, who need governmental assistance in collecting child
support from "deadbeat dads," why did the Court conclude that "Title V-D
was not intended to benefit individual children and custodial parents"?44 '
One possible explanation is that the Court is hostile towards civil rights
plaintiffs. While that may be true as a general matter, there is no reason to
believe that the Court's conservative majority has an interest in protecting
deadbeat dads from child support enforcement efforts. Rather, the best
explanation for Blessing is that the Court was justifiably reluctant to issue a
mandatory injunction that would have required the district court to oversee
virtually every aspect of Arizona's child support collection program.44 If
there was evidence to suggest that the Director of Arizona's Department of
Economic Security was purposefully violating federal law, then the Blessing
plaintiffs might have had a plausible claim for a mandatory injunction.
However, careful reading of the complaint and the Ninth Circuit opinion
indicates that the defendants' violations of federal law were primarily
• 443
attributable to bureaucratic incompetence. In light of traditional
438. BlessingComplaint, supra note 422, 143(d). See 45 C.F.R. § 303.5(a) (1) (1993).
439. BlessingComplaint, supra note 422, 143(j). See 45 C.F.R. §§ 305.26, 303.6(c) (1993).
440. BlessingComplaint, supra note 422, 1 143(k). See 45 C.F.R. § 303.20(f) (1993).
441. Blessingv. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 343 (1997).
442. The Ninth Circuit did not actually award injunctive relief; it remanded the case for the
district court to consider the appropriate remedy. See Freestone v. Cowan, 68 F.3d 1141, 1156
(9th Cir. 1995), vacated, 520 U.S. 329 (1997). However, the complaint sought a permanent
injunction "requiring affirmative measures sufficient to achieve as well as sustain substantial
compliance with federal law, throughout all programmatic operations at issue." Blessing
Complaint, supra note 422, Prayer for Relief.
443. See Blessing Complaint, supra note 422; Freestone, 68 F.3d at 1156.
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equitable doctrines related to the distinction between mandatory and
• • • 444
prohibitory injunctions, the Supreme Court might well have concluded
that a mandatory injunction would have been overly intrusive, and ultimately
ineffective as a remedy for bureaucratic incompetence. Indeed, the
Court's analysis would have been far more persuasive if it had confronted
directly the problems associated with issuance of a mandatory injunction,
rather than misrepresenting the allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint, and
pretending that Title IV-D was not intended to benefit the very people for
whose benefit the statute was enacted.
Blessing helps illuminate the difference between the two options
discussed above for extending the Shaw right of action to address systemic
violations of federal statutes by state executive officers. 446 If the Shaw right of
action applied only to claims challenging legal rules, then the Blessing
plaintiffs would not have had a private right of action because the
defendants were not acting pursuant to any official policy or legal rule. If, on
the other hand, the Shaw right of action encompassed all claims for
prospective relief to remedy ongoing violations of federal law, the Blessing
plaintiffs would have had an implied right of action under the Supremacy
Clause. Under the latter approach, though, the decision whether to grant
injunctive relief in any given case would necessarily be guided by traditional
principles of equitable discretion.447 Thus, the Court in Blessing could have
held that the plaintiffs had a right of action under the Supremacy Clause,
but that they were not entitled to injunctive relief for the reasons noted
above.
One key advantage of the broader right of action is that it would yield
more transparent judicial decision-making. A ruling in favor of the
defendant in Blessing based on the fact that the defendant was not acting
pursuant to an "official policy" or "legal rule" would not address the real
reasons for reluctance to grant injunctive relief. In contrast, if the Court
held that a Supremacy Clause right of action extended to all claims for
444. See DOBBS, supra note 187, at 163-64 (noting that "courts may be reluctant to award a
mandatory injunction because it may be especially intrusive, or more difficult to supervise and
enforce.")
445. Although the Blessing plaintiffs had a weak claim for injunctive relief, they had a
stronger claim for declaratory relief. A judicial declaration identifying specific violations of
specific federal regulatory provisions would have increased pressure on Arizona's child support
agency to improve its performance, without requiring the district court to supervise the details
of the program. It might also have sent a useful signal to the Department of Health and Human
Services to play a more active role in overseeing implementation of Arizona's child support
collection program.
446. See supra notes 394-402 and accompanying text.
447. Even Justice Scalia, who expresses a consistent preference for rules over standards, has
invoked traditional equity jurisprudence to support remedial discretion for judges in shaping
appropriate equitable relief. See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 380-83
(1992) (affirming in part, and reversing in part, an injunction directed at the Attorney General
of Texas).
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prospective relief to remedy ongoing violations of federal law, and directed
the lower courts to apply traditional principles of equitable discretion, the
lower courts in Blessing would have been forced to confront directly the
difficult remedial issues raised by plaintiffs' complaint, rather than relying
on empty formalism to dodge the issues.
Moreover, if the facts in Blessing were slightly different-in particular, if
there was evidence of willful refusal to comply with federal law-the case for
injunctive relief would be more compelling. A broad right of action, limited
by principles of equitable discretion, would enable courts to deal effectively
with that type of situation. In contrast, a narrower right of action, limited
only to claims challenging "legal rules," would preclude courts from
granting relief even in meritorious cases.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated that the Supreme Court applies two very
different private right of action doctrines in cases where plaintiffs sue to
enjoin state action that allegedly conflicts with federal statutes. In cases
where plaintiffs sue to enjoin enforcement of a state law that is allegedly
preempted by a federal statute (Shaw preemption cases), the Court tacitly
assumes that plaintiffs have an implied right of action under the Supremacy
Clause. But in cases where plaintiffs sue to enjoin state executive action that
allegedly violates a federal statute (Shaw violation cases), the Court does not
address the merits of the claim unless plaintiffs can establish a statutory
cause of action. The current doctrinal framework is irrational because it
creates a perverse incentive for states to de-codify laws to evade federal
judicial review.
The Supreme Court's ultimate resolution of the doctrinal tension
between Shaw preemption claims and Shaw violation claims has significant
theoretical and practical implications. From a theoretical standpoint, the
contrast between the Court's treatment of Shaw preemption claims and Shaw
violation claims can be viewed as a manifestation of the Court's tendency to
oscillate between what Professor Fallon has called the "federalist" and
448
"nationalist" models of judicial federalism. In essence, the Court applies a
nationalist model in Shaw preemption cases and a federalist model in Shaw
violation cases. The Court might take a further step in the federalist
direction by rejecting a Supremacy Clause right of action for Shaw
preemption claims. In that case, a large class of federal preemption disputes
that are currently litigated in federal court would be relegated to state court.
However, the Court might also endorse a Supremacy Clause right of action
and extend it to Shaw violation claims. The latter option would provide an
important nationalist counterweight to the recent federalist revival.
448. See Fallon, supra note 340, at 1151-64.
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From a practical standpoint, the fault line between Shaw preemption
claims and Shaw violation claims introduces litigation opportunities for both
plaintiffs and defendants. Although the Supreme Court has resolved any
lingering doubts as to whether federal courts have jurisdiction over Shaw
preemption claims, 449 defendants can still move to dismiss such claims on
the grounds that plaintiffs lack a valid federal cause of action. If defendants
litigate this issue, then in cases where plaintiffs do not have a private right of
action under the preemptive federal statute or under § 1983, courts will be
forced to decide whether to recognize an implied right of action under the
Supremacy Clause for Shaw preemption claims.
The doctrinal fault line between Shaw preemption claims and Shaw
violation claims also presents litigation opportunities for plaintiffs. In cases
where private plaintiffs sue to enjoin state action that conflicts with federal
statutes, federal courts are more likely to reach the merits of claims if
plaintiffs use the word "preemption," rather than "violation," to describe the
450
conflict between the federal statute and the challenged state action.
Therefore, plaintiffs who seek to enjoin state executive action that allegedly
conflicts with federal statutes would be wise to make greater use of the
preemption" label.4 If plaintiffs do so, then courts will be forced to decide
whether to extend a Supremacy Clause right of action to Shaw violation
claims.
The Supreme Court should hold explicitly that the Supremacy Clause
creates a private right of action not only for Shaw preemption claims, but
also for Shaw violation claims. In abstract terms, such a right of action is
necessary to promote important rule of law and federal supremacy values. In
more concrete terms, explicit recognition of a Supremacy Clause right of
action for Shaw violation claims would enable civil rights plaintiffs to obtain
injunctive relief against state officers without having to rely on § 1983 or
other civil rights statutes to establish a private right of action. Given that
recent cases such as Alexander v. Sandova ?
52 and Gonzaga University v. Doe45 3
have limited the availability of statutory rights of action for civil rights
plaintiffs, a constitutional right of action under the Supremacy Clause is
necessary to prevent systemic violations of federal statutes by state officers.
449. SeeVerizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 642 (2002).
450. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
451. The "preemption" label may not be applicable to cases like Blessing v. Freestone, 520
U.S. 329 (1997), where plaintiffs challenge a "pattern or practice" of executive branch activity.
See supra notes 421-47 and accompanying text. But the "preemption" label is applicable to cases
like Alexander v. Sandoval 532 U.S. 275 (2001), where plaintiffs challenge an executive branch
policy that is functionally equivalent to a law. See supra notes 403-20 and accompanying text.
452. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
453. 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
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